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University of Sussex 
Madlen Rabadi 
Doctor of Philosophy in EU-Middle East International Relations 
To What Extent has the ‘Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean’ been 
Economically Beneficial to Jordan? 
Summary 
The Jordanian government had high expectations for its Association Agreement (AA) 
with the European Union (EU), hoping it would lead to increased exports to the EU, 
although the private sector feared competition from European industries (Abu Dalbouh, 
2005, pp. 142–143). The early 1990s were politically and economically challenging to 
Jordan. The AA, which entered into force in 2002 following the Barcelona Process, 
stipulated the establishment of comprehensive partnerships and prosperity for the Euro-
Mediterranean area (EEAS, 1995). 
This thesis attempts to answer the following question: To what extent has the ‘Barcelona 
Process: Union for the Mediterranean’ been economically beneficial to Jordan? 
It is necessary to examine EU-Jordanian trade relations both within and outside the scope 
of the Barcelona Process from 1995 until 2012. First, this study will set the theoretical 
framework for the thesis, then examine the Jordanian political economy that led to the 
signing of the AA. The actual negotiations that led to the AA will be analysed using 
components of non-cooperative negotiating theory to shed light on the division of power 
among the parties (Jordan and the EU). The agreement will subsequently be tested using 
ex-ante and ex-post-free trade agreement (FTA) assessment models to determine the most 
potentially advantageous outcomes versus the actual outcomes.  
The action plans contain the annual expectations of Jordan’s implementation of the points 
stipulated in the AA. To measure the tangible successes of the action plans, they have 
been analysed using enterprise charter indicators, as developed by the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development. 
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The findings show that the AA, though it did not fully reach the economic benefits 
potential that Jordan had hoped for, led Jordan to fulfil its globalization goals and to end 
its economic and political isolation caused by the Gulf War, as well as to diversify its 
trading partners.  
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Introduction to the Research  
  
 
The King of Jordan, Hussein bin Talal (1996), in his speech addressing the Jordanian 
Parliament, declared that in an effort to enhance the economy of Jordan regionally and 
globally, and to continue in the open market economy, there would be negotiations with 
the European Union (EU) for an Association Agreement (AA), and that it would increase 
Jordan’s capability and competitiveness in the world economy. Prince Hassan (1997), 
when addressing the Chamber of Commerce in its annual meeting in 1997, pointed out 
that the agreement set to be signed with the EU would open new horizons for cooperation 
between Jordan and the EU, and it would benefit both parties. Mr. Outhman Budair (Al 
Rai, 2002), president of the Amman Chamber of Industry, said that the AA with the EU 
would enhance economic relations with the EU and increase Jordan’s exports to the EU, 
thus improving the trade balance that was currently in favour of the EU. However, the 
private sector in Jordan voiced its concerns about the AA and feared the competition that 
the agreement between the EU and Jordan might bring to the fragile Jordanian industries 
(Dalbouh, 2005).  
 
In 1997, Jordan signed the AA with the EU under the Barcelona Process and put it into 
effect in 2002. Thus, this thesis will address the question: To What Extent has the 
‘Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean’ been economically beneficial to 
Jordan? 
 
To answer this question, Chapter One will first establish the theoretical and interpretative 
framework for the thesis. Several international theories will be examined. Theories on 
economic integration and cooperation between Jordan and the EU will be used at the state 
and supranational entity levels. Five theories will be examined: liberalism, realism, 
Marxism, constructivism, and critical theory. The theoretical framework will be used to 
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interpret the Barcelona process, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), and the 
Union for the Mediterranean (UfM). To involve different points of view on the process, a 
detailed examination of the literature available on the Barcelona process will be 
performed. Based on the interpretation of the available literature on the process and using 
the theoretical framework, the thesis subsection examining the question will provide a 
foundation for the following chapters.  
 
Chapter Two will set the context for the Jordanian political and economic landscape that 
led to the signing of the AA with the EU. The chapter will explain the journey of the 
Jordanian political economy from the outset of Jordan in 1921 until the early 1990s. It 
will examine the different political and economic forces that influenced the economic and 
trade policies of Jordan and consequently its decision to join the Barcelona Process in 
1995. This will establish the motivation and mindset of the negotiation for the agreement 
itself that will be examined in Chapter Three. It will help evaluate whether the AA 
brought the economic benefits that Jordan was seeking when they signed the AA with the 
EU.  
 
Chapter Three will examine the negotiation process between the EU and Jordan to 
conclude the AA. The analysis of the negotiation will start with a comparison of the 
Jordan agreement itself and place it in contrast with the AA Morocco had with the EU. 
This will bring out any noteworthy features of the EU-Jordan AA and determine whether 
Jordan’s AA is substantively different from that of other Middle East/North Africa 
(MENA) countries like Morocco. This will build the basis for the analysis of the 
negotiation process.  
Interviews with the EU negotiators will provide insight into the process itself. The 
Jordanian point of view was built based on the expectations of the Jordanian private and 
public sectors and on debates covered by the Jordanian press, as well as the available 
literature and Jordanian government documentation from that period. The AA analysis, 
the EU negotiation input, and the Jordanian input will all be included in the theoretical 
basis (Nash Bargaining Theory) to reconstruct the environment of the negotiation process 
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and to evaluate if Jordan had the opportunity to negotiate agreement terms that would 
better serve its national interest, or if Jordanian negotiators were only in a position to 
accept the negotiation terms set by the EU. It will form a clearer picture of the power 
positions of both the EU and Jordan in the negotiations. 
 
The next step is to examine the impact of the agreements on Jordan’s economy after the 
agreement was put into effect in 2002. In this case, the definition of ‘economically 
beneficial’ will be addressed based on different FTA assessment models. This is 
established in Chapter Four. Chapter Four will analyse the extent to which the AA 
between Jordan and the EU was beneficial and brought positive welfare to Jordan using 
ex-post and ex-ante models of assessment for an FTA. The chapter will start with an 
analysis of each model, and the strengths and weaknesses of each model will be outlined. 
It will identify the most suitable model—in terms of data and resource availability, 
practical feasibility, expected accuracy, and suitability of the outcome regarding the 
intended purpose of this study—for application to the FTA between Jordan and the EU. 
Then, the models will be applied to the AA agreement for the period extending from 1998 
to 2012.  
 
In addition, two action plans for political and economic reforms were set for Jordan, and 
these will be covered in Chapter Five. Chapter Five will analyse the action plans put in 
place for Jordan. The chapter will cover two action plans: those of 2005 and 2010. Five 
aspects of the action plan will be assessed: 1) the macroeconomic framework and 
function of the market economy, 2) trade-related issues as well as market and regulatory 
reform, 3) employment and social policy, 4) transport, energy, information society, and 
environment, and 5) other areas. Political reform and ‘person-to-person contact’ are not 
within the scope of this study.  
In order to assess the progress methodology, the assessment process is based on the 
enterprise charter indicators as developed by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) (European Commission, OECD, European Training 
Foundation, 2008, p. 135). In this assessment methodology, each indicator is rated. For 
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the rating process, a scale from 1 to 5 was used, in which 1 represents no policy 
whatsoever, and 5 represents a situation in which a full policy that also met international 
standards was in place (European Commission, OECD, European Training Foundation, 
2008, p. 135). 
  
The methodology used in this thesis covers multiple types: Quantitative analysis—this 
has been used to assess extensively in chapters four and five to analyse whether the AA 
and action plans have been economically beneficial to Jordan’s economy; the Qualitative 
analysis approach has been used to assess Jordan’s political economy and the motives of 
Jordan and the EU when signing the AA. Data analysis, interviews, and statistical 
evaluation were also used to extract the balance of power during the negotiation process.  
 
The parameters of the thesis are set to indicate both the scope of the thesis and the period 
that this thesis covers. On the Jordanian side, both the public and private sectors focused 
on the economic benefit of the agreement—this was evident in King Hussein’s (1996, 
1997) speech to the parliament—while the private sector had concerns about its economic 
benefits. Thus, this thesis will focus on the economic benefits of the AA and examine 
whether these goals were met. Thus, the political aspect set in the agreement, as well as 
people-to-people contact, will be out of the scope of this thesis. In terms of time period, 
the agreement will cover a period of 10 years after the AA came into effect, from 2002 
until 2012. The ex-ante impact of the thesis will cover the four-year period from 1998 to 
2002 (where the data is available). This period is based on the start date of this thesis, 
which was in 2013. Consequently, the period set and data collected for the analysis and 
calculation in this thesis ended in 2012.  
 
 
To outline the original contribution this thesis makes to the literature, I would like to 
highlight the studies done on the economic impact of the EU-Jordan agreement on Jordan. 
To the best of my best knowledge, there are limited numbers of studies on the economic 
impact of the EU-Jordan agreement on Jordan: The first study was conducted by 
Nobuhiro Hosoe (2001) using the computable general equilibrium model to assess the 
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potential impact of the agreement on Jordan. Its findings were that the FTA would 
improve Jordan’s welfare, expand the output of the chemical and agricultural sectors, and 
reduce that of the non-metal mineral sector (Hosoe, 2001, p. 599). Hosoe (2001) was an 
ex-ante study focused on Jordan’s imports, exports and output that anticipated a positive 
impact on Jordan’s economy. 
 
In their study, Alfredo Tovias and Riad AL Khouri’s (2004) assess the impact of the EU 
Agreement with Jordan using the partial equilibrium approach and calculating the welfare 
for the period from 1996 to 2001, thus making it an ex-ante study on the potential impact 
of the Jordan-EU FTA in comparison with the Jordan-Israel FTA.  
 
Feraboli (2007) used the computable general equilibrium (CGE) model to assess the 
impact of the EU-Jordan agreement on Jordan (Feraboli, 2007), and Feraboli and 
Trimborn (2008) showed that the EU-Jordan agreement spurred capital accumulation but 
would result in reduced government revenues (p. 19). These studies focused on 
macroeconomic variables such as private consumption and investment as well as 
government revenues.  
 
Walid Abu Dalbouh wrote multiple papers on the EU-Jordan Agreement. In his 2005 
paper titled ‘Jordan and the Euro Mediterranean Partnership’, he evaluated the 
agreement’s impact on Jordan. That study mainly concentrated on the political aspects of 
the agreement and concluded that it was premature (in 2005) to assess whether the Euro-
Jordanian partnership had fulfilled its overall objectives, especially as far as the political 
dimension was concerned. Indeed, the study highlighted that the EU had pursued an 
imbalanced strategy that favoured economic and financial cooperation over political 
objectives (Abu Dalbouh, 2005). 
 
Peter Seeberg did a 2009 study, ‘The EU’s pragmatic bilateralism in the Middle East: the 
case of Jordan,’ which again concentrated on the political aspects of EU-Jordan relations 
and concluded that the EU pursued a realist and pragmatic policy which put aside the 
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ambitions of the promotion of democracy, human rights, and rule of law in favour of the 
stabilization of Jordan (Seeberg, 2009, p. 19)  
 
Bergstrand, Baier, Sunesen, and Thelle (2011) was an ex-post study that focused on the 
impact of the EU-Jordan agreement (among other six FTAs) on the EU. The study 
examined whether EU FTAs have a significant impact on EU exports and imports 
(Bergstrand et al., 2011, p. 5). 
 
Matthias Busse conducted a second study in 2012 (Busse, 2012). It was an ex-post study 
on the impact of the trade liberalization with Jordan performed using the gravity model. 
The study investigated the impact of the first year and concluded that the increase in 
exports cannot be taken for granted because of trade preferences. He underscores the 
importance of caution and negotiation before FTAs are ratified (Busse, 2012, p. 482). 
 
In his article ‘Assessing the Political Implications of the Euro-Jordanian Economic 
Partnership: 1995-2005’, Abu Dalbouh (2012a) outlines the shortcomings and limitations 
of the EU’s foreign policy towards its southern Mediterranean neighbours and its lack of 
balanced cooperation, especially in the political dimension. In ‘Conceptualizing Stability 
within the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership’, Abu Dalbouh (2012b) evaluates the concept 
of stability and concludes that EU policy is targeted towards the stability of the status quo 
while focusing on economic stability. In ‘Regional Instability and the Modernization 
Theory within the Euro-Jordanian Partnership Context’, Abu Dalbouh (2013) comes to 
the same conclusion as Abu Dalbouh (2012a; 2012b)—that political cooperation takes a 
backseat to EU priorities during cooperation with Jordan.  
 
This thesis contributes original knowledge because it is the first study that has analysed 
the EU-Jordan AA to determine whether the AA is economically beneficial to Jordan 
using both ex-post and ex-ante models covering a continuous period from 1998 until 2012 
(before and after putting the agreement into effect in 2002). This is the first study that 
uses an ex-ante assessment model of trade indicators and an ex-post assessment model of 
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FTA trade and welfare indicators to measure whether the agreement was beneficial and 
compare anticipated benefits versus the actual results of the agreement. In view of the 
findings on the shortcomings of these models, this thesis was not only satisfied with the 
model findings but expanded and complemented them using analyses of other indicators 
such as the trade balance of Jordan, unemployment—with a focus on unemployed women 
and youth—and losses from import duties. The thesis also gathered, for the first time, 
insight from the EU negotiators themselves into the actual negotiations, gathered through 
interviews, which gave a new and first-time perspective on the negotiations for the AA 
between Jordan and the EU and on the struggle for power. This novel point of view is 
complemented with different points of view from the Jordan public and private sectors. 
This thesis has used an OECD model that has never been used prior to this study to 
evaluate seven years of progress reports. Chapter One contains a literature review of the 
Barcelona Process (set chronologically from 1998 until 2015), the ENP, and the UfM, 
which will provide a better understanding of the different points of view, as well as an 
interpretation of the Barcelona Process and how the Jordan case fits into it.  
Finally, the methodology developed in this thesis is as follows: 1) ex-ante and ex-post 
evaluation analysis of the FTA, 2) analysis of AA negotiation elements, and 3) setting a 
numerical evaluation for progress reports that can also be used to evaluate AAs for other 
Barcelona Process partners, such as Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt.  
 
The thesis concluded that the economic results of the agreement did not fully meet the 
Jordanian expectation of the AA in terms of remedying the trade balance gap, so it was in 
favour of Jordan; however, there are signs that the trade balance gap is reducing. If we 
examine the results based on the goals Jordan set for its globalization and privatization 
policies, one can see that the AA between Jordan and the EU facilitated Jordan’s 
integration into the world economy, anchored Jordan’s free market policy, and diversified 
its trading partners, which, prior to the agreement, included few countries, rendering its 
economy vulnerable.  
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Chapter One 
EU-Jordan Relationship: Theoretical and Interpretive 
Framework 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter will set the theoretical explanatory frameworks for the European Community 
(EC)/EU-Jordan relations. It will explore the contents of the AA between Jordan and the 
EC/EU and the literature on the Barcelona Process. The explanatory framework will serve 
as a general guiding light to identify a direction for analysis for subsequent chapters. This 
chapter will be divided into three sections: 
 
In the first part of this chapter, several contending international relations (IR) theories will 
be examined. The main aim is to establish a theoretical context that can, where necessary, 
serve as an explanatory model for this research. Theories, including critical theory, 
constructivism, Marxism, liberalism, and rationalism, were chosen on the basis of a 
possible or probable relevance to actors, structures, or actions in the economic and IR 
fields. 
 
The second part will give a brief historical overview of the relationships between the 
countries in the Southern Mediterranean and the EC/EU. The titles and content of the 
articles of the AA with Jordan will be discussed. The AA between Morocco and the EU 
will be compared to deepen our understanding of the examples from Jordan. The articles 
of the AA will be critically examined to expose noteworthy elements considering the 
initial questions raised above. 
 
  
 
 
 
18 
The third part will address the literature covering EC/EU relations with the Southern 
Mediterranean countries. Different points of view of the Barcelona process will be 
consulted to assess the process politically and economically. The main goal is to create an 
inventory of opinions and the areas of research covered and identify trends in the opinions 
and root causes identified by the authors. This will allow insight into the main opinions 
and gaps in the existing literature and could thus form the basis for more specific research 
questions. 
 
By the end of this chapter, the findings of the critical reading of the history and the AA, 
combined with conclusions about the trends and gaps in the literature as well as the 
explanatory framework, will lead to more informed and specific research questions 
regarding the motivations and actions surrounding the—mainly economic—AA between 
Jordan and the EU and will set up an analytical framework which structures the rest of the 
thesis. 
  
1.1 Theoretical Context 
The efforts in this chapter will be directed towards defining an explanatory framework 
that will serve as the guiding light to identify a direction rather than as a goal in itself. IR 
theories will be used in this research as an explanatory tool in an attempt to explain reality 
by reducing it to relevant causative factors and factors being caused (Segbers, 2006).  
 
Theories are used at the level of the state and at the level of the supranational entity, 
thereby adding these two levels of analysis to Waltz’s images of actors, domestic 
influences, and international anarchy (Waltz, 1959), as suggested by Segbers (2006, p. 5). 
Social constructivism as proposed by Wendt (1992), a theory that develops or reifies state 
through other identities or individuals is discussed as well, as it may shed light on 
discrepancies when it comes to the sharedness of beliefs. Liberalism will be discussed, 
because it is the utopian (Burchill, 1995b) counterpart of realism and because the main 
topic discussed in this research is trade liberalization. Marxist and critical theory will be 
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discussed as well. The perspectives of these schools of thought on international trade and 
the validity of current structures may add points of view on the division of wealth and 
power and the desire to maintain the status quo, as well as a human-interest dimension.  
 
1.1.1 Constructivism  
 
Seen from a historical perspective, one could argue that after the fall of the Soviet Union, 
and thus the end of almost half a century of a bipolar world, new ways to explain and 
interpret the international world were considered. When a multipolar global system 
(Waltz, 2002) did not then materialise, more doubts were raised as to the explanatory 
value of neorealism. It is in this void that constructivism arose (Jackson & Sorensen, 
2013, pp. 206-208), at least in American scholarly circles. European IR have traditionally 
been less absorbed with the exclusive realist-liberal dichotomy.  
 
In constructivism, structures are not fixed, but exist because actors in their social 
interaction share an understanding and meaning regarding these structures. This 
essentially means that actors can change structures and the meaning of a situation when 
inter-subjective understandings change. This approach to structure adds explanatory 
dimensions and does not force theorists to build theory upon theory to retain a credible 
framework for explanation in a changing reality. A common example of this is the realist 
‘law’ of international anarchy. Cox (1981, p. 128), although approaching theory from a 
critical perspective, also warns against cramped adjustments to existing theories that 
simply ceased to be sufficiently associated with a changed reality. In his view, political 
theory is anchored in a certain time and situation and therefore has inevitable elements of 
opinion; in all probability, it also had no eternal validity (Cox, 1981, p. 128-130). It is 
interesting to note that Cox’s reasoning, while critical rather than constructivist, also 
explored new ways of looking at a changing global environment. 
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With regard to social constructivism as an IR theory, according to Jackson and Sorensen, 
constructivism sets itself apart from some other IR theories because it focuses on human 
perception or awareness as it pertains to global activities, rather than on material power 
like in neorealism. IR are primarily social in the constructivist perspective. Furthermore, 
this social world, of which the international political world is a part, is not a physical 
presence in existence outside the human consciousness (Jackson & Sorensen, 2013, p. 
206). The world of international politics is a creation of the human mind based on a 
shared understanding and is, as such, fully ideational. This conceptualization of interstate 
relations is reflected by Wendt (1992, p. 394): ‘Anarchy is what states make of it’. The 
pun regarding the nation-state-centred realist assumption of the international world as 
anarchy is clear in this sentence. In his article, Wendt (1992) attempts to bring 
constructivism from its social science starting point into the realm of IR.  
 
In social sciences theory, constructivism views reality as a social—and thus human 
made—construction. This reality is internal to the humans who constructed it and is thus 
not a separate material reality. Hence, it cannot be studied like a separate material realty 
such as chemistry or physics. Thus, the socially constructed reality has a certain inter-
subjective meaning specific to those who created this reality. Is sighing, for example, an 
expression of relaxation or a display of ennui? Only those who created that inter-
subjective reality may know the answer. That is not to say that constructivists deny the 
existence of a material world, but rather, that the ideational world gives meaning and 
(ir)relevance to the material, thus relegating the material to a place of secondary 
importance (Jackson & Sorensen, 2013, p. 210).  
 
The task remaining for constructivists is to define concepts, practice science, and make 
claims about reality. At this point, one enters a situation in constructivism where 
questions are raised regarding to what extent the constructivist scientist—being part of a 
social construct, and as an interpreter of an inter-subjective reality—can deliver claims 
about this reality that have a degree of universal validity. That constructivists do not 
recognise an objective truth in the style of the natural sciences has been previously 
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established. How, then, can a constructivist’s claim about reality have validity beyond the 
limitations of the necessarily purely interpretative and individualistic nature of a 
constructivist claim?  
 
Regarding different views on constructivism: Palan (2000, p. 581-582) describes Bloor’s 
criticism of Wendt in this matter as ‘...grasping a concept is a purely individual 
achievement. It is an individual mental act’. Yet, in constructivist thinking, because of the 
inter-subjective confirmation of meanings, a certain degree of universal meaning beyond 
the individual is acquired. Finnemore and Sikkink (2001, p. 391) explain the 
constructivist perspective as ‘ideational factors are widely shared or “inter-subjective” 
beliefs, which are not reducible to individuals; and that these shared beliefs construct the 
interests of purposive actors’. Hence, in this view—because beliefs are inter-subjectively 
confirmed, go beyond the individual, and are widely shared—interpretative claims about 
the world can be made.  
 
Critical constructivism has more reservations about constructivism’s ability to claim a 
certain level of truth. For the purpose of this study, however, the focus will be on 
Wendtian or conventional constructivism, since constructivist IR theory stems from that 
branch (Jackson & Sorensen, 2013, p. 212). Both constructivists and neo-realists 
subscribe to the notion that the international world outside the nation state is ruled by 
anarchy (Jackson & Sorensen, 2013, p. 213). Is constructivism then merely neorealism 
served with a sauce of the ideational? 
 
According to Wendt (1992, p. 394), this is not the case, since in neorealism, the identities 
and interests of states are a given, while in constructivism, a structure of identities and 
interests is created during the process of interaction. Therefore, both constructivists and 
neo-realists may agree about the interstate anarchy, but in neorealism, states are 
inevitably driven towards self-help, while constructivism offers options other than 
hostility. This vision on the position of states towards the interstate anarchy is illustrated 
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by a part of the title of Wendt’s (1992) article ‘Anarchy is what states make of it...’. 
Wendt’s position on anarchy did find criticism, however. 
 
Palan (2000, p. 583) draws attention to the fact that in Wendt’s perspective, the interstate 
anarchy or non-anarchy is the result of the interpretation of each individual state, thus 
making constructivism, for Palan, both state-centric and individualistic. In Waltz’s book 
(2010, pp. 91-93, 105), Theory of International Politics, the state is also seen as an 
individual actor, but the state has the innate and inseparable characteristic of a survival 
instinct and state actions are—directly or indirectly, through other states—based on this 
instinct. The state cannot do otherwise but to act based on that survival instinct.  
Regarding anarchy, Wendt reasons that for states, prior to social interaction, there is no 
social threat (Wendt 1992, p. 144, as cited in Weber, 2013, p. 186) so there is also no 
security dilemma before social interaction. In the same vein, self-help and anarchy only 
have meaning after social interaction (Wendt, 1992, p. 135 cited in Weber 2013 p. 184). 
Weber, however, describes how Wendt emphasises the importance of practice in Waltz’s 
earlier 1954 version of the neorealist self-help concept of states. By incorporating both 
international anarchy and the constructivist inter-subjectivity in his explanation of 
interstate behaviour, Wendt’s constructivist IR theory, according to Weber, may not even 
be a variety of Waltz’ neorealism or may be categorised in the liberal spirit in which 
structural anarchy may still see some cooperation between nation states; when the model 
of international anarchy is applied, or when the inter-subjectivity model is applied, 
international anarchy could go in any direction (Weber, 2013, pp. 181-182). Weber’s 
interpretation of Wendt’s constructivism leaves the reader with a rather amorphous 
visualization of the essentials of Wendt’s reading of IR theory. It can be called 
amorphous to a certain extent since inter-subjectively created meanings are, by their very 
nature, fluid, but inter-subjectively created meanings do have a commonly agreed-upon 
specific meaning at a certain point in time.  
 
Weber (2013, p. 214), while observing the comfort that can be derived from the idea that 
states are free, notes that the concept of state in Wendt’s reasoning remains, in fact, the 
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result of individuals making sense of the international world. Wendt answered the 
question of who the creator of anarchy is and exposed the state as the author of the 
interstate anarchy. Weber, though, poses a more intriguing question: ‘Who is the author 
and what are the practices or narratives that create states that appear to be creators of 
international anarchy?’ In Wendt’s constructivism, though, it is not the international 
anarchy, but the state—the author of international anarchy—that is reified and pre-
existing (Weber, 2013, pp. 209-211).  
 
While the reassuringly absolute existence of the international anarchy of neorealism may 
at times be suffocating and hard to match with the complexities of actions and changing 
entities in the real world, the seemingly fluid nature of Wendt’s constructivism may pose 
its own challenges in practical applications like this paper.  
 
On one hand, it may be difficult to prove that an event happened in a particular way 
because of how the actors constructed their inter-subjective meanings in that situation. On 
the other hand, a constructivist approach may assist in understanding why a certain 
situation did not lead to the desired or expected outcomes by analysing the meanings that 
the different parties gave to various aspects of the situation. It is harder to prove that 
something is at all times, than that something is not at all times. More practically put, one 
could say that if proof could be given of only one instance where no inter-subjectively 
coinciding meanings were given by the parties in a complex situation, the actors were 
interacting on the basis of diverging meanings with the inherent increased risk of failing 
the interaction. 
1.1.2 Critical theory 
 
Steinberg and Kincheloe (2010) describe critical theory as ‘if nothing else, a moral 
construct designed to reduce human suffering in the world’. Steinberg and Kincheloe 
(2010, p. 141) view the term ‘critical’, in the sense of critical theory, as derived from the 
tradition of social analysis in the work of the Frankfurt School. The Frankfurt School 
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originated in post-World-War-I Germany in an era of economic hardship following 
defeat. The school’s conviction was the centrality of injustice and subjugation as 
mechanisms that shaped the world. The Frankfurt School wanted to go beyond Marxism 
in its analysis and studied ‘the changing nature of capitalism’ and the resulting ‘mutating 
forms of domination’ (Steinberg & Kincheloe, 2010, p. 143). Critical theorists deviate 
from Marxism in that they do not accept economic factors as the sole determinants of all 
aspects of human life (Steinberg & Kincheloe, 2010, p. 144). In critical theory, there is 
recognition for racial, gender-based, and sexual domination as well as class-based 
domination. It should be clear, however, that economic factors play a vital role in 
oppression as in critical theory. It is, however, not the only form of oppression, as it is in 
Marxist theory.  
 
A good example of this desire to move beyond class struggle as the central explanatory 
concept is found in the thoughts on liberal European integration as expressed by Cafruny 
and Ryner (Diez & Wiener ed., 2009, pp. 221-222). While recognizing the validity of a 
class-struggle-based analysis, they feel that this approach would be unable to expose 
important aspects. Cafruny and Ryner (Diez & Wiener ed., 2009, pp. 221-222), after 
having noted the marked absence of international political economy thought in analysis of 
European integration, re-iterate Lowi’s (1979, p. 21) view of the liberal approach to 
European integration, ‘... a complex set of checks and balances that prevent particular 
ideologies, special interests, and protracted social conflicts from dominating in public 
life’. They further reason that to maintain that balancing order, economic integration must 
necessarily be followed by social and political integration. Cafruny and Ryner observe 
that this is in line with the idea of the EU as an overarching polity where politics is also 
supranationalised. 
 
When analysing the integration of the Union itself, Cafruny and Ryner (Diez & Wiener 
ed., 2009, pp. 223-224) note that the view of the liberal perspective outlined above, 
although valuable, is a framework unsuited to uncover important aspects, like power 
relationships and special interests. The call for international political economy analysis 
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became more urgent, as, among others, class conflicts became more evident in the late 
sixties and early seventies, and the corporate-liberal basis of the Union was questioned. 
Critical theorists, in other words, conclude that to develop a critical explanatory 
framework that could adequately address issues of international power and interest, it was 
necessary to move beyond the classical boundaries of class conflict. 
 
The transformational versus problem solving dichotomy: While Lowi (1979) and Cafruny 
and Ryner (2009) propose that the view of liberalism in European integration as a 
mechanism to conceal and prolong social inequality, although correct, is insufficient for 
analysis in the field of international political economy, Cox (1981) addresses the concept 
of theory itself. In the following section, we will see that Cox puts the value of critical 
theory in its detachment of the existing structures, thus leading the way to more idealistic 
definitions of critical theory, as quoted in the beginning of this paragraph: ‘... if nothing 
else, a moral construct designed to reduce human suffering in the world.’ Steinberg and 
Kincheloe (2010, p. 141). 
 
Cox (1981, p. 126) dissects theory while referring to it as a ‘... some initial subdivision of 
reality, usually dictated by convention’, and ‘at best just a convenience of the mind’. Cox 
continues that these theories, as reductions of reality based on convention, may be a 
representation of how the world is organised at a certain point in time, but that their value 
will erode when that organisation and the institutions therein change over time (Cox, 
1981, p. 126). IR, according to Cox (1981, 126-127), is a clear example of a field where 
the actors changed from the nation-state to other entities and where the very definition of 
the main actor, the nation-state, excluding civil society, had to be adjusted in view of the 
emerging and increasing importance of civil society. According to Cox, Marxist 
revivalists like Habermas and Althusser also failed to practically bridge the gap in theory 
formation caused by the diversification of the actors in the international field (Cox, 1981, 
pp. 127-128). Cox’s main point in his introductory chapter is to convey the message not 
to ‘base theory on theory’, but, rather, to consider the changing realities of the field as 
where the actual touchstone for theory is found (Cox, 1981, p. 128). Without passing any 
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judgement, what comes to mind in this respect is, for example, the neo-realist shift from a 
bipolar balance to a multi-polar balance to accommodate the changing realities after the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union, or the realist attempts to incorporate supranational 
organisations into the realist framework. Although this brief reference to Cox’s work is 
not meant as the starting point of a critical investigation of IR theories, it does hint at the 
possible relativity of certain IR theories in time and space. This, in turn, leads to the 
thought that certain theories may have more appropriate fields of application. This 
eclectic thought will lead the theoretical framework of this research. 
 
According to Cox, all theories have a perspective derived from one’s social and political 
position in time and space. Therefore, theories cannot be seen as separate from a certain 
standpoint and should be viewed as exposed ideologies and their perspectives (Cox, 1981, 
p. 128). The Cox article led to the division of categories between problem-solving 
theories and critical theories, where problem solving takes the existing framework as a 
starting point, while critical theory is more utopian and analytical in nature (Cox, 1981, p. 
129). Thus, the spirit and purpose of critical theory may be found in the desire to 
transform. For some who take ‘critical’ one step further, the essence should be found in 
dissensus or disagreement (Rancière, 2017, p. 111). A seed of this line of thought can be 
found when reading how Cox (1981, p. 127 - 128) describes how Wallerstein’s world 
systems theory was rejected by critical theorists as having a ‘system-maintenance bias’ 
(Cox, 1981, p. 127). One notices that, in this case, the theories are rejected from a critical 
perspective at least partly based on the fact that the theory lacks potential for social 
change or transformation. 
 
Critical approaches can be viewed in a wide perspective as suggested by Chris Brown 
(1994, p. 217), where critical theory includes, for example, feminism, postmodernism, 
and poststructuralism. The common denominator is the thought that dominant theories 
based on political and social theory from the Enlightenment are in crisis because of grave 
and fundamental criticism. The focus on a positivistic and rational way of practicing 
science excludes, by definition, aspects of norms and values as well as the roles of 
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experience. Hence, in this positivistic approach, the study of the role of colonialism or 
power inequality in the social and economic development of a country is not possible. 
This is of importance for this study, where aspects of power inequality and colonialism 
are indeed expected to have played a role. The criticism is, in other words, that in this 
time and age, it cannot be maintained that the social world can be successfully and 
comprehensively studied by reducing it to a positivistic natural science field. Critical 
theory thus rejects positivist assumptions and researches ways to transform the fields of 
social and political theory and practice (Brown, 1994, p. 217). 
 
As a Conclusion on Critical Theory: Critical theory may provide important frameworks 
for the analysis of policies and actions with the aim to do the ‘right’ thing in the spirit of 
Steinberg and Kincheloe’s (2010) definition of critical theory. It may thus introduce a 
more norm-and-value-based approach to the analysis of the different processes and 
agreements in place between the EU and the countries in the Southern Mediterranean, 
which is relevant to this study. However, since critical theory is defined by its 
transformational nature, it will offer little to analyse the part of this research oriented 
towards the economic and numerical. Yet, in the spirit of Cox’s work (1981) it will be 
accepted that theories may have a limited applicability in space and time, and thus 
different theories may be used to analyse different aspects of the interactions between the 
EU and their Southern Mediterranean partners. In the next section, the Marxist approach 
will be examined. The angle will be towards the examination of the validity and value of 
Marxist concepts for the analyses in the research, especially because of the slightly 
reductionist views on Marxism in this paragraph (Cox, 1981) (Steinberg & Kincheloe, 
2010). 
1.1.3. Marxist theory 
 
Marxist theory has three building blocks: the dialectical method, the mode of 
production (MOP), and the dialectical materialist theory of history. The dialectical 
method is Marx’s scientific approach in which how things appear and the material 
reality are distinguished. When properly applied, the dialectical method of class 
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analysis will expose that behind the seemingly complex appearance of things is an 
essence that can be reduced to the ‘class struggle fundamental to society’ (Hobson, 
2010, p. 110-111). Marx contrasted his class analysis against ‘fetishism’, an approach 
attributed to the bourgeois class who failed to see the distinction between appearance 
and material reality. The dialectic method also extends to economy. In the same vein, 
raw materials, for example, do not have any intrinsic value, but only extrinsic value that 
can be expressed in the number of hours of labour exploitation.  
Fetishism, on one hand, conceals the class struggle, thus making capitalism appear 
normal, while this very class struggle will inevitably end capitalism. On the other hand, 
fetishism is applicable to the state as well, since the state cannot be separated from the 
class struggle in the society that it is derived from. 
 
The second building block of Marxism is Karl Marx’s concept of the MOP. The MOP 
has two elements: first, the means of production, or in other words, the technologies or 
production tools; and second, the relationship of production, which is the relationship 
between the subordinate or producing class and the dominant or non-producing class. 
The tension between the forces and the relationship of production defines a MOP, such 
as the capitalist MOP. Further, this tension is the driving force for the change from one 
MOP to the next throughout the course of history (Bottomore, 1985, p. 178) The 
contradiction and conflict between these two classes has no solution (Hobson, 2000, pp. 
111-113).  
 
The historical theory called dialectical materialism is the third building block. In 
dialectical materialism, the tension between the subordinate and dominant classes and 
the resulting shifts in power determine the course of history (Bottomore, 1985, pp. 178-
179). 
The Marxist position on IR has the theory of MOP as foundation (Hobson, 2000, p. 
116, 117). Hobson argues that although the state was, in Marx’s view, no more than ‘... 
a committee to manage the affairs of the whole bourgeoisie’, the state had ‘moderate 
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international agential power’, or a moderate ability to conduct policy free from 
international constraints. This is in mild contrast with the state’s—accepted in Marxist 
theory—‘low domestic agential power’ or limited ability to conduct policy on the 
national level (Hobson, 2000, p. 116). Remarks on state relations are found in Marx’s 
‘The German Ideology’. Summarizing it could be described as the relationships 
between nations depending mainly on the level of development of their internal 
production (Hobson, 2000, p. 116-117). Thus, national relations depend on domestic 
economic and class forces (Hobson, 2000, p. 117).  
 
This was then further developed and outlined by Vladimir Lenin when he linked 
economic aspects to war and imperialism. Lenin highlighted that the root of 
imperialism is the monopoly of finance capital. Lenin concluded regarding imperialism 
that there is no such thing as a systemic international force that drives states towards 
imperialist behaviour, but that it is actually a social domestic force fuelled by class 
inequality that causes imperialism. When moving from imperialism to state and 
interstate behaviour, Lenin had the conviction that states by definition are unable to 
create a peaceful world. This is the case because states are the tool of the dominant 
class, and as such, they bring the need for exploitation and expansion into the interstate 
realm. Marxist theory assumes that the domestic class struggle will never have a 
solution and, therefore, that this struggle—when transferred to the international 
world—will be persistent and will thus inevitably lead to international conflict 
(Hobson, 2000, pp. 117-120).  
 
As a conclusion for Marxism, consider that Wendt, from his constructivist perspective, 
takes issue with the Marxist view on MOPs. Wendt argues that while the means of 
production may be materialist, the relationships of production are part of the world of 
ideas and hence shared ideas. Therefore, Marxism should, according to Wendt, not be 
considered a materialist theory. Marxists would argue that Marxism is a historical 
theory attempting to explain the temporary dominance of capitalist rationalism leading 
  
 
 
 
30 
to profit maximizing individuals (Risse-Kappen, 1994, p. 94). Criticism was also 
levelled by the Frankfurt school and later critical theorists. They targeted the 
reductionist view of Marxism in which economic parameters alone are responsible for 
all aspects of social and political life (Steinberg & Kincheloe, 2010, pp. 141-144).  
The Marxist approach to international politics offers an interesting framework in that 
the state is accepted to have moderate international acting power and will also protect 
the interests of the capitalists and is thus expected to do little to substantially change or 
improve the international economic, political, or social situation unless, of course, 
when it would serve the ruling class. When accepting that the EU can, in Marxism, be 
viewed as either a collection of nation-states furthering the interests of the ruling class 
or a supranational entity doing the same—and export the class struggle to the 
international world—Marxism offers to this study the ability to analyse actions and 
agreements in light of the extent to which they serve the vested interests of the ruling 
class. Another analytical aspect put forward by Marxism is the fact that state relations 
depend on domestic economic and class forces. More practically put, the relationships 
between states at a similar stage of development when it comes to class struggle will 
differ from the relationships between states at differing stages of development. 
1.1.4 Liberalism  
 
The starting point of liberalism, according to Jones (1995, p. 20) is the rationality of 
human beings. Human beings are best placed to determine what is in their own best 
interests. Harmony, peace, and cooperation between nations are the natural status of the 
world. Therefore, conflict is unnatural. An undemocratic government that aims to serve 
its own interests makes war (Burchill, 1995a). The cure for war is democracy and free 
trade. Democracy minimises the power of the ruling class, which might want to use that 
power to serve its own interests. Free trade helps create a bigger community by 
eliminating the barriers between subsectors of the community. (Burchill, 1995a).  
Jones confirms that a free market and democracy are essential to each other’s existence 
(Jones, 1995, p. 20). A democratic government should influence trade, since free trade 
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gives producers enough incentive to be efficient and creates interdependence between 
nations. This process contributes to the world’s division of labour (Jones, 1995, p. 21). 
This relates directly to the role of the government in liberalism in which liberalism 
favours a minimal governmental role. The intervention of the government should be 
limited to the role of maintaining favourable conditions for free competition (Frieden and 
Lake, 2003, p. 27). 
Regarding IR, liberalism considers that external international behaviour reflects internal 
policies. Consequently, it states that extending the basic principle of democracy to free 
trade enables countries to deal with each other on peaceful terms. However, a democratic 
state’s relations with a non-democratic state will not be free of conflict. Thus, the best 
way to spread peace is by spreading democracy and free trade (Burchill, 1995a). 
Consequently, for international business to thrive and prosper without hindrance, 
democracy and the free movement of goods and labour should be pursued and motivated 
on all platforms.  
The tenets of liberalism go against self-sufficiency (Burchill, 1995a). States should 
specialise in certain goods, which would enable them to produce with efficiency cheaper 
products that can be competitive and are not easily bought elsewhere (Burchill, 1995a). 
The free market would be beneficial for everybody and would create interdependency 
between states that would prevent any kind of conflict (Burchill, 1995a). Interdependency 
would minimise the importance of state territories and would be replaced by the 
importance of trade (Burchill, 1995a). Interdependency has as a basic premise in that 
trading partners are equals (Burchill, 1995a). 
 
Liberal theory has faced many challenges from other theories. Carr (Burchill, 1995b), 
who considers liberalism as utopian, highlighted that the starting point of liberal theory is 
based on what liberalists wish to have (Burchill, 1995b). Carr underlines that the liberal 
principles of common interests between countries were not a real reflection of those 
interests at all, but mainly the interests of certain elites during a specific period, serving 
only the strong rather than the weak (Burchill, 1995b). Thus, according to Carr, while 
liberalism and free trade would benefit only dominant countries that attempt to impose 
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one-way liberalism on economically weak countries, protection would be a more suitable 
way to help develop economically weak countries (Burchill, 1995b, p. 70). 
 
Liberalism, when applied to the relationship between two parties, assumes that the two 
parties have democratic systems and are striving for peace and harmony with common 
standards. However, the EU is imposing a one-way liberalism on countries like Jordan, 
while it protects its agricultural sector against external trade. In addition, the principles of 
trade between the two parties are based on EU standards rather than a common set of 
standards. Thus, this relationship better fits the definition of imperialism (Parenti, 1995), 
in which an economical power imposes its standards on an economically weaker nation to 
harness the outcome of that relationship for its own benefit. 
 
1.1.5 Realism 
 
The state is the main actor in realist theory (Roggeveen, 2001). The main concerns of this 
theory are security, power, and the achievement of national interests (Roggeveen, 2001). 
War is prevented because of the fear one power has of the other (e.g. the case of the 
United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR]). Thus, the absence of 
this rivalry would induce instability in the world (Burchill, 1995b). States, within realism 
theory, attempt to achieve their interests while acting in an internationally competitive 
and anarchic system (Halliday, 2005, p. 25), and the main features of the relationships 
between countries are the struggle for power (Burchill, 1995b) and achieving economic 
and military strength. (Roggeveen, 2001). According to Jones (1995, p. 30), under realism 
theory, the international order is determined by the inequality of powers and the centrality 
of the state. In realism theory, the government uses the international economy to 
emphasise its powers (Frieden & Lake, 2003, p. 31). Thus, the economy serves the 
political will of a dominant government (Frieden & Lake, 2003, p. 32). In addition, Jones 
outlines that realism puts current IR within a historical context and thereby inherits the 
dependency of existing interconnectedness. With time and effort, this dependency makes 
dependents weak due to the strategies of the dominant parties (Jones, 1995, p. 32). In 
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realism theory, the relationship of a strong power to a weaker one provides benefits for 
the powerful party (Burchill, 1995, p. 70). Jordan attempts to benefit most from this 
relationship with the EU; yet the unequal nature of the relationship between the EU, a 
strong economic power, and Jordan, which is economically weak, tips the balance of 
interests in favour of the EU. Thus, as Roggeveen indicates (2001), protectionism might 
be a better way to serve the interests of the weak parties in this equation. EU partners 
need to resist one-way liberalism and the economic and commercial standards that the EU 
attempts to impose on its partners through its agreements. These agreements serve the 
EU’s aims of opening new markets for its manufactured goods and services and securing 
cheaper resources in the form of raw materials.  
  
Conclusion theoretical framework: The EU views itself as one of the most open 
economies committed to free trade (European Commission, 2014). Since free trade is 
associated with economic liberalism, the liberalist theory was expected to be inherently 
part of this study, while, at the same time, it remains time debatable how free EU trade is 
outside its borders (Wolf, 2006, p. 325). 
Through the provisions of the Barcelona Process, it was clear that the rhetoric of the EU 
was to promote liberalism and democracy through ‘1) Political dialogue on a regular 
basis, 2) Development of economic and financial cooperation, and 3) Social and cultural 
dimensions’ (Directorate General External Relations, 1995). However, the details of the 
analysis of the provision indicate that EU policy towards its Mediterranean partners fell 
under the sphere of realism and imperialism, rather than liberalism. The EU applied, at 
least, the pressure of positive conditionality to impose its political, social, and economic 
standards on Mediterranean partners. The EU, as a dominant actor in the process, used 
reward and punishment to help implement that strategy. 
The EU imposed liberalism on the Mediterranean countries, while it protected its own 
agricultural sector and environment, thereby lowering international agricultural prices and 
harming the Mediterranean agricultural sector both directly and indirectly. Therefore, 
while theoretically—in liberal thought—free trade should ultimately lead to economic 
interdependence, and thus, a stable and peaceful international world (Burchill, 1995a), 
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doubts, however, arise as to how free and beneficial free trade actually is when the 
partners are not economic equals of some sort, as a weak economy may be better served 
by some level of aid and protection (Burchill, 1995b, p. 70). Furthermore, as mentioned 
in the paragraph above, a preliminary examination of the Barcelona Process gave strong 
indications that, at least in the wording of that agreement and in the parts of the 
agreement that clearly aim to protect EU agricultural interests, realist and imperialist 
goals are present. As a result, it seems difficult to justify liberalism as the only guiding 
theory in this study, since strong doubts emerged as to its applicability. 
 
Marxism, with its emphasis on the temporality (Risse-Kappen, 1994, p. 94) of the current 
structures, provides a strong perspective from which to analyse the international 
economic structures created and intended by a liberal capitalist structure like the EU. This 
is particularly since the focus of this research is on the economic relations between the 
EU and the countries in the Southern Mediterranean, which are expected to have different 
domestic economic and class forces and are thus expected to have a different economic 
relationship with the EU than countries that are, in that respect, more similar to the EU.  
 
Critical theory offers a valuable perspective to this study, since its transformational nature 
and its schism from purely positivist approaches allow for a more norm-and-value-based 
approach to the analysis of the different structures, processes, and agreements in place 
between the EU and the countries in the Southern Mediterranean. Critical theory may thus 
allow the exploration of how true improvements—regarding the economic situation in the 
Mediterranean-EU partner countries—could be made. This then could be compared with 
the intended and actual changes brought about by the EU agreements with the 
Mediterranean partners to expose discrepancies between the rhetoric and actual results. 
Furthermore, because EU Member States share a history of colonialism with many of 
their Southern Mediterranean partners, this study intends to explore to what extent current 
power relations are—in full or in part—a continuation of that shared colonial past and 
power inequality. 
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While Wendt’s (1992) social constructivism frees us from the absolute anarchy of 
neorealism, at first sight, a broad practical application in this economically oriented paper 
does not readily present itself. It does, however, allow for the analysis of diverging 
constructs or meanings between the actors that exceed the limitations of an absolutely 
anarchic international world and may offer explanatory options. Yet, the limited data 
available about the actual negotiations between the parties will make any research on 
shared or diverging meanings challenging.  
 
When observing the patterns in the literature in the third part of this chapter, one notices 
that changes in policy or instruments often appear to be informed by security 
considerations (Youngs, 2002, p. 97) (Del Sarto & Schumacher, 2005, p. 19). This self-
help orientation may be a situation where a realist approach offers tools for explanation. 
From an economic perspective, policies exist that appear protectionist (Mortanari, 2007; 
Nsouli, 2006). This also points in the direction of a realist approach, while the use of 
positive conditionality and the imposition of EU standards and political models are 
reminiscent of an imperialist or hegemonic approach to the international world. 
Therefore, there is a certain extent of acceptance of realist-informed actions and positivist 
assumptions, like actors being goal-oriented utility maximisers who function based on 
rational choice. This positivist approach is in line with the later use of non-cooperative 
bargaining theory to clarify the power, advantages, and equality aspects of the EU-
Jordanian relationship.  
 
The Theoretical Framework set for the thesis: From an IR perspective, since free trade is 
associated with economic liberalism, the liberalist theory was expected to be inherently 
part of this research while, at the same time, it remains debatable how free EU trade is 
outside its borders (Wolf, 2006, p. 325). 
Neo-realist theoretical approaches are employed because of their emphasis on the 
interstate realm, such as Waltz’s (1959) third-level image of the interstate realm and 
relative goal maximisation, which conforms with the national, supranational, and 
economic orientations of this research, making neo-realism acceptable as an explanatory 
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model. Yet, critical theory is also expected to offer insight that does not merely accept 
existing structures that may be continuations of pre-existing colonialism-based power 
inequalities. Critical theory may also offer inroads into the possible identification of the 
genuine economic interests of the countries in the Southern Mediterranean as opposed to 
their interests as expressed by the EU. Marxism offers a valid analytical perspective for 
exposing economic relations that are ultimately based on protecting the interests of those 
in power on national or international levels.  
 
To conclude, Carr exposed liberalism’s hidden agenda of benefiting the wealthy of the 
world and identified power as a driving force in the international world, while pure 
realism would only lead to a bland international landscape. 
 
‘... pure realism can offer nothing but a naked struggle for power which makes 
any kind of international society impossible’ (Carr as quoted by Schmidt, 1998, p. 
221). 
1.2 EC/EU-Mediterranean Relations 
 
As early as the Treaty of Rome in late 1957, the EC granted some (former) colonies of the 
Member States in the Mediterranean a free trade area with the EC. The purpose of the 
treaty was to bring these territories economically and socially closer to the EC while 
treating them under the same conditions as Member States (European Economic 
Community, 1957). There was no comprehensive EC policy towards the Mediterranean, 
but a bilateral ad hoc relationship with individual countries (Carbone, 2008, p. 158; 
Lister, 1997, p. 89). During the 1960s, there were requests from the Southern 
Mediterranean countries, Tunisia and Morocco, to sign trade agreements with the EC. 
Until the late 1960s, preferential agreements were signed only with the North African 
countries Tunisia and Morocco.  
On the eastern shores of the Mediterranean, the first agreement was signed between the 
EC and Israel in 1964. Israel was established in May 1948 and occupied a part of the 
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Palestinian territories. In solidarity with the Palestinians, the Arab countries implemented 
a full embargo on Israel. Thus, Israel resorted to developing its relationship with EC.  In 
1964, Israel signed its first trade agreement with EC. However, the  EC depended heavily 
on the oil of the Middle East (ME) and North Africa. To create a balance between its 
relationships with Israel and the Arab countries, the EC, by the early 1970s, had signed 
bilateral agreements in the Maghreb with Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, and Algeria, and in 
the Mashreq with Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, and Syria (Lisser, 1997, p. 84). In the early 
1970s, the EC began to develop its political framework, and with the European Political 
Cooperation (EPC), the EC began to develop a more comprehensive Mediterranean 
policy. The UK joining the EC, resulting in a widening of Mediterranean policy to 
include not only North African Mediterranean countries but also eastern Mediterranean 
countries, like Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey, and Israel (Richard, 1998, p. 94)  
 
With the European Council of Paris in 1972, the Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP) was 
initiated to replace the agreements that were signed (Cardone, 2007, p. 158). The GMP 
did not result in major reciprocal trade agreements, but rather, some form of financial aid 
and a common approach to immigrant labour (Lisser, 1997, p. 85). The policy towards the 
Mediterranean was brought into the spotlight again in 1981 when Greece entered the EC, 
and later in 1986 when Spain and Portugal joined the EC. These new EC/EU members 
formed a front or coalition to influence Mediterranean policy to their advantage and 
hinder any concession to the EC’s Mediterranean policy (Cardone, 2008, p. 159). 
 
France attempted to sub-regionalise its relationship with the Southern Mediterranean. In 
the early 1980s, Francois Mitterrand had the idea to create western regional cooperation. 
Thus, France launched limited relations between the EC Mediterranean countries (Spain, 
Italy, France, Malta, and Portugal) and North African Mediterranean countries (Tunisia, 
Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, and Mauritania). The Regional West Mediterranean 
Cooperation Council was initiated in 1990 (Carbone, 2007, p. 160; Henry, 2012, p. 44). 
Italy criticised the project, as the country did not appreciate the lack of involvement of the 
EC and perceived that the strategy would mainly serve French interests. Finally, a 
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meeting of the EC Ministers of Foreign Affairs took place but did not result in a novel 
approach to the Mediterranean region (Carbone, 2007, p. 160). The 5+5 ministry of 
foreign affairs meeting launched in December 1990 was mainly directed towards 
economic cooperation, but the meeting was weakly structured and resulted in light 
dialogue (Carbone, 2007, p. 160). The project did not proceed far because the EC was 
simultaneously re-igniting the EC-Maghreb partnership, which became the EC-
Mediterranean initiative. This time, Spain played a bigger role, starting with the ME 
Peace Process in Madrid, followed by the Barcelona Process (Henry, 2012, p. 45).  
 
1.2.1 Barcelona Process 
 
Several factors, both internal and external, contributed to the initiation of the Barcelona 
Process. In July 1987, the King of Morocco applied to include Morocco in the EC. 
Morocco submitted this application as a response to the enlargement of the EC to include 
Spain and Portugal. This enlargement would negatively influence Morocco’s exports to 
the EC. The EC denied this request, but it nonetheless motivated France to call for 
Mediterranean preferential agreements. France’s ties with the Maghreb countries 
(Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria) were crucial to the birth of the Barcelona Process 
(Harrop, 2000, p. 267). Spain’s role in the Barcelona Process was also significant. Since 
the late 1980s, the Mediterranean Policy had been one of Spain’s main foreign policies, 
owing to Moroccan immigration to Spain. In the early 1990s, Spain sought collaboration 
with France and Spain on the Mediterranean Policy because of events in Algeria that 
alarmed the EC: a wave of violence passed Algeria after the president of Algeria stepped 
down in January 1992, causing the cancellation of the second round of elections. The 
Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), who was sure to win, felt that they were robbed of the 
victory. Therefore, by 1993, the FIS members resorted to violence, pushing people to 
consider emigrating to France (Evans & Phillips, 2007, p. 185). This influenced the 1.5 
million Algerians living in France at the time. During a visit to France in 1993, Spanish 
King Juan Carlos urged collaboration on development policy for Latin America and 
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Maghreb. Spain competed successfully within the EU (the EC became the EU after the 
Maastricht treaty in 1992) for certain parts of the Mediterranean policy. Spain drafted the 
EU documents that led to the Barcelona Declaration of 1995. This is evident in the 
similarities between the political and security sections in the Barcelona Declaration and 
the clauses in the Hispano Moroccan Friendship Treaty of 1991(Gillespie, 1996, pp. 205-
207) 
 
Another dimension to the interest of the EU in a preferential agreement with the 
Mediterranean countries was the desire to minimise the migratory pressure from the EU’s 
Southern borders with the Mediterranean countries (Amin & El Kenz, 2005, p. 82). The 
economic difference in income between the EC population and that of its neighbours 
caused waves of immigration to the EC. This was welcomed during the 1950s and 1960s, 
since external labour was needed to develop Europe after the Second World War (Amin 
& El Kenz, 2005, p. 83). After the Oil Crisis in 1973, European governments were faced 
with increasing unemployment and often resorted to anti-immigration measures, hoping 
to make jobs hitherto filled by immigrants available to nationals and thereby hoping to 
increase voter satisfaction (Castles & Vezzoli, 2009, p. 70)  
The economic recession of the early 1990s led to the erosion of the social welfare system, 
and high unemployment rates gave right-wing parties, which emphasised nationalistic 
feelings, a firmer base within the European population. The electoral campaigns of the 
National Front in France (NF), the Republican Party in Germany, and the Freedom Party 
of Austria (FPO) were mainly populist in character, and an important part of their 
programmes included policies aimed at foreigners. The influence of these parties 
impacted the immigration policies of the EU (Marfleet, 2000, pp. 266–276). 
 
Marfleet (2000, p. 270) observed that ‘fear from Islam was a stimulus for the Euro-
Mediterranean initiative’. Although the fear of Islam was not the only reason for this 
major shift in political and economic relations between the EU and ME, Amin and El 
Kenz (2005, p. 82) described the Euro-Mediterranean process as a ‘...[d]efence agreement 
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that protects the EU against possible Social and political and cultural overflowing from 
the countries of the Southern side of the Mediterranean’.  
On a different level, the EU, through the Barcelona Process, wanted to play a role in the 
peace process between the Palestinians and Israel. The EU position towards the Israeli- 
Palestinian conflict developed over the years from the mere self-determination of the 
Palestinians in the Venice Declaration of 19801 to a ‘viable Palestinian state’ in the 
Seville Declaration of 2002 (Directorate General External Relations, 2005).2 The United 
States was the dominant mediator in the Palestinian-Israeli peace process, and therefore, 
the EU wanted to capitalise on the Oslo3 Accord to provide a counterweight to the United 
States (Hollis, 2006, p. 319). The EU approach was that a dialogue for peace between 
conflicting parties could be reached through an economic platform like the Barcelona 
Process. By including Israel as well as Arab countries in the Barcelona Process, the EU 
aimed to attain Arab acceptance of Israel (Amin & El Kenz, 2005, p. 99).  
Economic factors and regional dominance formed another major incentive for the EU to 
initiate the Barcelona Process (Attina, 2004, p. 147). The EU wanted to assert its position 
in the Mediterranean region both politically and economically, and in this way, 
counterbalance the US sphere of influence with its North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) and Japan’s dominance in East Asia. 
Attina (2004, p. 147) attributes the Euro-Mediterranean initiative to the economic crisis in 
the 1970s, whereby Europe wanted to strengthen its global economic position by 
dominating the Mediterranean region and confirming its hegemony in the region. This 
                                               
 
 
1 ‘The Venice declaration of 13 June 1980 established the right to existence and to security of all States in the region, including Israel, 
and justice for all the peoples, which implies the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people’ (Commission, 2005). 
2 ‘The Seville declaration of 22 June 2002: A settlement can be achieved through negotiation, and only through negotiation. The 
objective is an end to the occupation and the early establishment of a democratic, viable, peaceful and sovereign State of Palestine, on 
the basis of the 1967 borders, if necessary with minor adjustments agreed upon by the parties. The end result should be two States 
living side by side within secure and recognised borders, enjoying normal relations with their neighbours. In this context, a fair 
solution should be found to the complex issue of Jerusalem, and a just, viable and agreed solution to the problem of the Palestinian 
refugees’ (Commission, 2005). 
3 The Oslo Accord: The Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements or Declaration of Principles was signed 
in 1993 between the Palestinian people and the Israelis. It was a declaration of principles whereby the Palestinian authorities would 
take control of the Gaza Strip and Jericho within two months of the declaration, while the final resolution was not specified and left to 
negotiations (Shlaim, 2005, p. 246). 
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was done on both political and economic levels. The policy resulting from that period 
developed relations with Mediterranean countries that were based on ‘asymmetric 
economic power’ between the two parties. In addition, regional competition between the 
three blocs in the world—NAFTA, the EU, and East Asia—played a role. Miller and 
Mishrif (2005, p. 97) believe that this competition pushed each bloc to attempt to 
strengthen its economic position by increasing its economic influence in the regions 
around it in two ways: through ‘economic influence and partnership’ (Miller & Mishrif, 
2005, p. 97).  
 
At the conclusion of the Barcelona Conference in 1995, the EU and Mediterranean 
countries came up with a working programme for their association. The Barcelona 
Process was more comprehensive and covered more than 40 domains (Philipart, 2003, p. 
203). It took the form of cooperation at three levels (Directorate General External 
Relations, 1995): 1) Political and security cooperation: The EU declared via the 
Directorate General External Relations (1995) that the Barcelona Process established a 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) whereby peace and prosperity would be spread 
among the signatory states. At this level, peace in the region would be promoted first 
through regular dialogue between signatories, while adhering to international laws 
(Directorate General External Relations, 1995); 2) Financial and economic cooperation: 
The goal of this cooperation was to achieve a shared area of prosperity, but given the 
economic disparities between the two parties in the AAs, the long-term objectives were 
aimed at socio-economic development, improved standards of living for the populations 
in the participant countries, and encouragement of regional integration (Directorate 
General External Relations, 1995); and 3) Social and cultural cooperation: The aim of 
this level of the agreement was to increase understanding and tolerance among the 
different cultures comprising the Mediterranean, to bring people closer (Directorate 
General External Relations, 1995). 
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1.2.2         The ENP 
 
EU security issues were linked directly to the stability of its neighbours and how the EU 
could address these stability issues (Calabrese, 1997, p. 86). A series of events from 1995 
(Barcelona Process) to 2003 changed the internal dynamics of the EU and its priorities. 
The 9/11 event in the United States brought forward global security priorities, and the 
focus shifted towards fighting fundamentalism. The Palestinian-Israeli peace process 
collapsed, and the invasion of Iraq escalated violence in the region. In addition, eastern 
enlargement of the EU brought neighbouring members into the EU. The security of the 
EU became the main driver for the ENP. The EU offered Southern Mediterranean 
countries the ENP as an alternative to enlargement, and it was simultaneously a 
mechanism to allow the EU to promote its policies (Del Sarto and Schumacher 2005, p. 
18). 
The ENP was a British initiative that started in 2002, but the initial focus was on relations 
with Eastern European countries. The British initiative did not consider the Mediterranean 
neighbours as part of this initiative. When the initiative was presented to the Copenhagen 
European Council, the council approved it on the condition that it also included the 
Southern Mediterranean countries (Smith, 2005, p. 759). In May 2004, the ENP—as it is 
known today—was launched by the commission. The participating countries and the 
name of the ENP changed multiple times; it covers 16 of the EU’s closest Southern 
neighbours: Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Syria, Tunisia, and 
Ukraine. 
The EU had offered the ENP as an alternative to enlargement, and the concept of a wider 
Europe was introduced. In this way, instead of membership, the ENP partner countries 
were given access to the EU market as an incentive. Prince El Hassan Bin Talal (2007) 
proposed that EU policy re-enforced the division between rich and poor when he stated,  
‘…the European Neighbourhood Policy for the poor contrasts with the EU’s Gulf 
Cooperation Council dialogue for the rich’. 
  
 
 
 
43 
 
Although the Commission confirmed that the ENP did not replace the EMP, but 
complemented it, the ENP was still designed to address political issues directly and 
explicitly and offer rewards to partners who delivered more results in terms of political 
and economic reforms, based on EU norms and standards, whereas the EMP addressed 
the socio-economic aspects of EU-Mediterranean relations (Del Sarto & Schumacher, 
2011, p. 933).  
1.2.3 Union for the Mediterranean 
 
Officially, the UfM was born in July 2008, during the Paris Summit, when the heads of 
state of 43 countries signed an agreement to bring it into existence. It was ratified at a 
Conference of Ministers in Marseille in November 2008. The French idea of the UfM 
departs from the bilateralism of the ENP, since this approach did not solve the security 
issue of the south, instead concentrating on major non-controversial projects and 
separating them from controversial politics (Gillespie, 2011, p. 1207). The UfM included 
more countries from the South, like Libya and Mauritania, and more Balkan countries, 
thereby rendering the union more comprehensive (Gillespie & Bicchi, 2012, p. 167) 
The UfM’s conception began in February 2007, when former French President Nicolas 
Sarkozy, during his electoral campaign, called for what he named a ‘Mediterranean 
Union’. The initial idea was that the Mediterranean Union would be a union around the 
Mediterranean similar to the EU.  
‘The time has come to build a Mediterranean Union that will be the bridge 
between Europe and Africa’ (Sarkozy International Herald Tribune, 10 May 
2007). 
 
The proposal was based on membership for all countries in the Mediterranean basin, with 
Turkey playing a major role in the union, instead of having EU membership. There was 
no direct connection between the proposed Mediterranean Union and the current 
Barcelona Process or the ENP (Carbone, 2008). Very soon after, in the year that followed, 
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and because of negotiations between France and other EU members, especially Germany, 
the Mediterranean Union was renamed the ‘Barcelona Process: Union for the 
Mediterranean’ (Gillespie, 2008, p. 277). The main argument from Germany was that the 
proposed Mediterranean Union would jeopardise the integration of the EU as well as 
existing relations with Mediterranean countries, and therefore the Barcelona Process was 
an attempt to bring the two initiatives under one banner.  
France’s motivation behind the Mediterranean Union was multi-fold. Since the 1950s, 
France had believed in the ‘French Union’ concept, stretching from Paris to Congo. North 
Africa, especially Algeria, was a crucial element in this plan. This union would restore 
France’s ‘great power’ (Evans, 2011, p. 130). France wanted to give Turkey an 
alternative by offering it a key role in the Mediterranean Union (Balfour & Schmid, 2008, 
p. 279).  
Like the Barcelona process, the non-EU Mediterranean countries were only recipients of 
the EU decision on the genesis of the new process under the banner of the UfM. All 
negotiations—those for what the UfM should achieve and by which policies— were intra-
EU negotiations. Once the rivalry issue had been resolved between France and Germany, 
the non-EU countries were advised of the next steps (Gillespie, 2008, p. 278). 
Nevertheless, several countries, like Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco, supported the UfM 
idea, since they felt that the ENP was not in their favour, and the new process would 
bring a parity in their relations with France which had been beset by their colonial history 
(Carbone, 2008). The proposals outlined by the French president aimed to address at least 
one of the criticisms expressed by Mediterranean partner countries over the years by 
proposing new institutional structures based on a degree of parity in North-South 
representation. (Gillespie, 2008, p. 278). 
The UfM identified six priority projects that were at the heart of the partnership’s efforts, 
including: 1) de-pollution of the Mediterranean Sea; 2) the establishment of maritime and 
land highways; 3) civil protection initiatives to combat natural and human-made disasters; 
4) a Mediterranean solar energy plan; 5) the inauguration of a Euro-Mediterranean 
University in Slovenia; and 6) a Mediterranean Business Development Initiative focusing 
on micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises (European Commission, 2010b).  
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1.3  Literature Review  
 
The purpose of this literature review is to identify trends and omissions in subject matter, 
opinions, and root causes. An inventory was made of the articles, books, and reports 
written about the instruments and the relations between the EU and its neighbours in the 
Southern Mediterranean: the Barcelona Process, the European Neighbourhood Policy, 
and the UfM. There is an emphasis on literature with an economic angle, since that is the 
main focus of this research. A selection of the literature published between 1995 and 
2015 is covered.  
To see at a glance which topics were discussed in a certain period, I identified nine 
different main topics and coloured them differently to easily distinguish the trends, as 
shown in Table 1.1.  
The literature is set in chronological order. Table 1.2 below shows that the period from 
1995 to roughly 2002 is characterized by subject matter pertaining to a lack of social and 
cultural dimensions in the agreement and planning, and a less than expected spill over 
from the economic realm to other fields. As of 2002, security and stability—as well as 
slow economic integration—became central issues. In 2007 and the following years, EU 
internal division, power asymmetry, an alleged lack of civilian power—or lack of the will 
to use it internationally—and eurocentrism were the main topics. Naturally, the main 
topics and periods coincide with major events like 9/11 and the 2004 enlargements as 
well as the shifts from one EU instrument to the next. The different articles will be 
discussed below the table, grouped by period. 
Table 1.1. Nine topics and colour coding  
Legend for colour coding 
Synergy/spill over Power asymmetry 
Internal security No use of civilian power/credibility 
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Lack of/bad planning Lack of social or cultural dimension 
EU internal division Partner/region internal issues 
Eurocentric/Euro self-interest  
 
Table 1.2. Articles, reports or books about the EU instruments in the Southern 
neighbourhood, chronologically ordered  
Year Author Opinion Cause 
1998 Edis, R. -The process is ambitious. 
-There are positive feelings 
towards the process. 
-Changes may be painful to some 
countries. 
-Major economic and political 
changes for Mediterranean 
partners 
1999 Youngs, R. Cooperation is bigger than trust, 
but progress lags. 
-False assumption that the 
economic, political and social 
aspects will reinforce each other 
 
Solution: Prioritize 
2002 Gillespie, R. -Lack of cultural planning 
-Cause stagnation because of a 
collapse in peace process 
-False reasoning: Economic 
liberalization will lead to political 
liberalization 
2002 Manners, I. -EU is the normative power -EU is the unique entity and being 
normative is an inevitable result 
of what it is. 
2002 Youngs, R. -Democracy promotion became 
less of a priority because 
-External democracy promotion 
less important than internal 
  
 
 
 
47 
increased Islamist influence was 
feared because of liberalization. 
-EU lost credibility, when no 
economic pressure was exercised  
on Israel 
security 
2003 Gillespie, R.  -More focus on social and 
cultural planning   
-Risk that new security concerns 
might prevail 
2004 Attina, F. -Reserved positive opinion on 
Barcelona Process become 
negative 
-Failing of the process leads to a 
negative attitude 
-Ambitious project, and the EU 
learns as it goes 
2005 Del Sarto 
and 
Schumacher 
-ENP failed -Changing international security 
policies 
2006 Nsouli, S.M.  -Generally improved 
relationships 
-Improved macro-economic 
stability 
-Slightly improved social 
indicators 
-Declining per capita GDP in 
partner countries.  
-High youth unemployment rates 
cannot keep up with population 
growth 
-Little progress in internal 
reforms 
-Long transition period, so results, 
if any, are late 
-Limited economic integration 
-No trade liberalization schedule 
for agriculture 
-Conflicts in the region affect 
economic stability 
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2007 Mortanari, 
M.  
-Barcelona process did not 
succeed in boosting Euro-Med 
bilateral trade 
-Low financial support for 
partners. 
-High agricultural protectionism 
-Long transition period 
Solution: Two level EU interests, 
North-south and Industrial-
agricultural 
2008 Gillespie, R.  -ENP made relations more 
positive 
-Barcelona goals were elusive 
 
-UfM based on French efforts not 
on ENP evaluation 
-Result of asymmetric economic 
relations: Only partners were 
informed 
2010 Bechev, F. -Eurocentric 
-Partner ownership debatable 
because of conditionality 
-Result of power asymmetry.  
Solution: Decentralized polity  
2011 Gillespie, R.  -There were no synergy  between 
the political, social and economic 
aspects. 
-UfM coloured by French 
ambition 
2011 Del Sarto, 
Schumacher 
-Few EMP few results 
-Different approach by ENP 
(positive conditionality) 
-Partners not committed to 
democratization 
-EU does not use negative 
conditionality 
-EU prefers political stability over 
democracy 
2011 Cardwell, 
P.J. 
-Partnership versus projecting 
own values 
-Euromed layers of governance 
and a weak partner 
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-EU goals seem inconsistent -EU goals are self-serving 
2011 Bicchi, F.  -EU went from regionalism to 
bilateralism in ENP 
-Relation is soft hegemony with 
no partnership 
-UfM is more bilateral (outcome 
minority initiative) 
-Security concerns 
-EU goals may be better served 
with bilateral and positive 
conditionality 
 
2012 Yildiz, U.B. -UfM has failed -Regional conflicts 
-Mistrust 
-No active role for the EU in 
conflict resolution 
 
Solution: Active role in conflict 
resolution 
-Political inclusion in partner 
countries 
2012 Abu 
Dalbouh, W. 
-EU lack influence on 
Mediterranean countries with 
regard to democracy promotion 
-Inability to challenge the United 
States on the Israeli-Palestinian 
issue 
2012  Tobias, A.  -Action plans for partners to 
reform, not for EU to adapt 
-Failure of EU to give partners 
concessions to enter the market 
-Internal north-south conflict 
2012 Teti, A -EU reaction to Arab Spring: EU 
repeats earlier mistake of 
democratization in the region  
--Weak EU leadership caused by 
a lack of strategy  
 
2013 Gillespie, R.  -UfM parameter set by EU -Eurocentric 
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a -No enhanced regional 
identification since ENP 
-Did not manage partner diversity 
-Differing geopolitical motives 
2013b Gillespie, R.  -EU reaction on Arab spring was 
cool 
- Weak EU leadership > lack of 
strategy 
2015 Celata & 
Coletti 
-ENP is important for EU’s 
geopolitical goals 
-Guarantee of security and 
stability 
-New neighbours > new dividing 
lines 
-Strengthening ties with new 
neighbours 
2015 Ion, G. Enhanced regional cooperation 
in South Mediterranean failed 
-Internal dynamics between Arab 
states 
-EU went from regionalism to 
bilateral cooperation 
2015 Kallioras, D. 
& Pinna, A. 
-ENP was launched because new 
neighbours in the south (and the 
east) contain crucial energy 
suppliers and emerging markets 
- EU trade and energy interests 
inspired ENP 
1.3.1  Literature review on the Barcelona Process and EMP 
 
Between 1998 and 2002, in the initial years of the Barcelona process, authors remarked 
that the expected spill over or synergy from economic liberalisation to the social and 
cultural fields did not take place (Youngs, 1999. Gillespie, 2002). At this point, the terms 
used, such as ‘progress lags behind’, were carefully chosen, and causes were found in the 
Eurocentric approach from a social-cultural perspective. Attina (2004, p. 140 - 152) 
remarked that a careful positive attitude quickly changed to a more negative outlook 
when the Barcelona Process appeared to be failing. From a liberal perspective, 
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improvements in the economic field were expected to be followed by liberalisation in the 
social and political fields. Social and political liberalisation had not thus far appeared to 
follow economic liberalisation; yet this seems an early point in the process to generalise 
this conclusion as being applicable to all Southern Mediterranean partners. Some 
partners, like Jordan, were not even a part of the process yet.  
 
Furthermore, for economic liberalization to affect other areas, there must be economic 
liberalization or at least some tangible progress in that field to begin with. The previous 
section, where the agreement with Jordan was discussed, noted that the AA with Jordan 
had scheduled a transition to the full abolition of tariffs for purely industrial products over 
a period of twelve years. Hence, at least at this point in the process, it was difficult to 
assess whether the dogma that economic liberalization would necessarily be followed by 
liberalization in other fields proved to be valid or invalid.  
 
Lack of cultural planning and the collapse of the Palestinian-Israeli peace process were 
seen as potential causes for the stagnation of the process (Gillespie, 2002). For 
agricultural products, there is little hope that tariffs will be abolished in the foreseeable 
future, since no schedule for tariff abolition is present in the Barcelona Process, and tariff 
abolition for industrial products will take up to twelve years. This may also influence the 
way the partners look at the agreement and cooperation, where there seem to be few easy 
wins in the short term for the Mediterranean partners. 
 
1.3.2 Literature review on ENP 
 
Between 2002 and 2007, there was a shift in focus towards the EU’s increased internal 
security concerns (Youngs, 2002; Gillespie, 2003; Del Sarto, 2005; Salah, 2006) while 
the mechanism of cooperation was changed to the ENP, also offering the Southern 
Mediterranean neighbours an alternative to EU membership. This shift to security can be 
attributed to the increased global and EU internal security concerns at the time following 
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the 9/11 event, the collapse of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, the invasion of Iraq, 
and the Algerian crisis (Del Sarto & Schumacher, 2005, p. 18). The global and EU 
internal security concerns appeared to reflect on the EU policies towards their Southern 
neighbours. In this respect, Youngs (2002) notes a lack of persistence when it comes to 
democracy promotion in the Southern area. In his view, the EU showed a preference for 
stability rather than liberalization, since liberalization may ultimately lead to further 
Islamization and, from the perspective of the EU, destabilization of the region. According 
to Youngs, the EU pursues a desire for stability, fed by internal security concerns, rather 
than democracy promotion in the Southern Mediterranean region. Nsouli (2006) noted 
that the results of the economic cooperation between the EU and the Southern 
Mediterranean partners were limited. Among the causes that he identified were the 
absence of a schedule for the implementation of the agricultural integration and the 
generally limited economic cooperation, in addition to the lack of spillover and synergy 
between economic, social, and political liberalization mentioned (Youngs, 1999. 
Gillespie, 2002) in the previous paragraph.  
 
Mortanari (2007), after having noted that the Barcelona Process did not bring about a 
boost in trade between the EU and the Southern partners, like Nsouli (2006), identifies a 
long transitional period among the causes. He furthermore sees the EU’s internal division 
of interests between the industrial North and the agricultural South as the main cause for 
the lack of financial aid to the Southern Mediterranean partners and the protection of the 
agricultural interests of the countries in the Southern part of the EU.  
 
While Mortanari may have partly answered the question of why economic cooperation 
was limited, the question remains regarding what goals and intentions the EU may then 
have had, in view of possibly limited intentions in the field of economic cooperation. 
Conversely, what then were the goals and expectations of the Mediterranean partners and 
what was their input and influence during the process, the implementation, and the 
negotiations?  
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This also raises the following question: if economic liberalization was the core of the 
cooperation that would create the momentum to bring change to other fields, why was 
economic cooperation limited (Nsouli, 2006), and how limited were the results for the 
partners? At the same time, though, should the criticism be moderated somewhat since 
economic liberalization was on a slow schedule for industry and on no schedule for 
agriculture? Bearing in mind the level of industrial development of the partner countries, 
how much economic liberalization and improvement could realistically be expected in the 
partner countries in the short and medium term? 
 
At this point, the concept of ‘normative power Europe’ introduced by Manners (2002) 
becomes relevant. Norm diffusion in general and diffusion of democratic values 
specifically are part of the normative power proposed by Manners (2002, p. 243). He 
argues that the EU is characterized by the centrality of respect for human rights, rule of 
law, democracy, and social justice. The EU’s international identity is further determined 
by the norms that define the relations between member states within the EU and the 
relations between the EU and third countries—the same norms that define the EU’s 
international and developmental policies. Manners (2002, pp. 241-242) concludes that the 
EU is thus normatively different from other polities. Manners continues with the 
argument that the EU not only acts like a normative power; it is a normative power at the 
core of its being (Manners, 2002, pp. 252). While Youngs considers it possible that the 
EU had the real intent to promote democracy and wanted to be a genuine power for good, 
the concept of normative power as an exclusive explanatory model does not coincide with 
Youngs’ (2002, p. 97) conclusion that the EU’s fear of further Islamization of the 
Southern Mediterranean region was related to the lack of progress in the field of political 
reform. Gillespie (2002) fears, in the same vein, that the social agenda of the Barcelona 
Process, although much improved, will be at risk of being secondary to the Union’s 
security concerns. Del Sarto and Schumacher (2005, p. 19) also attribute the EU’s shift in 
the ENP to a more conditional bilateral relationship with the Southern Mediterranean 
partners to the changed security considerations both globally and internal to the EU.  
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When examining the EU’s policy changes in the years following 9/11 and the 
corresponding literature, a shift towards a more controlled bilateral relationship with 
individual partners, instead of the previously more regional and region-building approach, 
is noted, together with the desire to pursue stability rather than normative goals in the 
field of democratic values or implementations. The policy shifts appear to have been 
caused by EU internal security concerns, which were in turn created by increased external 
global security and migration concerns. The policy shift was thus informed by security 
concerns in the international realm, the interstate anarchy, either in the sense of a 
constructed anarchy in the spirit of Wendt (1992, p. 394) or in the sense of the more 
absolute interstate anarchy as proposed by Waltz (2010, p. 91-93). The fact that the EU 
actively changed relations with its partners to more controlled relations—preferring 
stability over its own normative core goals of political liberalization and democratic 
values—may be an expression of self-help in an increasingly hostile international world. 
That is not to say that a degree of normative intent or action was by definition not present, 
only that the changing policy behaviour was most likely based, more than anything else, 
on reasons of self-help in an international world that was perceived as increasingly 
hostile. As previously noted, in this period, shifts in EU policy and the very core of the 
relations with the partners in the Southern Mediterranean were observed.  
1.3.3 Literature review on UfM 
 
As of 2007, the literature began to focus on the UfM and its inception. In addition to the 
instruments governing the relations between the EU and the partners in the Southern 
Mediterranean, the literature begins to revolve around EU internal issues resonating again 
on the changing focus of the cooperation. The cooperation shifts from issues of security 
to environmental issues of a different nature that were considered less controversial 
(Gillespie, 2011, p. 1207): for example, depollution of the Mediterranean Sea, 
establishment of sea and land highways, Mediterranean solar energy, and civil protection 
against disasters. 
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Regarding the goals of prosperity, security, and political reform that were set in the 
Barcelona Process, Gillespie (2008, p. 277) remarks that these goals were ‘elusive’. This 
may be an indication that the process achieved little in this field. Gillespie, however, feels 
that the process did improve the relations between the EU and the Partners. At the same 
time, he concludes that the new process, the UfM, was largely the result of EU foreign 
policy efforts, and the partners in the Southern Mediterranean were informed rather than 
consulted in the matter. The UfM was the result of the power asymmetry between the EU 
and the Mediterranean partners, according to Gillespie (2008, p. 278). Bechev (2010, p. 
480) also takes note of power asymmetry and attributes the limited ownership of the 
Mediterranean partners and eurocentrism to this asymmetry. In his 2011 article titled ‘The 
Union for the Mediterranean: An Intergovernmentalist Challenge for the EU’, Gillespie 
(2011) concludes that the UfM was a challenged project from the start because it was 
built on the contested ‘inter-governmental’ compromise between France, which on one 
hand wanted a new process outside the framework of the EU, and Germany, which was, 
on the other hand, insistent that the process should be integrated into the EU structure. 
Furthermore, the previous shift of instruments, from the EMP to the ENP and from 
multilateralism to unilateralism, was the result of the EMP’s failure more than anything 
else (Gillespie, 2011, p. 1206). Del Sarto and Schumacher (2005) also mention the 
limited results of the EMP, especially in the field of political reform and the shift from 
multilateralism to bilateralism in the ENP. They see the addition of positive conditionality 
in the ENP as a potentially promising development. However, they point out that 
advancements in the field of political reform may also be limited in the ENP, since the 
EU may prefer national and regional stability in the Southern Mediterranean over political 
reform and democratization. Cardwell (2011, p. 236) makes an important observation 
when he states that, although the EU’s different layers of instruments and changing 
approaches may seem incoherent, the limited input of the Mediterranean partners 
combined with the EU’s core governance system allows the EU to pursue its own goals. 
That observation is in line with the findings of the previous paragraph, in which 
instruments and policies appeared to change based on varying EU concerns and interests 
rather than those of the Mediterranean partners. In this paragraph, a similar pattern is 
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observed. Authors like Gillespie (2008), Bechev (2010), and Cardwell (2011) are of the 
opinion that the UfM was mostly the result of power asymmetry and EU internal issues, 
while the role of the partners was reduced to being ‘informed’. While Bicchi 
acknowledges the lack of true partnership, she adds that the shift to bilateral positive 
conditionality that started in the ENP and continued in the UfM may serve the EU’s 
security concerns better (Bicchi, 20011, p. 16). The EU’s lack of participation in the 
resolution of local conflicts as well as the EU’s limited efforts to assist in creating 
political reform and stability in the partner countries is, according to Yildiz (2012, p. 117, 
144), among the causes for the limited success of the UfM. Also, Abu Dalbouh (2012) 
points out the EU’s limited application of civilian power. He identifies the EU’s inability 
to confront the United States with regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a cause for 
the EU’s lack of credibility and influence when trying to promote democratization in the 
Southern Mediterranean partner countries. Tobias (2012, p. 200-201) views the limited 
progress in the field of political reform in the Southern Mediterranean partner countries as 
a result of the EU’s inability to offer their partners concessions to access the market. This 
decreased the importance and influence of the EU in the region. This lack of concessions, 
he argues, is the result of power asymmetry that led to situations in which action plans for 
reform only existed for the partner countries, while no plans whatsoever existed for 
reforms in the EU. Tobias’ observations not only offer explanatory value for the 
diminishing EU influence in the region but may also give an indication of a strong degree 
of one-sidedness in the EU process in the Southern Mediterranean. The question of how 
the agreements and instruments came into being in this form becomes, in this light, 
inevitable. 
 
Gillespie (2013b) draws attention to the fact that the EU did offer co-ownership in the 
UfM. Gillespie also notes, however, that the increased number of partners and their 
differences made it more difficult to bridge these differences, while the divergences at the 
same time led to the formation of subgroups among the partners (Gillespie, 2013b, p. 178, 
186). In another article from the same year, Gillespie (2013a) notes that the EU reacted to 
the Arab spring with the ENP and that such a reaction was less than expected by the 
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countries in the Southern Mediterranean. According to Gillespie, this flawed reaction was 
caused by weak leadership and the resulting lack of an EU strategy (Gillespie, 2013a p. 
121-122). Del Sarto and Schumacher had already brought forward in their article (2011, 
p. 984) that the EU appeared to prefer regional stability over political reform. This EU 
preference for stability may very well be a plausible explanation for the EU’s less 
enthusiastic reaction to the Arab Spring mentioned by Gillespie (2013a). Also, the EU’s 
delay in reacting was a measure of how it had underestimated the pressure for change or 
ignored it in the interest of security and stability. Teti (2012, p. 266) highlighted the 
policy set by the EU as a reaction to the Arab Spring, and in setting the Partnership for 
Democracy and Shared Prosperity (PfDSP), it repeated its earlier mistakes in 
democratization promotion in the region. The discussion in that article suggests that there 
was no substantial break from the EU prior to the Arab Spring policy on democracy and 
liberalization promotion, but that it is a mere variation to the same rhetoric (Teti, 2012, p. 
279-280) and focused only on civil and political rights within the narrow definition of 
democracy, which depended mainly on procedural criteria that focused on elections and 
political rights over social and economic factors. The EU position through PfDSP 
perpetuated its poor reputation on democracy promotion in the region (Teti, 2012, 266) 
 
 
Celata and Coletti also conclude that the EU’s main focus after the 2004 enlargement was 
security and stability at its new borders and that this security focus led to the ENP as an 
instrument for building relationships of strategic relevance. Gabriela Ion (2015, p. 496) 
concludes that the EU’s efforts towards region building in the Southern Mediterranean 
and the efforts to build cooperation between the Southern Mediterranean region and the 
EU were not successful because of the ENP’s shift to bilateralism and the dynamics 
between the Arab states themselves. 
 
As a conclusion to the literature review on EMP, ENP, and UfM, we can state that while 
Youngs (1999) and Gillespie (2002) noted that economic liberalisation was not followed 
by liberalisation in other fields, the intermediate conclusion had to be that, at that point in 
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time, several partner countries were not yet part of the EuroMed process and that, as a 
result, not much economic liberalisation or integration could be expected for the partner 
countries in general. Therefore, fixed conclusions regarding the success or failure of 
multi-field liberalisations initiated by economic liberalisation were difficult to come to. 
When the continuation of the various iterations of EU instruments in the Southern 
Mediterranean is observed, an intriguing picture emerges. The economic interests of the 
Southern EU Member States hindered swift and optimal economic integration with the 
Southern Mediterranean partners. In this respect, Tobias (2012) mentions the lack of 
concessions made by the EU to facilitate market entry, while Mortanari (2007) notes the 
same protection and adds to that the lack of financial aid given to the partners and the 
long transition period. Also, Nsouli (2006) took note of the long transition period and 
views it together with the limited economic integration and the absence of a trade 
liberalisation schedule for agriculture as reasons for the failure of the ENP to boost trade 
between the EU and the Southern Mediterranean partners.  
Assuming that few tangible economic improvements were made in the different 
processes, and assuming that, as the literature suggests, little was offered to the partners 
with regard to incentives and concrete integration schedules to begin with, why would the 
Southern Mediterranean partners embark on such a process, especially when they were 
aware that that process was labelled as one in which economic aspects were at the core? 
Conversely, if genuine economic integration with the Southern Mediterranean partners 
was intended by the EU, why did the EU not attempt to facilitate this integration more? 
Since the economic integration and liberalization regarding the different EU processes in 
the Southern Mediterranean alone leads to many questions, the notion of economic 
liberalization leading to political and social liberalization will be abandoned for the 
purposes of this research. 
 
Manners (2002) views the EU as a construct that—because of its history, policies, 
behaviour, and overall existence—must be a normative power, a power that spreads EU 
core values like respect for the rule of law and democratization. Interestingly, Youngs 
(2002) observes that EU efforts in the field of democratization and political liberalization 
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lessened. He concludes that the EU considered liberalization unfavourable in a political 
climate with Islamists. The EU thus preferred stability over liberalization. In addition, Del 
Sarto and Schumacher (2011) note the EU’s tendency to let stability prevail over 
democratization. Bicchi (2011) concludes that the EU’s shift to bilateral relations and 
positive conditionality with regard to the Southern Mediterranean partners was informed 
by the EU’s security concerns, and the conclusion of Celata and Coletti (2011)—that the 
ENP is the response to the EU’s security concerns after it was confronted with new 
borders—shows the importance of security concerns to the EU. In this case, the 
instruments and modes of cooperation were arguably changed because of security 
concerns. Celatta and Coletti (2011) proceed to conclude that the main reason for the 
establishment of the ENP was the fact that the Southern Mediterranean contained energy 
suppliers and emerging markets crucial to the EU. 
The image emerging mostly from the literature is that of the EU as a polity that changes 
policies, instruments, and modes of cooperation at least partly based on security concerns 
external to the EU. Whether this should lead to the conclusion that the nation states 
gathered in the EU—as well as the EU—have an exclusive view of the international 
world as an anarchy is questionable. The literature does suggest, however, that important 
major decisions by the EU were informed by security concerns. Therefore, the 
perspective of the EU as an entity that is reactive or proactive with regard to security 
concerns is legitimate and useful as an explanatory model for the purpose of this paper. In 
addition, a stable energy supply and the wish to enter new emerging markets were 
mentioned as possible intended economic gains (Kallioras & Pinna, 2015, p. 61). In view 
of the previous statements, the question arises as to what extent security concerns and/or 
economic interests motivated the different EU-Southern Mediterranean processes and to 
what extent these concerns influenced the policies and content of the agreements. 
 
Gillespie (2008) gives an illustrative and near-symbolic example of power asymmetry 
when he mentions that the Southern Mediterranean partners were merely informed about 
the changes brought about by the UfM. Bechev (2010) considers power asymmetry to be 
the main reason for the lack of ownership arguably present in the UfM project, while 
  
 
 
 
60 
Cardwell’s (2011) findings suggest that the imposition of EU values on their partners is 
the result of the relative weakness of the EU partners. Gillespie (2013b) and Tobias 
(2012) both consider power asymmetry the cause of the Eurocentric approach to the 
action plans. At the same time, Youngs (2002), Yildiz (2012), and Abu Dalbouh (2012) 
notice the EU’s reluctance to use civilian power to assist in conflict resolution regarding 
Israel. The literature suggests that the presence of a degree of eurocentrism in the 
instruments and their execution is the result of the power asymmetry between the EU and 
the Southern Mediterranean partners. If this argued power asymmetry is unlikely to lead 
to the most favourable conditions and outcomes in an agreement, the question of why the 
Southern Mediterranean partners decided to become part of the different EU processes in 
the region begs for an answer. 
1.4 Analysis of The Barcelona Process within the Theoretical Framework 
 
At the conclusion of the Barcelona Conference in 1995, the EU and Mediterranean 
countries came up with a working programme for their association. It took the form of 
cooperation in three principal areas mirrored in the AAs with various Mediterranean 
countries. The Declaration of Barcelona in 1995 was formulated around this cooperation 
in these main areas (EEAS, Barcelona Declaration, 1995), quoted as follows: 
 
1) Political & security partnership: Establishing a common area of peace & stability, 2) 
Economic & financial partnership: Creating an area of shared prosperity and 3) 
Partnership in social, cultural and Human affairs: Developing human resources, 
promoting understanding between cultures & exchanges between civil societies. 
 
Thus, the Barcelona Process was more than a trade agreement; it was a comprehensive 
process that covered more than 40 domains (Philipart, 2003, p. 203). 
If we view the three pillars of the agreement from a liberalist point of view, we may see 
that the EU is trying to link economic development and democracy with peace. 
Liberalism underlines that the cures for war are democracy and free trade. Free trade 
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helps create a larger community by eliminating the barriers between community 
subsectors. Democracy minimises the power of the ruling class, which might want to use 
that power to serve its own interests (Burchill, 1995a).  
 
Neorealism will point out that though peace and prosperity is the rhetoric of liberalism, 
the mechanisms and tools used in the EU interference with the internal political and 
economic structure of its partners intended to emphasize EU dominance over its partners 
to address its internal migration pressure and securities issues. Marxism can complement 
that view by underlining that the principles of trade between the two parties are based on 
EU standards rather than a common set of standards, in which an economic power 
imposes its standards on an economically weaker nation to harness the outcome of that 
relationship for its own benefit (Parenti, 1995). 
 
The partnership terms (Directorate General External Relations, 1995) established by the 
EU were defined in the following three levels of the agreements. The first areas were 
related to political and security terms. At this level, peace in the region would be 
promoted first through regular dialogue between signatories, while adhering to 
international laws. Cooperation among the signatories was based on several principles: 
respect for human rights, internal promotion of good governance and democratic systems, 
respect for pluralism, respect for sovereign equality, non-intervention by the EU in 
internal affairs, combatting terrorism, sharing information, and fighting organised crime. 
Signatory states would pay special attention to promoting security through nuclear, 
chemical, and biological non-proliferation efforts, limiting armaments to defence 
requirements and avoiding the accumulation of weapons to achieve a zone free of 
weapons of mass destruction. The final goal of cooperation in the field of security was to 
create a Euro-Mediterranean Pact (Directorate General External Relations, 1995).  
We can review the political aspects of the Barcelona agreement from multiple points of 
view. First, the political aspect of Euro-Mediterranean relations has its roots in the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) that the EU wanted to develop (Miller & 
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Mishrif, 2005, p. 95). These security concerns surfaced during a council meeting in 1994 
prior to the launch of the Barcelona Process.  
The EU concern relates to the EU’s own security, which is threatened by mass migration 
that the unstable neighbouring countries have caused. This immigration, besides 
threatening the national identity of the EU, also brings the conflicts of other nations from 
outside the EU into the EU. This is, within neo-realism, a pivoting point for the state. 
These concerns started at the beginning of the 1990s and came from the entire region. It 
started in Algeria when the FIS won the 1992 elections and violence resulted in the 
cancellation of the election result (Evans & Phillips, 2007, p. 170). By January 1992, the 
president of Algeria stepped down, causing the cancellation of the second round of 
elections, and the FIS resorted to violence because they felt they had been robbed of sure 
victory. The violence pushed people to consider immigrating to France (Evans & Phillips, 
2007, p. 185). This influenced the 1.5 million Algerians living in France at the time. The 
concerns continued with the Gulf wars and the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in the early 
1990s, as well as the ongoing Palestinian-Israeli conflict (Moss, 2000, p. 47). All these 
events pushed the EU to review its strategy, resulting in the political provisions in the 
EU-Mediterranean relationship. 
 
At a second level, one can see the EU’s attempts at promoting peace in the region through 
dialogue, especially among the two parties of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. At a third 
level, the EU/EC intended to promote human rights and democracy as a method of 
influencing the internal political system of the participants. Pace, Seeberg, and Cavarort 
(2005) allude to the logic behind the EU interconnectivity between economic prosperity 
and democratisation, which brings us back to liberalism, in which the EU’s point of view 
was that economic prosperity automatically leads to democratisation, and on that basis, 
the EU signed a series of AAs with MENA countries. However, Pace, Seeberg, and 
Cavarort (2005) raise the idea that an increase in prosperity does not necessarily lead to 
democratisation, especially since the EU’s approach was lacking in both policy and 
agreements addressing a long-term vision on democratisation in the MENA region (Pace, 
Seeberg, & Cavarort, 2005, p. 11).  
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The second of the three areas were the Economic and Financial Partnership for Shared 
Prosperity. The goal of this cooperation was to achieve a shared area of prosperity, but 
given the economic disparities between the two parties in the AAs, the long-term 
objectives were aimed at socio-economic development, improved standards of living for 
the populations in the participant countries, and encouragement of regional integration. 
To reach these long-term goals, the signatory states should follow three steps: first, 
establish a free trade area between signatory states; second, cooperate and coordinate 
efforts to develop common areas of interest; and third, increase financial aid from the EU 
to its partners. 
The free trade area should have been realised by 2010, and done so according to the 
World Trade Organization’s (WTO) principles of gradually eliminating tariffs and trade 
barriers. Trade would be divided into three categories: first, trade in manufactured goods, 
in which there was a set timetable for tariff elimination; second, trade in agricultural 
goods, which would be dealt with through liberalisation of the markets of the parties, 
considering the different EU agricultural policies; and third, free trade of services, 
including the right of establishment, which would be implemented in the respective 
markets based on the General Agreement on Trade in Services. As a precondition to the 
establishment of the free trade area, the participants had to adhere to EU regulations 
concerning country of origin determination and ensure proper application of intellectual 
property and copyright regulations.  
To analyse this goal, we can refer to Hix (2005, p. 379), who argues that the EU effort to 
develop its external policies went hand in hand with the development of its internal 
policies. The EU’s external policy is based on the Common External Tariff and Common 
Commercial Policy (CCP) and emanates from the necessity to preserve and support its 
internal coherence and interests (Peterson & Bomber, 1999, p. 91). The EU’s main 
concerns in the field of its external trade were the key areas of energy and raw materials. 
Thus, the EU concentrated its external relations on ex-colonies of EU members, which 
were rich in these resources (Harrop, 2000, p. 261). Therefore, from its inception, the 
policy was selective in its range of countries and materials. 
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However, because the CCP overlaps with other internal EU policies, especially the 
Common Agricultural Policy, the EU was not following the principles of liberalism 
(Harrop, 2000, p. 261), more those of neo-realism and Marxism. Thus, the EU still has in 
place several protectionist policies, as follows: 1. Common external tariffs by which the 
EU applies one tariff on goods entering the EU, the highest being on agricultural products 
at approximately 18%, and the lowest, and the lowest 0% on some manufactured goods; 
2. anti-dumping measures by which the commission can impose a tariff if the EU deems it 
a necessary measure to protect domestic producers; 3. import quotas, in which national 
quotas are replaced by EU quotas on imports, mainly of agricultural products, textiles, 
and iron and steel; and 4. voluntary export restraints, a measure that usually follows 
political pressure by importers or to protect the interests of exporters or importers on the 
account of the consumers of importing countries (Hix, 2005). Peterson and Bomberg 
(1999, p. 95) best describe the trade policy of the EU as ‘schizophrenic’: on one hand, the 
EU pushes for liberalisation, but on the other hand, it promotes protectionism for certain 
agricultural products to serve certain classes within the EU. This phenomenon certainly 
surfaces with highly politicised trade policies; in particular, France would join Italy, 
Spain, and Portugal to block any decisions for the liberalisation of agricultural markets. 
Despite the EU’s protectionist policy, Tsoukalis (1997, p. 237) argues for the 
‘international liberalisation’ of trade worldwide to the EU. However, did the EU not steer 
world trade in the direction of its own interests? Here, the role that the EU played in the 
WTO is significant. The EU, when negotiating in the different multinational rounds of 
global trade liberalisation, negotiates as a bloc with significant trade weight and thus is 
more influential in the decision-making process. Tsoukalis explains that during the 
Uruguay and Doha rounds, the EU was aware that it would lose ground on some of its 
protectionist policies, especially in the field of agriculture, and the EU wanted to obtain 
some gains on intellectual property, copyright, and the liberalisation of services 
(Tsoukalis 1997, p. 238), areas in which the world economy was actually developing. 
At a second level of analysis for this goal, the EC/EU intended to influence the 
participants’ internal economic policies by explicitly requiring that the parties keep an 
open door to dialogue on their own internal policies.  
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The third area was social, cultural, and human affairs. The aim of this level of the 
agreement was to increase understanding and tolerance among the different cultures 
comprising the Mediterranean to bring people closer (Directorate General External 
Relations, 1995). The participants had to cooperate to promote cultural recognition 
through the mass media and to organise campaigns against racism and xenophobia 
(Directorate General External Relations, 1995). 
This level of the agreement highlighted the role of migration and its effect on 
relationships between people and encouraged policies for the reversal of trends, thereby 
encouraging participants to cooperate ‘to reduce migratory pressure’ (Directorate General 
External Relations, 1995) using job creation and training. Meanwhile, the signatory states 
would need to cooperate more closely (Peridy, 2012) to minimise illegal migration, 
permit re-admission, and develop measures and policies to minimise illegal migration. 
Finally, participants had to institute effective measures to fight international crime, 
corruption, terrorism, and human trafficking (Directorate General External Relations, 
1995). The theoretical frameworks that explain this element of the agreement are realism 
and Marxism. In neo-realism, security is the main concern of the EU, and it will thus 
attempt to put content in all measures to minimize the flow of migration, while in 
Marxism, in view of the EU internal pressure from the right wing parties in France and 
Austria, the EU’s aim would have been to influence the internal social and economic 
structure of its partners to minimize migration to the EU and thus serve the EU right wing 
parties. 
 
1.4.1 The role of EU institutes in the AA 
 
The role of the EU institutes in the AA is highly relevant to the analysis because it will 
underline the role of each country in the process and its influence on the actual agreement 
conditions and concessions. The EU concludes several kinds of agreements with other 
countries under the scope of Article 300 for Trade Agreements and Article 310 of the 
AAs (Bomberg & Peterson, 1999, p. 93). However, the AAs underwent a long procedure 
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that required a majority vote in the European Parliament. This gave EU producers the 
opportunity to lobby against some of the concessions to low-cost imports in the AAs. The 
result was ‘disappointing’ agreements for other parties (Peterson & Bomberg, 1999, p. 
93). 
Montanari (2007, p. 1011) argues that negotiations at different levels—nationally, inter-
EU, and finally with Mediterranean countries—have led to greater protectionism for 
agricultural products, lower financial support, and a long transition period. At the start, 
EU policy for the Barcelona Process partners was formed at the level of national interest. 
The EU member states’ interests differed from North to South. Southern EU member 
states were interested in greater protection of agricultural products to protect their 
agricultural producers (mainly citrus fruit) from competition from Barcelona Process 
partners. However, the Southern EU member states are also proponents of greater 
financial aid to boost the local economies of the Barcelona Process partners, since the bill 
for financial aid would be paid by the Northern EU member states. However, the 
Northern EU member states advocate lower protectionism for agricultural products and 
lower financial aid for Barcelona Process partners, since the northern countries compete 
less with the Barcelona Process partners (Montanari, 2007). At the level of inter-EU 
negotiations, the Northern EU countries advocated greater liberalisation of trade with the 
Barcelona Process partners to open the EU’s agriculture market to those partners in order 
to ensure liberalisation of the Barcelona Process markets for the industrial products of the 
Northern EU countries. Meanwhile, the Southern countries of the EU advocated greater 
protectionism. Thus, the EU policy in the Barcelona process had to be formulated as a 
compromise between the industrial producers (quick liberalisation of the market) of the 
Northern EU member states and the Southern agricultural producers (protectionism). 
Thus, to find an acceptable compromise, the outcome of the inter-EU negotiations was 
that there would be protectionism of the agricultural sector and lower financial aid 
(Montanari, 2007, pp. 1019–1021). As a result, the EU negotiators had little manoeuvring 
space for compromise with the partnering countries when going to the negotiating table 
with the Mediterranean partners. 
 
  
 
 
 
67 
The Barcelona Process has set the basis for establishing multiple institutes and bodies to 
ensure the implementation this agreement:  
At the first level, the Foreign Minister’s role in the process is crucial to ensuring the 
implementation of the agreement. The minister meets regularly to set the actions 
stemming from the agreement and to follow up on implementation. The second level of 
institution that was set by the agreement was the Euro-Mediterranean Committee for the 
Barcelona process. The committee consists of senior-level officials from the EU, Troïka, 
and one representative from each Mediterranean partner. At the third level, The Economic 
and Social Committee of the European Community and their Mediterranean counterparts 
would contribute to a better understanding of the major issues relevant in the Euro-
Mediterranean partnership.  
The European Commission became the secretariat and strategic part of the Barcelona 
process. It undertook preparatory and follow-up work for the meetings resulting from the 
Barcelona Work Programme and the conclusions of the Euro-Mediterranean Committee. 
Representatives from state and public administrations, as well as the private sector and 
education and civil society, formed a mixed body that served as ad hoc thematic networks 
and meetings. The commission would plan these meetings, and the Euro-Mediterranean 
Committee would assess and evaluate these meetings. 
Conclusion  
An examination of the literature revealed that the economic interests of the Southern 
EC/EU Member States, the lack of concessions made by the EC/EU to facilitate market 
entry (Tobias, 2012), the lack of financial aid to the partners and the long transition 
period (Mortanari, 2007), the long transition period alongside the limited economic 
integration, and the lack of a trade liberalization schedule for agriculture (Nsouli, 2006) 
as the reasons for the absence of a boost in trade as a result of the ENP. Little or no spill 
over to the policy areas of political and social liberalisation was noted (Youngs, 1999; 
Gillespie, 2002), but since liberalisation achievements in the area of economics were 
modest, little could reasonably be expected from the other policy areas, at least when 
following the EC/EU scenario wherein economic liberalisation was the core after which 
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other policy areas followed. At the same time, the Barcelona Process was considered an 
ambitious initiative that led to better relations between the EU and the Southern 
Mediterranean (Edis, 1998; Youngs, 1999). This invites further investigation of the 
following: 
 
Assuming that few tangible economic improvements were made in the different 
processes, and assuming that, as the literature suggests, little was offered to the partners 
with regard to incentives and concrete integration schedules to begin with, why would the 
Southern Mediterranean partners embark on such a process, especially when they were 
aware that that process was labelled as one in which economic aspects were at the core? 
Conversely, if genuine economic integration with the Southern Mediterranean partners 
was intended by the EU, why did the EU not attempt to facilitate this integration more?   
 
On the other hand, literature suggests that the EU policy choices are at least in part 
influenced by security concerns, the presence of energy sources, and potential new 
markets (Celatta & Coletti, 2011). In view of the previous, some questions arise: 
 
To what extent did security concerns and/or economic interests motivate the different EU-
Southern Mediterranean processes, and to what extent did these concerns influence the 
policies and content of the agreements? 
 
Gillespie (2008) gives an illustrative example of an indication of power asymmetry when 
he mentions that the Southern Mediterranean partners were merely informed about the 
changes brought about by the UfM. The literature overwhelmingly suggests that power 
asymmetry in favour of the EU resulted in eurocentrism in the instruments and the 
execution of the process (Gillespie, 2008, p. 278) (Bechev, 2010, p. 480) (Tobias, 2012, 
pp. 200-201).  
 
First, was there power asymmetry in the relations between Jordan and the EU, and if yes, 
to what extent did it affect the negotiations, the Agreement, and its implementation? 
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Aware that the power asymmetry will not result in favourable results, the question is why 
the Southern Mediterranean partners agreed to participate in the three processes: EMP, 
ENP and UfM?  
 
Conclusion and research questions 
The literature as well as the examination of the Barcelona Process agreement have 
supplied many indications that the EU’s motivations for changing policies and 
instruments were based on security concerns and possible economic gain. Therefore, a 
neo-realist perspective to explain the actions of the actors seems appropriate.  
 
However, some reservations will be had as to the absolute and pre-existing nature of 
anarchy as proposed in neo-realism. Reference is made in this case to Wendt’s (1992) 
social constructivism, which allows a more fluid inter-subjective definition of the 
interstate world and to the approach of Carr, who saw an essential need for something 
more than realism to be able to create an acceptable interstate world (Schmidt, 1998, p. 
221). When an analysis towards the improvement of human interest becomes necessary, 
critical theory (Steinberg & Kincheloe, 2010) may provide an approach. Theory is seen as 
an explanatory tool for the purpose of this research, not a goal in itself. 
Further examination of the questions posed in the above, in the ‘Inventory of findings and 
issues’, warrants the following questions: 
● What were Jordan’s political and economic motivations to join the Barcelona 
process?  
● In view of the asymmetry of power, did the AA negotiations between Jordan and 
EC/EU serve the goals of Jordan?  
● To what extent was the AA resulting from the negotiations between Jordan and 
the EC/EU economically beneficial for Jordan? 
● Did the economic, structural, and legal reforms that Jordan undertook through the 
action plans of 2005 and 2010 result in improvements in Jordan’s economic 
performance?  
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Chapter Two 
The Jordan Political Economy Leading to the Barcelona 
Process 
Introduction  
 
The goal of this chapter is to create a starting point and a baseline for the political and 
economic situation in Jordan that led to the 1995 Jordan-EU AA. The different aspects 
characterise Jordan’s economy and political and economic makeup will be explored to 
create a deeper understanding of who the major political and economic stakeholders are 
and what motivates the actions of these stakeholders. Since the subject of this research is 
the EU-Jordan AA signed in 1997, this chapter will start with 1921 and cover events up to 
the period just before the signing of the AA in the 1990s. A chronological order will be 
followed to optimally determine cause and effect, while exploring the historical 
development of Jordan’s political economy. An overview will be given of the 
international and regional economic cooperation initiatives in which Jordan participated 
or is still participating. In essence, this section describes Jordan’s journey towards an 
open market economy, economic liberalization, globalization, and Jordan’s methods for 
dealing with the tension between internal and external pressures in a volatile and ever-
changing region. 
 
The interpretative framework that will be employed in this chapter was outlined in 
Chapter One. Actions and narratives as well as facts and results will be examined to 
determine motivational forces and actual goals. A realist perspective will be guided with 
the assumption of politico-economic actions being largely goal-oriented. However, when 
exposing motivations, Marxist assumptions about the continuing tension between the 
possessing class and the working class and the continuing drive of the possessing class to 
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perpetuate its domination on both the national and international levels will be accepted. A 
critical analysis is proposed regarding the impact of political and economic change on the 
general population to maintain perspective on the interests of the majority.  
 
2.1 The Jordan Political Economy  
2.1.1 Pre-1970s political economy in Jordan  
 
The March 1921 meeting between Prince Abdullah Ibn Al Hussain and British Minister 
Churchill resulted in agreeing to instate Prince Abdullah as the ruler of Jordan, which was 
the Emirate of Transjordan at the time, to establish a national government with an 
independent administration that was financially supported by the British (Klaifat, 2012, p. 
160). In April 1921, Prince Abdullah established the first government, and British high 
commissioner Herbert Samuel appointed Julius Abramson as his first representative in 
Amman (Klaifat, 2012, p. 160). 
 
According to the 1924 Britannic Majesty's Government report on Transjordan, its 
population at the time was around 200,000 and included mainly Muslims, Christians, 
Circassians, and Chechens.  
 
The territories were divided into three separate districts: Ajloun, the Balqa, and Karak. A 
Council of Ministers was formed, and a Governor was appointed in each district 
(Britannic Majesty's Government, 1924). The main cities were Amman, Salt, and Karak. 
In the first years of his rule, Prince Abdullah saw financial difficulties. After reinstating 
Prince Abdullah as ruler in 1921, and for the period from 1921 to 1946, the Emirate of 
Transjordan had political stability. That stability attracted rich elites, mainly of 
Palestinian and Syrian origin (Wils, 2001, pp. 123-124). At that time, the majority of the 
Emirate of Transjordan’s income came from two sources: taxes and British financial aid, 
and he depended on British financial aid. Initially, in 1924, Transjordan received financial 
aid of 150,000 pounds, but it was reduced to 60,000 pounds in 1925 because of a lack of 
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satisfactory statements of accounts (Britannic Majesty's Government, 1924). This 
reduction created instability, but it made the Prince open to other sources of income.  
 
Since British financial support was fluctuating and did not cover the prince’s obligations, 
he resorted to the elites for financial support. As a result, these elites enjoyed some 
privileges with the palace government. In particular, they accumulated huge wealth after 
World War II, when they had access to import licences. After Transjordan gained 
independence in 1946 and became Jordan, making Abdullah King, state income was low, 
so the wealth of these elites began to fund the industries and the financial sector of the 
country, thus enabling the government to maintain strong relationships with the elites and 
supplying them with advantages over their competitors (Wils, 2001, pp. 123-124).  
The 1948 Arab-Israeli War impacted Jordan’s economy. First, Jordan was cut off from its 
coastal access; then Jordan received thousands of Palestinian refugees. The Palestinian 
businesspeople transferred their wealth from Palestine to Jordan (Wils, 2001, p. 124). 
Thus, by the 1950s, because of high demand, there was a need for industrial 
modernisation to be led by the government. A close net of nationalist bureaucrats marked 
by leftist aspirations and led by Hamad Al-Farhan, Minister of Economy, challenged the 
British free market approach in Jordan that was dominant during the pre-independence 
period. This close net, convinced of a state intervention policy (El Said, 2001, p. 148) 
began to develop, and the Ministry of Economic Affairs launched developmental projects, 
such as the Aqaba Port, and began to cooperate with the wealthy elites to fund these 
projects in the absence of foreign investment or external financial aid. Thus, during the 
1950s, phosphate mining, cement factories, and oil refinery companies were established. 
In return for financial support, these elites were given privileges and a monopoly over the 
market, securing against their losses. In the 1960s, when major institutions in the 
Jordanian economy, like the Central Bank of Jordan, the Industrial Bank of Jordan, and 
the Chamber of Commerce of Jordan, were established, these elites and their families 
were appointed as members of the boards of directors in these institutions (Wils, 2001, p. 
126). 
  
 
 
 
73 
These bureaucrats’ power was amplified by the weakening of the palace after the 
assassination of King Abdullah I in 1951. The young King Hussein took power at the age 
of 18 in 1953, and the bureaucrats kept a strong hold until 1957, when, after the failure of 
the Zarqah military coup, and an attempt on King Hussein’s life, the prime minister, 
Suleiman Nabulsi, was forced to resign (King Hussein, p. 106-108), which weakened the 
movement. 
The 1967 war resulted in another wave of Palestinian refugees, and a military movement 
began to develop within the kingdom. The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) 
began to develop a country within a country, and that caused friction between the palace 
and the PLO. In September of 1970, that friction escalated to military action against the 
PLO by the Jordanian Armed Forces (King Hussein, 224). 
 
During the Cold War, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, unlike Egypt and Syria, was not 
linked to the USSR, but remained pro-West. King Hussein’s opinion of communism 
might shed some light on the will of Jordan to ally itself with the free world through its 
relations with Britain. King Hussein (1975, p. 74) expressed that communism did not 
provide any freedom of thought or work and deprived populations of any individual 
ambitions unless their ambitions were to be slaves to the state. In addition, it deprived 
nations of nationalistic ambitions unless those ambitions were directed towards being 
under the control of a foreign country. To a great extent, this explains the direct 
relationship between Jordan and Britain and the keen role of Britain in Jordan, thereby 
reflecting later relations between Jordan and the EU.  
 
Although there has traditionally been a strong interaction and (inter)dependency between 
the financial elite and the ruling family and thus a strong influence of this financial elite 
on the economy, the country also saw other economic influences. There were aspirations 
towards a limited state-led economy, yet because of the insufficient availability of 
government sources of funding, the country had to rely on the financial elite. These elites 
thus secured their positions during and after this left-wing period. Thus, in the period 
before 1970, economic power was and continued to be in the hands of the few who 
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owned the industrial and financial infrastructure and were able to fund government 
projects and thus gain access to influential economic and trade organisations. What can be 
observed from the perspective of Marxist economic thought is that the financial elites 
strengthened their grip on the government, ensuring the government's assistance in 
protecting their interests and perpetuating their grip on Jordan’s economy. 
2.1.2 Jordan’s political economy in the 1970s  
 
The early oil boom shifted the power balance in favour of the palace over the nationalists, 
since developmental efforts could be financed by external financial aid (Wils, 2001, p. 
126).  
The weakening of the institution was for multiple reasons: Policymaking was highly 
concentrated within the Economic Security Committee, a committee established after the 
1967 war to deal with the effect of the Israeli occupation. Martial laws imposed after the 
war were also a means to overpass all laws, increasing the dependency of the technocrats 
on the palace through a policy of rotation and a reshuffling of economic posts.  
 
By early 1971, Prince Hassan had taken hold of economic planning, thus bringing it 
closer to the palace. The first oil boom, together with high government spending, resulted 
in substantial GDP growth for Jordan, leading to a high exchange rate for the Jordanian 
dinar. This caused lower exports and more investment in construction and services. In 
1971, the National Council for Planning (NCP) of Jordan was formed and replaced its 
predecessor, the National Council for Human Power Planning (Ministry of Planning and 
International Cooperation, 2018). The NCP began to transform the Jordanian economy 
and initiated the three-year economic development plan for 1972 to 1974, followed by a 
five-year developmental plan for the subsequent periods in the 1980s and 1990s.  
During those periods, Jordan faced major economic challenges, and its external debt 
reached more than 180% of the GDP (Al-Wazzani, 2015). The end of the seventies 
brought the Iranian revolution, while the early 80s brought the Iraq-Iran war and changes 
in regional oil economics. This all negatively impacted Jordan’s revenue from the 
remittance and caused high unemployment and major destabilization (Lobell, 2008).  
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In the 1970s, economic power moved closer to the monarch because of his influence on 
economic planning. At the same time, after multi-annual economic reform plans, Jordan’s 
external debts increased, raising questions about the amount of foreign influence and 
dependency contained in Jordan’s economy. Although the royal family gained economic 
influence, it appears that dependency on a national financial elite was in part exchanged 
for international financial dependency.  
2.1.3 Jordan’s economic crisis during the 1980s 
 
By the 1980s, the growth in Jordan’s economy had slowed down owing to multiple 
factors: cuts in assistance from Gulf countries (Kannan & Hanania, 2009, p. 160), 
reduced oil prices, decreasing remittance revenue for Jordan, and an unchanged policy of 
government intervention. This resulted in high debt—add to that the fall of phosphate 
prices in the early 80s and an increase in unemployment (Sullivan, 1999, pp. 41-42). 
According to Al Said (2001, p. 150) the public sector contributed to Jordan’s economic 
malaise. The public enterprise would go back to the central government to cover its 
losses, which increased the government’s debt. Yet, the public enterprises’ deficient 
performance was attributed to government price restrictions, corruption, and monopoly, 
which weakened their competition, as well as a lack of managerial independence and 
incentives (El Said, 2001, p. 151).  
Thus, during the 1970s and 1980s, Jordan suffered from the effects of ‘Dutch disease’—
most investment was in construction and services, which are non-tradable goods, because 
exports were weakened as a result of a high exchange rate (Kannan & Hanania, 2009, p. 
143). 
During that period, from 1980 to 1988, the Iran-Iraq war erupted. Jordan’s relations with 
Iraq intensified for multiple reasons: exports and imports to Iraq were going through the 
Aqaba port, Iraq provided loans and financial aid to Jordan, and Iraq was Jordan’s biggest 
trading partner (Bouillon, 2002, p. 5) 
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However, there was a shift in the global economy towards privatization, and both 
developing and developed countries embarked on these changes and joined the movement 
(El Said, 2001, p. 145). Compared to other countries like Egypt and Syria, Jordan seemed 
to be the most private-sector-oriented and the most supportive of privatization and 
economic reform (Sullivan, 1999, p. 41). The commitment to privatization came from the 
late King Hussein himself, when he appointed Zaid Al Refai as the head of the cabinet in 
1985, making him responsible for reviving the economy based on two strategies: privatize 
the public sector and increase the role of the private sector in the economy (El Said, 2001, 
p. 152). The motion was set for privatisation by 1986, when the privatising programme 
was set and the privatisation committee was established (El Said, 2001, pp. 151-152). 
This was later supported by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as part of the reform 
of the Jordanian economy.  
 
In 1988, the external debt of Jordan reached six billion dinars, and the government was 
not able to meet its obligations; therefore, the dinar was floated and lost 50% of its value 
(Bouillon, 2002, p. 4). 
Jordan had to call on the IMF for debt rescheduling. The World Bank stepped in to 
facilitate debt payment. Bretton Woods Institutions made resources available conditional 
upon economic reform to reduce government intervention and subsidies and to stimulate 
the liberation of trade, privatisation, and an open market (Schlumberger, 2002, p. 226). 
First, Jordan embarked on economic reform, trade liberalisation, and privatisation to 
attract foreign investment. Schlumberger (2002, p. 226) argues that trade liberation was 
not a choice for Jordan but a result of the unproductive policies that a rentier country 
would usually follow (Schlumberger, 2002, p. 226). The first agreement with the IMF 
was put into effect in 1989. To reduce its debts, the Jordanian government reduced 
subsidies on basic commodities and caused an increase in commodity prices. This led to 
the first bread riots in 1989 (Lobell, 2008, p. 91; Bouillon, 2002, p. 4). The riots started in 
Ma’an, the stronghold of King Hussein, so to reinstate his stronghold constituency, the 
King sacked the unpopular government and called for the first general election in 20 
years. The general election was held in November of 1989 (Bouillon, 2002, p. 6). 
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Under these circumstances, the Arab Cooperation Council between Jordan, Egypt, Iraq, 
and North Yemen was established in February 1989, in the hope that it would bring 
economic and political benefit to Jordan. However, it was Gulf countries who provided 
financial assistance to Jordan to help them face these riots (Bouillon, 2002, p. 4). 
Soon after, Iraq invaded Kuwait, and the programme was put on hold. Jordan had to deal 
with 300,000 Jordanians who returned to Jordan (Schlumberger, 2002, p. 227)  
 
Therefore, in the 1980s, regional conflicts, decreasing remittance and oil prices, and 
unemployed returnees, as well as decreasing exports, led to a further increase of the 
national debt and inflation. Jordan’s financial elite had acquired considerable interests in 
public service enterprises. However, when these enterprises became less profitable, these 
ailing companies returned to the government to cover their losses, thus increasing the 
burden on the government. The fact that the Jordanian government accepted 
responsibility for the ailing enterprises appears to be an indication of the continuing 
influence of Jordan’s financial elite. Privatisation in a more progressive form, though, 
was part of the plan to revive the economy, an indication of the monarch’s inclination 
towards economic liberalism. The privatization initiative later became part of the IMF 
reform package. By that time, the World Bank was also involved in Jordan’s external 
debts, further increasing external economic influence. The royal family came under 
considerable national pressure because subsidies were reduced as part of the IMF 
recovery plan. Thus, the Jordanian government and ruling family, faced with a serious 
increase in national debt, had to balance the policies nationally between pressure from a 
dissatisfied population and a still-influential financial elite, and internationally between 
the pressure of debt payment plans and important regional trade interests with Iraq. By 
explaining this era from a Marxist perspective, in the bread riots, we can observe the 
struggle of the society’s financially weakest paying for the losses caused by the financial 
elite. While the IMF had pointed out several shortcomings in Jordan’s internal economic 
organisation, it must be noted that, in the 1980s, external factors like regional conflicts, 
the resulting decreasing remittance, and unemployed returnees had a major impact on 
Jordan’s economy. Hence, in realist terms, Jordan felt the IMF exerting power on 
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Jordan’s internal affairs, while Jordan’s international economic interests and affiliations 
with Iraq were also at odds with the wishes of one of the major Western economic 
powers, the US. There are indeed many different forces working on a country, especially 
against the backdrop of intensifying regional conflicts in which Western allies took a 
stand. 
2.1.4 Jordan’s political economy during the 1990s 
 
In 1990, during the Arab summit in Baghdad, Jordan’s plea for help was only responded 
to by Iraq, who committed aid for Jordan in the face of its economic crisis. This aid and 
the economic dependence of Jordan on Iraq made it difficult for Jordan to support the US 
in its fight against Iraq when Iraq invaded Kuwait.  
 
By 2 August 1990, when Iraq invaded Kuwait, Jordan was greatly affected. Economic 
sanctions were imposed on Iraq, who was the biggest trading partner of Jordan. These 
sanctions directly impacted Jordan’s economy; Jordan lost its trade with its biggest 
partner. Jordan lost its financial aid from the Gulf countries, and this resulted in a 
reduction in Jordan’s trade in agriculture and industry (Lobell, 2008, p. 91). Internally, 
the Jordanian population was in full support of Iraq in view of the double standards that 
US and the West had against Iraq versus Israel. The swift action to form a coalition 
against Iraq by the US and its allies, while no action was taken against the Israeli 
invasion, caused the Palestinian population in Jordan, as well as the Jordanians, to feel 
betrayed by the West (Bouillon, 2002, p. 6). Politically, the King supported his internal 
population and had to walk a tightrope (Bouillon, 2002, p. 7) between the pressure from 
the West to support their coalition, and thus receive all the aid and assistance to 
compensate for the losses that Jordan might incur, and maintaining internal support and 
keeping to his population’s sentiment. King Hussein followed the latter and 
communicated anti-West pro-Iraq rhetoric internally and neutrality internationally 
(Bouillon, 2002, p. 7). This was perceived by the West as being pro-Iraq and put Jordan 
in isolation.  
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However, after the end of the Gulf crisis, Jordan began to shift back and amend its 
relationship with the West when Jordan accepted the invitation to the 1991 peace 
conference in Madrid; yet its relations with Saudi Arabia and Egypt remained stressed 
(Bouillon, 2002, p. 7). The relationship between Jordan and Iraq was initially still strong 
but began to sway because the peace process was the main topic of that period. 
Immediately after Palestine signed a peace agreement with Israel, Jordan signed its own 
agenda for peace with Israel. In 1995, Jordan’s King granted the son-in-law of Saddam 
asylum in Amman, sealing its relationship with Iraq, and moved to the anti-Saddam camp 
(Bouillon, 2002, p. 8).  
 
Hence, while the Gulf crisis left Jordan isolated in the international arena, the peace 
process brought back its pivotal role. Israel insisted that it would not negotiate with the 
PLO in Madrid and was only willing to accept them as part of the Jordanian delegation, 
which played a key role in restoring Jordan as a strategic ally in the region (Bouillon, 
2002, p. 8).  
 
The second agreement with the IMF was put into effect in 1992, and the return of the 
300,000 Jordanians, with their assets, to Jordan created temporary momentum and an 
increase in the GDP: 11% in 1992, 7.5% 1994 and 3.9% in 1995 (Figure 2.1). This GDP 
increase, as Schlumberger argues, was wrongly attributed to the peace process’s positive 
expectations and government privatization policies (Schlumberger, 2002, p. 227)  
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Figure 2.1: Jordan Real GDP in dinar and GDP per Capita for the period of 1975-2000 
 
Taken from: World Bank Documents (Ramachandran, 2004, p. 4) 
 
Yet, in its 2004 report, the World Bank Operations Evaluation Department observed that 
the economy of Jordan had been stagnating in the 1990s and was not prepared to cope 
with the economic changes of the early 1990s (Ramachandran, 2004, p. xi). Jordan’s 
policy was to support privatization and promote the free market economy. The aim was to 
promote private investment in telecommunications and transportation. However, that was 
faced with major issues: first, these sectors were not profitable and thus did not attract 
investors on their own and required significant internal transformation to be attractive to 
private investors; second, the wars and volatility in the region did not reflect well on 
Jordan, even though it was a stable country, so it did not attract foreign investment 
(Fluellen & Merriam, 1992; Sullivan, 1999). The increase in remittance (Figure 2.2), 
according to Faisal Ahmad (2012), would mean that autocratic countries like Jordan 
would increase their patronage. These countries were then channelling foreign aid to 
finance their patronage to ensure the survival of their regimes. Patronage would take the 
form of compensation for government employees and the government’s inner circle. 
Faisal Ahmad (2012) presented Table 2.1 to substantiate that the more remittance Jordan 
received, the less the government would spend on welfare and more they would spend on 
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government patronage. His argument that this patronage had a direct correlation with the 
survival of the regime. In a time of crisis, the government will increase patronage to 
ensure the support of their employees (Ahmad, 2012, pp. 161-163) 
 
Figure 2.2: Jordan’s Remittance, Imports and Exports in Goods and Services for the 
Period from 1975-2000 
 
Taken from: World Bank Documents (Ramachandran, 2004, p. 4) 
 
Table 2.1 Aid, Remittances, and Government Expenditures in Jordan, 1990-2004 
 
Taken from: 
http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.sussex.ac.uk/stable/23275367?seq=1#page_scan_tab_conte
nts (Ahmad, 2012, p. 162) 
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Economic policy in Jordan did not change. According to Ramachandran (2004, p. 1) in 
his report on Jordan’s economy during the 1990s, the economic policies in Jordan did not 
change with a change in ministries because the policies were approved by the King and 
by a limited circle of people who shared the same opinion. According to El Said (2001, p. 
154), privatization from 1986 until the death of King Hussein in 1999 was ‘non-existent’ 
and limited to franchises in the public buses and selling shares of Jordan’s hotels and 
tourism companies. Yet, under King Abdullah, privatisation gained momentum, and most 
of the shares in the cement factory and the telecommunication company were sold. 
However, this privatisation did not mean a decrease in the government role in the 
economy, since the sales were in non-strategic sectors and were not significant enough to 
cause changes; it was a mere re-arrangement of the roles of the public and private sectors 
(El Said, 2001, pp. 154- 155). The privatisation was slowed down by some elites and 
government officials who benefitted most from the status quo (El Said, 2001, p. 157). 
Wils (2001) argues that the privileged elite of businesspeople in Jordan has complicated 
the transformation of the rent approach economy to an open market economy (Wils, 
2001). 
 
In 1996, the IMF and Jordan’s government declared the success of the program. Yet, both 
Schlumberger (2002, p. 233) and Harrigan, El Said, and Wang (2006, p. 287) underline 
that these achievements were overestimated. Schlumberger (2002, p. 234) highlights that 
after the influx of the Jordanian returnees with their capital, the economy did not register 
any growth after 1995, and by 1998 it registered negative growth, unemployment 
remained high, and real salaries continued to fall. The Karak riots of 1996, when the 
government cut support for bread, was an indication that a large number of the Jordanian 
population’s standard of living was exceptionally low (Schlumberger, 2002, p. 234). 
Harrigan, El Said, and Wang (2006) argues that the Jordanian government was not the 
best performer when it came to reforms; there was slippage in the implementation of the 
reforms. The growth that was achieved was not export-led intensive growth but based on 
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increased factor inputs rather than productivity gains (Harrigan, El Said, & Wang, 2006, 
p. 287). 
 
Regarding why the IMF declared that Jordan was successful in its reform efforts, 
Harrigan, El Said, and Wang (2006, p. 287) highlight that the IMF reflects donor geo-
political interests, thus influencing the allocation of aid. As Wils (2001, p. 130) 
underlines, the US and EU were very keen on the political stability of Jordan. This 
resulted in softer conditions for loans and gave the government more room for 
manoeuvring the reforms needed for privatisation (Wils, 2001, p. 130). 
 
To conclude the 1990s, during Iraq’s war with Kuwait, Iraq was not only Jordan’s most 
important trading partner, but Iraq also provided Jordan with loans. It is interesting to 
note that Jordan also politically sided with Iraq and antagonised the US-led coalition 
despite Jordan’s generally Western political and economic orientation so far. This is an 
indication of a situation in which Jordan's economic realpolitik had to make way for the 
royal family's national political survival, since, in this case, strong national sentiments 
prevailed over pressures related to international debt. The fact that Iraqi loans to Jordan 
went straight to the government may have helped the Jordanian government to become 
more independent from the financial elite, may have helped the regime’s survival, and 
thus may have influenced the choices Jordan made at the time. 
Therefore, external factors again heavily impacted Jordan's economy. The Gulf countries’ 
sanctions affected Jordan's economy negatively, while the political choice to side with 
Iraq, driven by the national interests of the royal family, antagonized Jordan's Western 
allies. The peace process with Israel, however, offered the Jordanian government an 
opportunity to re-establish its ties with the West. Popular sentiments were still largely 
against Israel, but Iraq's defeat may have diffused the population's focus enough to allow 
the Jordanian government to gain a key role in the peace process. When assessing 
Jordan's decision to unequivocally support the peace process despite popular sentiment, 
one should bear in mind that Jordan's most important trade partner, Iraq, was a nation in 
ruins with little economic importance for Jordan. The only real economic choice left was 
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to befriend its Western debtors. The IMF imposed measures on Jordan that forced the 
Jordanian government to make far-reaching changes to its national economic policies that 
ultimately led to popular unrest, meaning the end of the sitting government, and must 
have impacted the monarch as well. The motivating factors during this period appear to 
have been the survival of the royal family as the ruling monarchs, as well as economic 
survival necessitating an economic and diplomatic realpolitik that adapted to drastically 
changing economic and geopolitical circumstances in Jordan's environment.  
In the 1990s, Jordan did not manage to attract foreign investors, and genuine steps 
towards privatisation were hindered by the financial elite protecting their interests. The 
attempt of the ruling class to prolong their dominance appeared to have come at the cost 
of slowing down economic improvements that could have helped the population as a 
whole. The interests of the West were the peace process and a stable Jordan, so the IMF 
was not strict with the enforcement of economic reform plans. As a result, the goals of the 
West were served rather than building on true economic improvements for the population 
of Jordan. 
2.2 Jordan’s Globalization Policy 
 
During the volatile economic period, Jordan’s population rose from 1.7 million in 1970 to 
5.1 million in 2000 (Table 2.2). This high growth is attributable to natural growth but also 
due to the influx of immigrants.  
Figure 2.3 shows that the population growth rate in Jordan was higher than that of the 
world growth rate on an average of 2% to 3%, but in extreme years, like in 1967, the 
population growth was 6% higher than the world growth rate due to Palestinian refugees. 
During the first Gulf War in 1992, the repatriated Jordanians triggered another peak 5% 
growth higher than the world growth. The most recent peak of 5% growth in 2012 was 
triggered by the Syrian refugees. 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Growth Rate of Jordan’s Population Compared with the World Growth Rate  
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Taken from the World Bank: https://data.worldbank.org/country/jordan?view=chart 
 
This demographic growth imposed pressures on the economy to meet the needs of the 
growing numbers of youth who entered the labour market (Table 2.2). The urgent need 
for a diversified industrial economy in Jordan was even more urgent in view of the 
demographic growth (Kannan and Hanania, 2009, p. 144). 
 
Table 2.2 Jordan’s Population and Youth Percentage 
Jordan Population 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 
Population in million, total 1.71 2.06 2.37 2.89 3.56 4.57 5.10 5.71 7.18 9.15 
Population growth (annual %) 6.2 2.9 3.2 4.1 4.8 3.9 1.7 3.2 5.2 3.9 
Population ages 20-24, male (% 
of male population) 8.9 8.0 8.7 9.3 10.1 10.8 10.0 10.2 9.3 9.1 
Population ages 20-24, female 
(% of female population) 8.2 7.5 8.1 8.6 9.2 10.4 9.8 10.1 9.3 9.2 
Taken from the World Bank: https://data.worldbank.org/country/jordan?view=chart 
 
In the 1990s, Jordan embarked upon regional integration efforts. In 1994, Jordan, along 
with 14 other Arab countries, concluded an agreement to establish the Great Arab Free 
Trade Area (GAFTA) by 2007. The aim was to remove tariffs and quotas. The rule of 
origin was set at 40% of the added value, though some of the agricultural products (10 
products per country) could be excluded during the harvest season. There were multiple 
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attempts at Arab trade integration, but none was as far reaching as the GAFTA, and it 
encouraged a faster pace of integration among the countries through sub-regional 
agreements and was thus the birth of the Agadir Agreement (Abedini & Peridy, 2008, p. 
851). The early results of the impact of the GAFTA agreement showed an increase in 
intra-GAFTA exports at a quicker pace than world exports (Abedini & Peridy, 2008, p. 
852). Abedini’s study used the gravity model to show that the GAFTA agreement resulted 
in an increase of 20% for intra trade, thus having a positive impact on the region (Abedini 
& Peridy, 2008, p. 869).  
 
2.2.1 Jordan-Israel peace process  
 
In 1994, Jordan signed the peace process with Israel. This brought Jordan out of the 
isolation that resulted from its position towards the US-led coalition against Iraq 
(Bouillon, 2002, p. 8). Immediately after the signing of the peace agreement, the US 
declared that Jordan was a non-NATO ally. The US provided Jordan with financial aid 
and military assistance and wrote off Jordan’s debts. Jordan further received one billion 
dollars in aid from the US over three years. As a result, the peace process ensured the 
restoration of the foreign aid flow (Kassay, 2002, p. 55). In his 2018 Congressional 
Report, Sharp (2018, p. 1) underlines twenty years later that Jordan’s support of Israeli-
Palestinian peace as well as the continuity in Jordan’s government are still paramount to 
relations between Jordan and the US. 
 
The other side of the coin is Jordan’s concern for keeping popular opinions in the nation 
in line with the government’s policies regarding the peace process with Israel. Jordan has 
different social and historical links with Palestine than any other country in the region. 
Furthermore, a very considerable part of Jordan’s population is of Palestinian origin. The 
lack of progress in the peace process in the post-Oslo period therefore weighed much 
heavier on public opinion and the political balance in Jordan than in other Arab countries 
(Brand, 1999, p. 65). Jordan’s stance in the Gulf War, mentioned above, did not sit well 
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with the American-led coalition but may have increased the regime’s legitimacy in the 
eyes of the population. Yet, Iraq’s quick defeat left popular emotions volatile, and hence, 
the government in Jordan treaded carefully to avoid letting the peace process with Israel 
alienate public opinion too much. It was key for Jordan to balance international 
diplomatic and economic interests with the domestic tension between public opinion and 
liberalization (Brand, 1999, p. 65). Jordan’s stance in the Gulf War followed by Jordan’s 
signing of the peace process with Israel suggest that, although domestic concerns played a 
role, open communication lines with the Western powers and international economic 
cooperation were of importance to Jordan in the mid-1990s. 
 
Awartani and Kleiman (1997, p. 216) note that the tendency for Arab signatories in the 
peace process to trade with each other is low. Therefore, past or present sentiments of 
hostility towards Israel may likely not be the cause for a low tendency for the Arab 
signatories to trade with Israel, conclude Awartani and Kleiman. Contrary to the 
conclusion of Awartani and Kleiman, it may be the case that there are reasons, like ethno-
religious tensions, causing deeply rooted and long-standing suspicions among the Arab 
signatories themselves, impeding their aspirations for intra-regional trade. Therefore, the 
low tendency to trade with Israel may be based on different reasons than those of the 
Arab signatories and may still be based on sentiments of hostility. Awartani and Kleiman 
(1997, p. 216) also mention the vivid trade of the Arab signatories with Turkey. 
According to them, this is an indication that there are trade policies in place that allow for 
active trade. In view of the aforementioned low tendency to trade among the signatories 
of the peace process, trade with Turkey appears only to underline the fact that the reasons 
for the low tendency towards intra-regional trade need further investigation, and it is also 
necessary to make feasible a workable economic interaction that supports the peace 
process in the region. However, this also means that the expectations of possible 
economic benefits following the peace process should be viewed from the perspective of 
low tendency towards intra-regional trade. Deardorf (1995, p. 40) is more optimistic and 
predicts a tangible increase in welfare because of the peace process. It must be noted, 
however, that Deardorf’s predictions are based on the calculation of trade flows between 
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the signatories of the peace process themselves and the rest of the world as expected 
when there would be peace in the region. The peace process, though, did not reach its 
intended completion. The process stopped in its infancy with Syria, while Israel pulled 
out after the Palestinian Authority was established (Moore, 2004, p. 2). 
 
When looking specifically at Jordan, low intra-regional trade volumes can be explained in 
part by Jordan’s restrictions on competing imports of Palestinian products (Awartani & 
Kleiman, 1997, p. 220) and Jordan’s ‘unusually complex import regulations’ at the time 
(Awartani & Kleiman, 1997, p. 221). After the peace treaty between Jordan and Israel 
was signed in 1994, a trade agreement was signed in 1995. The agreement was to see to 
the establishment of an FTA but ultimately led to a preferential trade agreement because 
of Jordan’s reservations (Awartani & Kleiman, 1997, p. 226), where Jordan could export 
cement, paint, and some other industrial products to Israel free of tariffs. For other 
Jordanian products, tariffs were reduced to between 50% and 80%. Among these products 
were, for example, fertilizers, cigarettes, and some electrical appliances. A similar list of 
Israeli imports into Jordan would have tariffs reduced to 90%, with further reduction 
planned at a later stage. Although this appears to put Jordan in an advantageous position 
compared with Israel, this may not be the case, since Jordan, being a country with a small 
industry, may find it difficult to comply with the 35% local value-added rule (Awartani & 
Kleiman, 1997, p. 226). Jordan’s decision not to further pursue the FTA with Israel may 
reflect Jordanian fears of having to compete with Israeli products. As of 1997, little 
cooperation between Jordanian and Israeli businesses was seen. The cause for this may be 
found in the businesses’ fear of antagonizing domestic public opinion (Awartani & 
Kleiman, 1997, p. 227-228). 
 
It is interesting to note that Awartani and Kleiman’s study (1997, p. 221) observes that 
the signatories of the peace process did not form a trading bloc as a matter of course and 
rather appeared to be more competitive than complementary in their economic policies. 
This, in turn, leads to the conclusion that opportunities for economic advancement are 
most likely to be found in the cooperation with big economic powers like the EU and the 
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United States (Awartani & Kleiman, 1997, p. 221). Also, Brand (1999, p. 65) mentions 
Jordan’s interest in pursuing international diplomatic and economic interests in this case 
as being related to the peace process. This is despite domestic ambiguity regarding 
Jordan’s involvement in the peace process. In the Gulf War, Jordan alienated itself from 
the US, but Jordan’s support for the peace process despite domestic emotions may further 
underline Jordan’s wish to economically and diplomatically open doors towards Western 
economies. 
 
2.2.2 The Qualified Industrial Zone (QIZ) 
 
The Qualified Industrial Zone (QIZ) negotiation, a United States initiative to encourage 
regional cooperation between Jordan, Israel, and Egypt, started after the Israel-Jordan 
peace process was signed and put into effect in 1997 (Royal Scientific Society, 2013). 
The QIZ are specially designated zones where the investors are exempt from income tax, 
social security taxes, and foreign full ownership within the boundaries of the QIZ. 
Products manufactured in the QIZ will enjoy free entry into the US, if the products 
comply with agreed-upon rules of origin which stipulate that 35% of the product value 
has to be of Jordanian origin, and from that 35%, 11.7% must be from the QIZ, 8% from 
Israel, and the rest can be from the West Bank/Gaza, Israel or the US. There are 13 QIZs 
established in Jordan (Jordan Investment Board, 2018). 
 
The main advantage of the QIZ Agreement was the ability to export duty free products 
from Jordan to the US. Other advantages included exemption from income and social 
security taxes as well as acquiring full ownership or control of plants within the 
boundaries of the QIZ and full restoration of capital, profits, and salaries, as well as 
exemption from customs tariffs. The agreement does not include any time limits, renewal 
requirements or a termination date (Congressional Research Service, 2013).  
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To ensure enforcement of the economic cooperation, a joint technical committee was 
established. The committee includes one Jordanian representative, one Israeli 
representative and one observer from the office of the US Trade Representative. The 
committee determines which products are eligible for duty-free entry into the US market 
(Kardoush & Khouri, 2004, p. 14).  
 
Map 2.1: Map of Jordan and Egypt QIZs 
  
Taken from: (Congressional Research Service, 2013) 
 
For 1997 to 2011, the impact of the QIZ on Jordan was significant, as shown in Figure 
2.4, where the export of QIZ to the US increased from 1999 to 2011 and represented a 
high percentage of all exports to the US, as shown in Figure 2.5. It also had a positive 
impact on increasing women’s participation in the workforce, according to the Royal 
Scientific Society report (2013, p. 4). 
Figure 2.4: Overview of US Trade with Jordan, 1996-2012  
 
Taken from: (Congressional Research Service, 2013, p. 6) 
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Figure 2.5: Jordan’s QIZ Exports as % of All Exports to the US, 1996-2012  
 
Taken from: (Congressional Research Service, 2013, p. 6) 
The QIZs created jobs, and Kardoush and Khouri (2004, p. 9) referenced that the QIZ 
resulted in creating more than 20,000 jobs in its first four years (Table 2.3) and increased 
foreign currency earnings due to exports. An increase in women’s labour in the workforce 
of the QIZs was positively received, raising family incomes, empowering women, and 
creating a ‘new working class’ in Jordan (Kardoush & Khouri, 2004, p. 28; Saif, 2006). 
 
Table 2.3 QIZ Workforce 2001 to 2003 
 
Source: QIZ Unit at the Ministry of Industry and Trade 
Taken from: https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/139049/62.pdf (Saif, 2006, p. 34) 
 
Foreign investment, especially from Asia (62%), established factories in the QIZs. The 
investments mainly came from India, at 22%; 40% came from other Asian countries, 17% 
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from Jordan, and 3% from the United States (Congressional Research Service, 2013, pp. 
5-6).  
 
After Jordanian exports increased to the US, Jordan and the US began to negotiate an 
FTA that meant that the Jordanian factories did not need to obtain the Israeli 8% to 
qualify for free entry into the US; 35% of the total value of the goods could only be 
Jordanian. There were differences between the QIZ and the FTA as shown in Figure 2.6, 
which favoured export under the FTA, so the exports from the QIZ began to fade away by 
2006.  
 
Figure 2.6: Main Differences between the QIZ and US-Jordan FTA  
 
Taken from: (Lord, 2001, p. ix) 
 
There were critics of the QIZ and its sustainability. Kardoush and Khouri (2004, p. 10) 
underlined that QIZ did not bring the industrial transformation to Jordan that it was 
designed to promote; the work was labour intensive and based on foreign expertise; thus 
it added little value to the skills of the local labour pool (Kardoush & Khouri, 2004, p. 
21).  
 
Employment in the QIZ was dominated by foreign workers. This was attributed to 
multiple factors: Foreign labour was a condition for foreign investors to invest. Other 
factors were also attributed: the low technical skills of the Jordanian labour force and the 
reluctance of the local population to do such jobs for their social status (Kardoush & 
Khouri, 2004, p. 24). There was resentment from the locals where there was high 
unemployment, as well as the feeling that investors were taking advantage of the 
Jordanian open policy for foreign labour to bring cheap labour. While foreign labour was 
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mainly males who accept long working hours and cheaper wages, most Jordanian 
labourers were females who do not accept these conditions (Kardoush & Khouri, 2004, p. 
25). The government began to put measures in place to discourage foreign workers and 
penalties on the factories that did not phase out foreign labour workers and replace them 
with local labour, so with this, Jordan’s liberal policy for foreign workers began to change 
due to the QIZ.  
 
This brings the main issue of working conditions that was raised by the International 
Labour Organization (ILO) in some of the QIZs. The conditions in the QIZ are poor. 
Certain factories are crowded, and in the summer, it is extremely hot, and the factories are 
not air conditioned (Saif, 2006, p. 38) 
 
The backward linkage with the local economy was weak in the QIZ (Kardoush & Khouri, 
2004, p. 30; Saif, 2006, p. 6; Congressional Research Service, 2013, pp. 6), the 
expectation was that QIZ would lead to local suppliers and industries supplying the 
operations in the QIZ and thus creating demand for a domestic product, thus increasing 
employment and generating an exchange of technology and foreign currency. Yet, for 
Jordan, due to its weak industrial base and infrastructure, the QIZ did not link to local 
suppliers and continued to import raw materials from abroad. The foreign investors also 
attributed poor quality and slow service to the fact that they opted for foreign suppliers. 
The role of the government should be underlined: the government did not promote that 
backward linkage and did encourage and work on the whole industrial base, since the QIZ 
could not operate in isolation (Kardoush & Khouri, 2004, pp. 29-31) 
 
However, the QIZ contributed to Jordan’s economy in other ways: The use of QIZ was 
leverage for export to other countries, and Jordan increased its use of the QIZ zones.  
The QIZ was the stepping stone in preparing for the FTA to the US (Congressional 
Research Service, 2013, p. 7)  
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Thus, to conclude, the QIZ and the following FTA had a tangible positive impact on 
Jordan's economy in creating employment and an increase in exports. Critics (Kardoush 
& Khouri, 2004, p. 10 and 40) argued that the QIZ construction did not add sustainable 
improvements to the Jordanian workforce or economy. The QIZs did not increase 
productivity in Jordan proper, since the expected production supply to the QIZs did not 
take place. This was in part attributed to the professional culture in Jordan that was 
considered slow and unreliable by the foreign investors in the QIZs and in part attributed 
to insufficient stimulation from the government, which seemed more concerned with the 
success of the QIZ as a whole than its potential to contribute to sustainable economic 
development in Jordan. One can reason that the Jordanian government had to make 
sudden changes to the Jordanian professional culture and that such a process takes time. 
At the same time, though, the QIZ did benefit the Jordanian economy. The question that 
remains is who in Jordan benefitted in the end from the QIZ? The probable answer is that 
the main beneficiaries were the financial elite who could thus strengthen their positions, 
while opportunities for more sustainable development towards the workforce and local 
businesses seem to have been missed.  
 
2.2.3 Accession to WTO  
 
With the IMF conditions to liberate the market and the government’s long-term economic 
objectives to support economic growth via trade and regional and global integration, 
Jordan pursued General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) membership and 
applied for accession in 1994. With the establishment of the WTO in 1995, the 
membership file was transferred to the WTO. Jordan set the year 1999 as the accession 
year to avoid the ‘Millennium Round’ that might bring higher requirements (Milkawi, 
2010, p. 14). Jordan committed to certain obligations, like reducing tariffs, reforming the 
agricultural sector and removal of all subsidies to that sector, simplifying customs 
procedures, removing pre-inspection procedures, liberalizing the service sector, and 
protecting intellectual property (Milkawi, 2010). 
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Jordan became a member of the WTO in April 2000 (Wils, 2001); the concept was that 
joining the WTO would bring benefits to the country’s global position and 
competitiveness by opening up global markets to local producers and also open up the 
local market to global producers.  
When applying for the WTO, the country negotiated and underwent economic and legal 
reforms to meet the WTO standards. According to Bino, Abu Ghunmi, and Qteishat 
(2014, p. 64) different countries benefit differently from joining the WTO, and the 
countries that negotiate the best regarding specific products with specific countries 
benefit the most from accessing the WTO. In the case of Jordan, it is found that Jordan’s 
imports and exports increased after the accession to the WTO in 2000, and it positively 
impacted its trade, especially when Jordan and the foreign countries were regional 
members (Bino, Abu Ghunmi, & Qteishat, 2014, p. 64). 
However, the accession necessitated significant administrative and financial investment 
from Jordan. Jordan had to develop policies to protect the most vulnerable groups, which 
were likely to be impacted by this liberalization, as well as to develop other revenue 
resources to compensate for the loss in import taxes (Milkawi, 2010, p. 31).  
 
Jordan's accession to the WTO was yet another step to Jordan’s economic 
internationalization. Imports and exports increased, while the country incurred some 
losses of tariff income because of WTO obligations to reform its tariffs. Special measures 
had to be taken to protect certain weaker groups in Jordan's society from the 
consequences of WTO accession (Milkawi, 2010, p. 31). This brings to mind the IMF 
measures and the QIZ, which did not bring a sustainable positive impact to the general 
population, nor end up putting financial pressure on the economically weaker groups.  
2.2.4 Jordan-US Free Trade Agreement  
 
After Jordan became a member of the WTO in 2000 (Wils, 2001; Barakat & Saif, 2010), 
Jordan and the US signed an FTA in October 2000 and put it into effect in December 
2001. Under the agreement, both Jordan and the US agreed to gradually eliminate all 
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duties on nearly all products by 2010 (Office of The United States Trade Representative, 
2018).  
 
The FTA between Jordan and the US consisted of 19 articles and 3 annexes. The 
preamble of the agreement outlined the objectives of the agreement. The objects mainly 
established rules governing their trade and created an environment in which to promote 
the liberalisation of trade, while remaining compliant with the WTO system, and to 
promote economic growth to improve standards of living. The objective of the agreement 
also covered the environment and labour standards (Office of The United States Trade 
Representative, 2018) 
 
According to Malkwaj, the US had different reasons to sign the FTA with Jordan. First, 
because Jordan is not a threat to US industries, and the agreement would boost Jordan’s 
economy to minimize its dependence on foreign aid, but most importantly, because of 
Jordan’s role in the peace process and its cooperation in counterterrorism (Malkwaj, 
2007, p. 160). Lobell, though, argues that trade is used as a second face to security 
measures that the US is using to fight fundamentalism. The economic situation in the ME 
and the high unemployment made the ME a fertile soil for religious fundamentalism 
(Lobell, 2008, p. 88). The FTA could foster growth, alleviate poverty, and create jobs, 
thus reducing the reasons for fundamentalism, and a number of George W. Bush’s 
National Security Strategy (NSS) programs in 2002 addressed the need for expanding 
trade with developing countries (Lobell, 2008, p. 88). 
  
On a critical note, it appears that, for Jordan, trade liberalization and globalization 
brought little to the general population other than an intended increase of the standard of 
living in order to minimize interest in religious extremism (Malkwaj, 2007, p. 160), thus 
reducing the risk to Jordan's internal stability, a stability deemed crucial to the peace 
process. Thus, Jordan's FTA with the US might very well have had the interest of 
America's partner Israel at heart and was thus based purely on furthering geopolitical 
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stability in the region, or, in other words, stemmed from a rather realist desire to pursue 
the dominance of Western states and their allies. 
 
The US-Jordan agreement contains 19 articles:  
Article 1. Establish an FTA based on the GATT and the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS).  
Article 2. Covers free trade of goods where duties are eliminated gradually based on a 
schedule in Annex 2.1 of the agreement 
Article 3. Covers trade in services 
Article 4. Covers intellectual property rights: This article extensively covers all conditions 
for copyright rules with transition periods ranging from six months to three years based 
on the product.  
Article 5. Environmental protection  
Article 6. Labour: Under this article, through domestic laws, each party will ensure 
respect for the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and 
incorporate that into their labour laws.  
Article 7. Electronic Commerce: The agreement seems to be one of the first agreements 
to include an e-commerce provision in it (Malkwaj, 2007); however, the article did not 
manage to go beyond the WTO provision or add to e-commerce advancement. In the 
agreement, there is no definition of e-commerce, digitized products, or electronic 
transmission. The agreement was only a confirmation of the no tariff status policy 
(Malkwaj, 2007, p. 161). The article does not tie Jordan and US e-commerce with 
commitment for technical assistance (Malkwaj, 2007, p. 163). 
Article 8. Visa Commitment: This article gives equal obligation for both parties to permit 
the nations of each party to enter and sojourn for the purpose of establishing, developing, 
administering, or advising on the operation of their businesses.  
Article 9. Government Procurement: This section is left for negotiation pending Jordan’s 
accession to the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement. 
Article 10. Safeguarding Measures: This is an elaborate article aimed at protecting the 
domestic industries that might be harmed by imports under this agreement. This article 
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gives the possibility to halt the reduction of duties on the products in question and goes as 
far as providing compensation if the damage is irreparable.  
Article 11. Balance of Payment: This article gives the right to impose measures for 
balance of payments purposes; however, they should be within the principles of the WTO 
Agreement.  
Article 12. Covers exceptions 
Article 13. Covers economic and technical cooperation  
Article 14. Rules of Origin in Customs Administration: The country of origin rules in the 
FTA were simple compared to those in to the EU trade agreement. Jordan qualifies for 
preferential treatment if the total Jordan materials cost is no less than 35% of the value of 
the goods (Lord, 2001, p. xiii) 
Article 15. Joint Committee  
Article 16. Consultation: In the case of differing interpretations of the agreement, each 
party under this article can request consultation with the other party to arrive at a 
mutually satisfactory interpretation of the application of this agreement.  
Article 17. Dispute Settlement  
Article 18. Miscellaneous Provision  
Article 19. Entry into Force: Entry into force is assigned two months after each party 
receives a notification from the other party that the domestic legal procedures have been 
adapted to meet the agreement conditions. It is interesting to note that there is a 
termination clause that any of the parties can invoke with six months’ notification. 
  
From the articles of the agreement, one can observe that the agreement, contrary to the 
EU-Jordan Agreement, does not include political or cultural elements. Additionally, the 
approach to the approximation of laws in the agreement is based on international 
standards, and any economic liberalization is based on the international standard, not US 
standards, which is different than the EU-Jordan AA, in which the aim was to 
approximate Jordan’s rules to those of the EU.  
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From a liberalist point of view, the trade agreement would serve to promote 
specialization, since Jordan has comparative advantages in certain areas like chemicals 
and has low-cost labour, footwear, and furniture. Yet, Jordan has the same comparative 
advantage over the US as the other ME countries like Morocco for chemicals and Egypt 
and Tunisia for labour-intensive products (Lord, 2001, p. x).  
 
Under the neo-realist theory, one can see that the motivation for the US to enter into a 
trade agreement with Jordan was security and a way to fight fundamentalism. As Lobell 
(2008, p. 89) underlines, the US was using a ‘Trojan Horse’ to transform the political and 
social structure of a strategic country like Jordan to be a supporter rather than a source of 
security concerns (Lobell, 2008, p. 88). Therefore, though the agreement did not directly 
stipulate political or economic restructuring for Jordan, the motivation of the agreement 
was to be used to address US security concerns, for example, terrorism, through the 
economic means of the trade agreement. 
 
2.2.5 Jordan and EU agreement 
 
Building on the previous sections, the picture is now clearer through which we can 
understand the economic and political context of Jordan’s motivation to embark on the 
Barcelona Process in 1995. Jordan, since its inception in 1921, was dependent on Britain 
to provide financial aid to the country, but Prince Abdullah looked for other sources of 
financial support and encouraged the wealthy elites to support and to bring their wealth to 
the country. In return, the elites enjoyed privileges with the palace and became hugely 
rich after World War II due to their access to import licences (Wils, 2001, pp. 123-124). 
Until 1948, Britain’s economic policy in Jordan was a market-oriented policy, but that 
policy was challenged by the net of nationalist bureaucrats with a leftist ideology. In the 
1950s, these leftist bureaucrats adopted policies that were characterised by state-owned 
interventionist enterprises, protection of local industries through import-substitution 
industrialization policies, and welfare governments. This close net, convinced of a state 
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intervention policy (El Said, 2001, p. 148), still cooperated with the wealthy elites. The 
elites funded major projects and became members of the Industrial Bank of Jordan and 
the Chamber of Commerce of Jordan, thus directly influencing the economy of Jordan 
(Wils, 2001, p. 126). The palace influence in the 1950s was weakened by the 
assassination of the King Abdullah I in 1951, but the palace influence began to supersede 
the nationalist bureaucrats by 1957, after a failed attempt on the life of King Hussein. The 
1967 war with Israel brought a huge Palestinian population to Jordan. The 1970s showed 
a shift in power from the nationalists to the palace (Wils, 2001, p. 126), and by 1971, 
Prince Hassan had taken over economic planning. The first oil boom, together with high 
government spending, resulted in substantial GDP growth for Jordan. This caused lower 
exports and more investment in construction and services, but that did not last long, so by 
the 1980s, the growth in Jordan’s economy had slowed (Kannan & Hanania, 2009, p. 
160) due to reduced oil prices, decreasing remittance revenue for Jordan, and an 
unchanged policy of government intervention. The public sector added to Jordan’s 
economic malaise (Al Said 2001, p. 150). King Hussein initiated privatisation when, in 
1985, he appointed Zaid Al Refai as the head of the cabinet with the intent to privatise the 
public sector and increase the role of the private sector in the economy (El Said, 2001, p. 
152).  
However, because of high debt, Jordan was not able to meet its obligations and had no 
choice but to resort to the IMF for the rescheduling of the debt (Bouillon, 2002, p. 4). In 
1989, the IMF and the World Bank facilitated Jordan’s debt payments. These institutions 
made resources available conditional upon economic reform (Schlumberger, 2002, p. 
226). 
Jordan embarked on economic reforms, trade liberalisation, and privatisation to attract 
foreign investment. However, in 1990, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait significantly impacted 
Jordan’s political and economic situation. Jordan was perceived by the West as being pro-
Iraq. The Gulf crisis resulted in isolating Jordan politically and economically and caused 
Jordan losses in aid and remittance. Yet, while the Gulf crisis left Jordan isolated from the 
international arena, the peace process brought back its pivotal role when Israel insisted 
upon speaking to the Jordanians and not the PLO (Bouillon, 2002, p. 8). 
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Hence, Jordan was eager to get out of its isolation and faced major economic challenges 
due to the demographic growth that imposed pressures on the economy to meet the needs 
of the growing numbers of youth who entered the labour market (Table 2.2). There was 
an urgent need to diversify the industrial economy in Jordan, which became even more 
urgent in view of the demographic growth (Kannan & Hanania, 2009, p. 144). A shift in 
policy occurred from an orientation towards security to socio-economic and foreign 
policy in order to facilitate international trade and adhere to the international standards of 
trade and economic policies (El Anis, 2010, p. 62). The overarching direction of this 
economic reform was towards a market economy.  
Thus, Jordan underwent substantial structural adjustments, and the country was among 
the most active in signing trade agreements with the EU (Moore & Springborg, 2001, pp. 
66, 84). It also signed an FTA with the United States in 2001 and joined the WTO in 
April 2000 (Sekkat, 2010, p. 14). During the 1990s, after the end of the Cold War, when 
the EU embarked on its EMP through the Barcelona Process, it was difficult for countries 
like Jordan to separate their agreements with the EU from that process, especially given 
that the EMP was in fact an upgrade to the pre-existing bilateral agreements (Del Sarto, 
2006, p. 66). Thus, Jordan began negotiations for a bilateral agreement with the EU in 
1995, which was finalised in 1997 and put into effect by 2002 (Delegation of the EU to 
the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 2012). 
Details of the agreement and the negotiation process will be analysed in Chapter Three.  
2.2.6 Agadir Agreement 
 
Jordan, in its intent to harness the benefit of the open markets offered to its products in 
return for opening its own market to foreign products, embarked on regional and bilateral 
trade liberalization (Kang, 2011, p. 74) Jordan signed the Agadir Agreement with Tunisia, 
Morocco and Egypt in 2004, which was put into effect in 2006 (Royal Scientific Society, 
2013, p. 5) 
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As a member of the Great Arab FTA, Jordan, Tunisia, Morocco, and Egypt recognized a 
need for another level, an inter-Arab (members of the Barcelona process) agreement, to 
benefit most from the Barcelona process. As a result, the Agadir Agreement was launched 
in 2001, when the four countries agreed upon the main objectives of the agreement: to 
enhance the coordination of positions vis-à-vis the EU and to achieve the economic 
integration of the four partners in order to increase intra-trade and the countries’ 
competitiveness in the EU (Wippel, 2005; Kang, 2011, p. 76) 
 
The Agadir Agreement was directly linked to the EU/EC AA agreements. The Agadir 
Agreement followed the EU country of origin rules allowing for the cumulative added 
value of products to qualify for exemption under the AA agreement (Bilateral Org, 2017). 
The Agadir Agreement received more support from the European Commission than the 
GAFTA agreement (Wippel, 2005, p. 45). The EU provided financial support of 3 million 
euros to support this south-south trade integration initiative (Peridy, 2005, p. 329). 
 
Jordan participated in the Agadir Agreement in an attempt to benefit from the cumulative 
added value of products to qualify for duty-free entrance under the AA agreement 
(Bilateral Org, 2017). Therefore, Jordan initiated policies and programmes to improve 
economic cooperation with members of the Agadir Agreement to enhance export 
performance in the EC/EU (Kang, 2011, p. 95).  
 
Peridy’s (2005) study based on the gravity model studying the potential effects of trade 
integration concluded that intra-trade would be slow among these countries because of the 
trade cost variables among them, since it would be more expensive to trade among 
themselves than with non-Agadir countries (Peridy, 2005, p. 343). In contrast, Kang 
(2011, p. 95) highlights that Jordan has not been actively using the Agadir Agreement to 
enhance its export performance in the EC markets and that Jordan needs to set policies to 
enhance the integration with the Agadir countries to improve their export to the EC/EU.  
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Conclusion  
Based on the above findings, an overview of the characteristics that influence Jordan’s 
political economy will be outlined. These characteristics are: 1) Jordan’s dependence on 
external financial support; 2) Jordan’s Western orientation and dependence; 3) its 
proximity to Israel; 4) half of the population being of Palestinian descent; and 5) the 
influence of Jordan’s financial elite. The development of Jordan’s economy will then be 
viewed in the light of the theoretical framework developed in Chapter I to better 
understand the motivation of Jordan to enter into an agreement with EU.  
 
A determining feature of Jordan is its political and economic orientation towards the 
West. In the Cold War, King Hussein took a principled stand against communism, and the 
country reliably held that position and thus a pro-free-market policy. Economically, 
Jordan was closely related to Great Britain, receiving support. That is not to say that 
Jordan’s interest was never at odds with its Western orientation. Being a small country 
with few natural resources and a developing economy, the Jordanian government had to 
make decisions based on realpolitik. An example is that, during the Gulf War, under 
heavy internal pressure, Jordan sided with its then most important trading partner, Iraq, 
against the US-led coalition. Subsequently, Jordan grabbed the opportunity to endear 
itself to the West again when Jordan’s strategic geographical position, as well as its role 
in the peace process, offered that opportunity. It is probable that America’s quick 
turnaround towards Jordan, with regard to lenient repayment conditions and the 
stimulation of various trade initiatives, would not have been as easy had Jordan not 
traditionally been a pro-west country. Jordan’s border with Israel and the relatively stable 
situation between the two countries became an important characteristic for Jordan’s 
political economy once the peace process gained momentum. In that sense, this 
characteristic is related to the previous point. 
Related to Jordan’s proximity to Israel is also Jordan’s demographic composition, where 
about half of the population is of Palestinian descent. This is of political importance, since 
the Palestinian refugee population has specific opinions regarding Jordan’s cooperation 
with Israel. 
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Another characteristic of Jordan's economy is the presence of an influential financial elite. 
This elite became influential after they offered needed resources to the Jordanian 
government, and their importance grew when they acquired ownership or decision-maker 
power in services, businesses, and economic organisations. The fact that this elite wanted 
to safeguard their interests had different consequences. The desire to maintain the status 
quo led to non-competitive management practices and their financially ailing companies 
burdening the national economy. Furthermore, the slow implementation of improvements 
and competitive privatisation may be partly attributed to the financial elite protecting their 
interests. Initiatives for more state intervention in the economy by the government were 
redirected because the financial assistance of the elite remained necessary.  
 
An important driver is also the interest of the government in perpetuating and protecting 
itself. This involves several areas of tension: on one hand, between the government and 
the royal family during the 50s, and on the other hand, the financial elite. Often, the 
interests of both these groups likely converge. There is also tension between the 
government and the Palestinian population in Jordan. Not only does the Palestinian 
population have specific political opinions and interests, but they also feel that they are a 
separate group in Jordan’s society. This last point led to a violent confrontation in 1971 
with the Palestinians in Amman and Irbid, in which the Jordanian army had to intervene. 
 
Jordan’s economy started like the borders of the country itself, as the result of 
imperialism. Jordan has few natural resources, and its developing economy relied upon 
support from Great Britain. The Jordanian government, faced with the desire to improve 
the economy and in need of financial help, turned to the national financial elite. An 
increasing national debt combined with a decreasing influx of money was briefly relieved 
by Iraqi trade and loans, but soon enough, intervention by the IMF, and later the World 
Bank, became factors. Cooperation with the IMF improved as soon as Jordan’s role in the 
US-initiated peace process was confirmed. The emerging pattern is that Jordan has 
always been, to a greater or lesser extent, dependent on and influenced by assistance from 
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Western powers. Britain served its own purposes, and later, the US, wishing to create a 
stable neighbour for Israel, did the same with its economic initiatives. The motivations 
and actions were realist and the goals imperialist in nature. At the same time, the 
Jordanian government cooperated internally with the financial elite, needing their 
resources, ultimately leading to an economy that was in part focused on perpetuating the 
influence of the financial elite and maintaining the distribution of wealth and influence as 
it was. This pattern stems from a Marxist perspective and shows a country where, both on 
a national and international level, the powers that be supported and maintained a system 
where the interests of the wealthy elite were protected, and class differences were 
reinforced. Continuing this line of thought, one can observe that the government’s 
survival was of concern in view of the pressures of the Palestinian demographic 
component, but also in view of securing the support of the Jordanian population. The 
government made decisions in line with popular sentiments when it supported Iraq but 
antagonized most of the population by pledging Jordan’s full support to the peace 
process. One also wonders what would have happened if the government and the royal 
family would have antagonized the financial elite through more ambitious privatizations, 
or rather, nationalizations of services, just to give an example. The pressure that the 
government experienced from the IMF becomes clear when the infamous bread riots 
come to mind. On a critical note, improvements for the population may be found in 
exposure to international business practices as a by-product of the QIZ areas rather than 
intent. 
 
For Jordan, it is clear that to keep the boat floating, the course of the boat highly 
depended on the prevailing winds. Jordan was not a strong economic power to begin with, 
and the country is situated in a volatile environment. The pattern that became visible was 
that of the government practicing realpolitik to safeguard its existence and the interests of 
its elite. Realist political practices led to the continuation of the distribution of wealth. In 
view of the results of regime changes in the region, one could argue that governmental 
stability is preferable. From a critical point of view, one notes that efforts brought little 
sustainable enrichment to the population. The forces from outside are no different, as US 
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initiatives to improve Jordan’s economy appear motivated by imperialist notions. 
However, cooperation with the IMF and US as well as regional economic frameworks led 
to internationalization. Jordan’s cooperation with the other Western economic power, the 
EU, was an expected next step.  
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Chapter Three 
EU-Jordan Association Agreement Content and the 
Negotiations Process 
Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the goals and content of the EU-Jordan AA to 
bring out its significant features. The analysis will be done within the theoretical 
framework set in Chapter One. At the same time, it will compare the Jordan EU 
agreement with that of the EU-Morocco agreement to highlight and determine whether 
the Jordan AA is substantively different from that of other MENA countries like 
Morocco. This will permit construction of the basis for the analysis of the negotiation 
process. The process will first be reviewed within a theoretical context; second, it will be 
assessed at the empirical level by involving the views of the EU negotiators themselves, 
as well as the Jordanian private and public sectors’ expectations in addition to debates 
covered by the Jordanian press, the available literature, and Jordanian government 
documentation during that period. These resources will give insight into the negotiation 
process itself and the views of the negotiators on the outcome of the AA. This approach 
was followed to reconstruct the environment of the negotiation process and to evaluate 
whether Jordan had the opportunity to negotiate agreement terms that would better serve 
its national interest, or whether the Jordanian negotiators were only in a position to accept 
negotiation terms set by the EU. 
  
Establishing who conducted the negotiations and thus the exact framework proved 
difficult. I contacted the European External Action Service (EEAS) to obtain the names of 
the negotiators on both sides, as well as the minutes of the negotiations. The EEAS 
provided only 1) Aide memoire – Partnership Agreement Negotiations 22 October 1996 
(Appendix V), 2) Agreed Agenda for the last negotiation session 16 April 1997 
(Appendix VI), 3) Meeting Commission – Jordan 29-30 January 1997: Delegation 
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Commission (Appendix VII), and 4) the names of eight of the 13 EU negotiators 
(Appendix VIII), and Meeting Commission Jordan Jan 1997 (Appendix IX). As for the 
Jordanian side, after four months of correspondence with the EEAS, the EEAS sent me a 
letter stating that it was not authorised to share the names of the Jordanian negotiators. 
EEAS shared only the composition of the Jordanian delegation (Appendix X). The letter 
from the EEAS dated 20 December 2012 stated, ‘The names cannot be disclosed as their 
disclosure could undermine the protection of the public interest’. In addition, the EEAS 
referred to Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation 1049/2001 regarding access to the European 
Parliament on the protection of the privacy and integrity of the individuals. 
For the second time in December 2017, I contacted the EU and obtained the full minutes 
of the EU-Jordan negotiations, and for the second time, the EEAS sent me a letter (Annex 
X) dated 4 June 2018 stating that they do not hold any of the requested documents; they 
searched for them to no avail, and that they took six months to respond because they 
could not locate the documents. 
  
Although I had none of the names of the Jordanian negotiators, I identified Dr. Rima 
Khaled Huneidi from the documents as the Minister of Planning at the time. I attempted 
several times to contact her through Birzeit University, where she is on the Board of 
Trustees, but I received no response. I then tried to get Jordanian input on the agreement 
through the parliamentary documentary from the government website. I also contacted the 
Al Rai, Jordan Time, and Al Distour newspapers. Al Rai thankfully provided me with  
articles about the EU-Jordan AA. This meant that, in terms of the precise information 
upon which I drew, I referred to the newspapers and the available literature on the 
parliamentary debate and Jordanian reaction to the EU-Jordan Agreement.  
 
For me to obtain the input of the EU negotiators, I first had to ensure that the 
questionnaires and process complied with the university’s ethical review. Thus, I 
prepared the questions, an information sheet, and a consent form and submitted them to 
the Ethical Committee. The Ethical Committee issued an approval reference, 
  
 
 
 
109 
ER/MR375/1, for me to proceed and granted me six months within which to undertake 
the project. The questionnaire, information form, and consent forms are in Annex IV. 
I searched and found the contact details of the EU negotiators, and I sent requests to all of 
them. Out of the eight negotiators whose names I was given, only three responded. I am 
most grateful that two among them gave insight into the negotiations: Mr. Peter Zangl, 
Director EU External Relations, and Mr. Michele Villani, Administrator of Industrial 
Affairs, Dismantling of Tariffs (Annex XI Consent forms). The third person indicated that 
his participation was limited and thus, he would be in no position to answer the questions. 
The questionnaire has nine questions aimed at shedding light on the EU position and 
policies that motivated the EU to negotiate the AA with Jordan and the dynamics of the 
negotiations with the Jordanian negotiators. In the first set, questions one to five were on 
the negotiation process itself and the main topics of concern, while the second set, 
containing the remaining questions, was aimed at obtaining the views of the negotiators 
on whether the agreement did indeed benefit Jordan. Questions 1 and 2 aimed to 
understand the motives of the EU and Jordan when negotiating and concluding the AA. 
Question 3 was directed towards understanding the main domain with which Jordan was 
concerned. Question 4 was to understand which countries in the EU were most involved 
in the negotiation process. Question 5 aimed to understand if the negotiation process with 
Jordan was different from the negotiation process with any other country within the 
Barcelona Process. Questions 6 and 7 targeted the change that the AA has brought to 
Jordan and whether these changes were beneficial to Jordan. Question 8 pursued another 
direction of the negotiations by putting the EU negotiators in the position of the Jordanian 
negotiators: What would their requests have been if they had been negotiating from the 
Jordanian negotiators’ position? Finally, the goal of Question 9 is to assess whether the 
EU negotiators consider the agreement successful. 
3.1  Agreement Main Aims and Content  
 
The agreement between Jordan and the EC/EU comprises eight titles, 107 articles, seven 
annexes and four protocols; the main aim of the agreement is highlighted in Article One 
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which set the conditions for the liberalization of trade in goods, services and capital to 
develop balanced economic and social relations through dialogue, to improve living and 
employment, to increase productivity and finance stability, to encourage regional 
cooperation, to attain peaceful co-existence, and to promote cooperation in mutual areas 
of interest. All these conditions should be implemented while respecting democratic 
principles and human rights (Article 2). Through this, one can see that the main aim of the 
agreement was trade liberation and attaining peace in the region.  
It is worth underlining that there is no mention of the free movement of persons in the 
objectives. In the objective of the agreement with Jordan, there was also no mention of 
regional integration, but only regional cooperation, while in the agreement between the 
EU and Morocco, it was outlined as a separate objective of the agreement to encourage 
the integration of the Maghreb countries. Thus, economic integration appeared to be less 
important to the EU with regard to Jordan. One wonders whether regional (economic) 
integration of the Maghreb countries directly bordering the Southern part of the 
Mediterranean Sea held special importance for the EU from the point of view of 
geographic location and their status as direct neighbours.  
 
The first title of the agreement is on political dialogue. It was covered in articles three to 
five to encourage dialogue between parties as a means to ensure peace, while the same 
title for Morocco was aimed at dialogue within Maghreb countries. This, again, may 
indicate that the EU sees a different (geopolitical) role for Jordan compared with the 
Maghreb countries. Jordan was a major partner to the EU in the peace process with Israel, 
and thus, Jordan’s role within this agreement revisits its pivotal role in the region. 
 
The second title is on the free movement of goods. It is extensive and covered by 24 
articles, from Article 6 to Article 29. The aim of Article 6 was the gradual elimination of 
trade barriers and the creation of a free trade area in 12 years. The agreement includes a 
distinction between industrial and agriculture goods. Industrial goods are covered in the 
agreement, except the goods that contain any of the items listed in Annex II as a 
component. Those are industrial products with an agricultural component and are a part of 
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the agricultural products that are protected by the EU. It is noteworthy that three articles 
were dedicated to political dialogue, while 24 articles were devoted to trade. If the most 
important title of the agreement were to be chosen solely based on the number of articles 
dedicated to it, the free movement of goods would be the most important aspect of the 
agreement for the EU.  
 
Article 10 grants both the EU and Jordan the ability to retain the right to levy on the 
agricultural components listed in annexes I and II and Article 11. Regarding all items not 
listed in annexes II, III, and IV, tariff barriers would be abolished immediately according 
to the agreed upon schedules. Annexes II, III and IV would follow a schedule for 
gradually abolishing import duties in 12 years. 
 
In Article 13, exceptional measures are allowed for Jordan to introduce customs duties for 
the protection of local industries that are in their infancy, but these should not exceed 
25% of the ad valorem, which is also stated in the agreement between the EU and 
Morocco.  
 
Agricultural products are covered in Article 14. The provision applies to Annex II of the 
treaty establishing the EC, Article 15, the EU liberation of agricultural products. In this 
section, protectionism of the agricultural product appears and is exercised by the EU. It 
should be emphasized, however, that industrial products with an agricultural component 
as defined in Annex II are viewed as agricultural products for the purpose of this 
agreement and are thus, like the agricultural products, not a part of the group of products 
that are scheduled for the abolition of tariffs.  
 
Article 16 refers to Protocol I, which sets up the arrangement for Jordanian imports into 
the EC/EU. It includes a table of Jordanian imports benefiting from the customs 
reduction; however, it also set limitations in the form of a volume quota.  
A highlight is necessary for the discussion point of tomato concentrate CN code 
20029031/39/91/99. It has a quota of 4,000 tons specified, and the provision contains a 
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detailed description and the percentage of dry matter of tomato concentrate allowed. Also, 
this item was subject to paragraph 1(4), in which the quotas would be also increased 
annually at 3% of these amounts, while Protocol II set up the arrangement for EC/EU 
imports to Jordan. It is worthwhile to note here that quotas were set for Jordanian exports 
to the EU, while it appears that no quotas were set for EU exports into Jordan. This 
limitation goes against all liberation theory because goods are not free, yet realism theory 
explains that the EU was dominant in the negotiation and managed to impose limitations 
on the free movement of goods for the benefit of certain EU member states. On another 
level, Marxism states that the agreement was set as a tool to oppress the weaker party for 
the benefit of the stronger one.  
 
It is interesting that, in the same protocol in the agreement of the EU with Morocco, the 
list of products is longer with more quotas; it is more specific regarding establishing 
prices per ton for entry into the EU. Here one can notice the extensive detail and care that 
the EU introduced into the agreement to ensure complete protection of the trade of 
agricultural goods. The bilateral agreement with Morocco is even more specific and 
detailed regarding agricultural exports to the EU. One explanation could be that it is even 
more important for the EU to strictly regulate trade in agricultural products with 
Morocco, since Morocco is closer and has 13.6% of its GDP value added by agriculture, 
while that figure is 4.3% for Jordan (The World Bank, 2016). 
 
The common provision of that title is covered in articles 18 to 29. It is outlined that no 
new restriction was to be introduced on trade between the EU and Jordan, but there was 
the possibility to amend the arrangement. An important article in this section is Article 
28, which refers to Protocol II regarding rules of origin. That protocol is detailed and has 
39 articles and four annexes to outline country of origin rules and procedures. These rules 
have proved to be some of the most complex and demanding requirements for the 
Jordanian industries to comply with. These rules made it hard for the Jordanian industries 
to feel encouraged to export to the EU. Through Marxism, one can see that the EU was 
imposing its own standards on Jordan and putting major hindrances and markedly high 
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standards that directly influenced the level of benefit Jordan obtained from this agreement 
to tip the benefits towards its own side.  
 
Title Three of the Agreement covers the rights of establishment and service, and in the 
agreement with Jordan, it is elaborate and covers two chapters: in Chapter One, rights of 
establishment, and in Chapter Two, services. Article 30 EU grants Jordan access to the 
right of establishment, but Annex V restricts activities related to mining, fishing, real 
estate purchase, and audio-visual services including radio and telecommunication 
services, as well as infrastructure, agricultural activities, and news agencies. The benefit 
of this clause would only apply to company branches or subsidiaries established after the 
AA became active. Yet, the rights of establishment in the Morocco AA were only 
confined to two articles, Article 31 and 32: Article 31 of the AA stipulates that there 
should be an assessment within five years of the agreement entering into force. 
  
The migration fear on the EU side is evident in this article. Realism can explain this 
through the dominance that the EU exercised to service its security-centred interests. This 
article establishes a one-sided limitation on Jordan. The EU had no restrictions on any 
activities related to the rights of establishment in Jordan. However, Jordan had limitations 
on both access to certain activities and the time of establishment of the benefiting 
companies. 
 
Article 31.1 lists that the provisions of Article 30 do not apply to air transport, inland 
transport or maritime transport. It then lists the activities that are permitted: marketing 
purchases for transport and related services, preparing documentation for transport or 
customs, providing information about businesses, setting business arrangements, and 
organizing calls for the ship or cargo. 
 
Article 33 states that both parties shall make all efforts to avoid taking any restrictive 
measures against the establishment of the other party. Article 34 is about the right to 
employ or be employed by the branches or sub-branches in the partner country. These 
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employees should only be employed for those companies and for the duration of that 
employment.  
Yet, here, they introduced a restriction that those personnel should be the key personnel 
working in senior positions: directors, supervisors or employees who have the authority to 
employ, and those who possess uncommon knowledge, and they should have originally 
been working at the main company in the origin country and transferred temporarily and 
are not engaged in making direct sales.  
 
The fourth title is regarding payment, capital movement, and other economic matters. 
These are covered by articles 48 to 52 regarding cooperation for the free movement of 
capital between the EU and Jordan and abolishment of any restriction on the free 
movement of capital that existed prior to the agreement. Chapter Two sees to competition 
and other economic matters, and articles 53 to 56 set the rules for fair competition. It is 
interesting to note that the competition rules in Chapter Two of the Agreement are 
notably similar to the competition rules in Article 81(1) of the EC treaty. The question 
that arises is whether Jordan really wanted to adopt EU competition rules or whether there 
is a degree of asymmetry at work somewhere. Tobias (2012, p. 198), in this respect, 
points to power asymmetry when he concludes that several reforms in the action plans 
were requested in the from the partners in the Southern Mediterranean, while no reforms 
were requested from the EU. This is clearly explained by realism and Marxism under 
direct dominance and influence—the dominance of EU in imposing its own standards on 
Jordan to yield its own interests.  
 
The fifth title is concerned with economic cooperation and covers 20 articles. It is similar 
to the agreement the EU had with Morocco. The objective of this section is to support 
Jordan’s efforts to reach economic development, covering the areas that will face 
difficulties, arising from the liberalization of trade under the scope of this agreement. The 
economic cooperation will take the form of dialogue, an exchange of information, 
training, and joint ventures. An important article to bring to the foreground is Article 68 
regarding standardisation and conformity assessment. The parties needed to cooperate to 
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increase the implementation of EU standards and improve Jordanian standards to 
eventually reach a level of mutual recognition. The situation with the adoption of EC/EU 
standardisation rules by Jordan is quite similar to the situation where Jordan was to adopt 
EC/EU competition rules outlined above. Is there, again, a desire from the Jordanian side 
to adopt EC/EU rules, or are other reasons playing a role here? 
 
Article 70 sees to financial services and is aimed at cooperation for the approximation of 
the standards to restructure the financial system and improve the accounting and 
supervision of the financial sector in Jordan. Here, similar to the competition law and rule 
of origin, Jordan was expected to adopt EU financial standards and structure; therefore, 
the inclusion of this article is an expression of EU dominance or Jordan’s desire to adopt 
EU rules internally. 
 
Title VI sets rules for social and cultural cooperation and cultural matters. It is covered in 
Articles 80 to 85. The goal is to establish social dialogue between the parties, similar to 
the Morocco Agreement, and the focus is on migration, illegal migration, equality, and 
the elimination of discrimination. Encouragement should be given to social cooperation, 
while the priority is to reduce migration through job creation, re-integrate illegal 
immigrants, improve health care, and improve the social role of women. It is remarkable 
that a special working body was designed by the Association Council to monitor the 
implementation of chapters one and two of Title VI of the Agreement. It is therefore 
probable that the implementation of these chapters in Title VI was especially important to 
the EU. This importance reflected back to the EU policy to fight migration and its 
consequential impact on EU culture. 
 
Title VII pertains to financial cooperation and is covered by articles 86 to 88. It addresses 
the financial cooperation package that will be available to Jordan, and has the aim, in 
addition to titles V and VI, to promote reforms to the economy, promote private 
investment, and to create jobs. The EU can examine suitable ways for supporting 
structural reforms. 
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Title VIII is directed towards the institutional setup for EC/EU-Jordan relations. 
The Association Council was established by the agreement. It meets at the ministerial 
level once a year to discuss key issues arising from the framework of the agreement. 
Members of the Association Council include the government of Jordan, members of the 
Council of the EU, and members of the Commission. The Association Council sets the 
rules of the procedures and will be chaired every other year respectively by the Jordanian 
government and the member of the Council of the EU. The Association Council can make 
recommendations or decisions that are binding and can set up bodies to aid in the 
implementation of the agreement. Each party can refer an issue to the Association 
Council to settle a dispute. If the dispute is not settled, each party can assign an arbitrator, 
and the Association Council can assign a third arbitrator. 
 
On the second institutional level is the establishment of the Association Committee, 
which is responsible for the implementation of the agreement. It reports to the 
Association Council. The Association Committee includes members from the government 
of Jordan, members of the Council of the EU, and members of the Commission. The 
Association Committee sets the rules of the procedures and will be chaired in turns by the 
Jordanian government and the member of the Council of the EU. The Association 
Committee has the power to make binding decisions for the management of the 
agreement. 
 
Conclusion  
 
While examining the content of the agreement, several things are noteworthy. Political 
and economic regional integration were mentioned in the bilateral agreement with 
Morocco, while for Jordan the agreement mentions regional dialogue. The section on 
trade in the Moroccan agreement is more detailed than in the agreement with Jordan. 
Jordan has a different position regarding the EU than does Morocco. It is worthwhile to 
shed light on the reasons for these differences.  
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A special body is provided for with regard to the monitoring of the implementation of the 
articles pertaining to migration. This is an indication of special importance that should be 
considered during the rest of this investigation. 
 
With 24 articles, the section on the movement of goods is the largest and apparently holds 
particular importance. Agricultural products and industrial products with an agricultural 
component are out of the scope of tariff abolition. Certain quotas for trade are set, but 
only limiting Jordan’s exports, not the EU’s exports. The EU rules for financial services, 
standardisation, and competition are to be adopted by Jordan in such a way that the rules 
in Jordan will, in due course, be acceptable for the EU, while no approximation of EU 
rules to the Jordanian rules is provided for. All this poses questions about the power 
division among Jordan and the EU during negotiations as well as the level of 
protectionism involved, and the respective benefits expected or intended. 
 
If we refer to the theoretical framework, liberalism can explain some of the intended 
liberalisation of goods and services but does not explain the limitations in the form of 
quotas on certain agricultural products and any manufactured goods that have these 
agricultural products as components. Also, it cannot explain the one-way limitation set for 
Jordan on the free movement of persons. Liberalism assumes equality between the two 
negotiating parties, and therefore it cannot explain the asymmetry of power that this 
agreement demonstrates. Asymmetry is evident when the EU imposes its standards in the 
rule of origin, competition law, and financial standards on Jordan, and Jordan did not 
have the power to implement its own standards on its territories, let alone impose them on 
the EU.  
Realism can explain this asymmetry, and it is evident that the EU had the upper hand and 
was the dominant party in the negotiation of the agreement in view of the fact that the 
signed agreement contained only EU standards and it managed to maintain its 
protectionism over the agricultural product of concern. Marxism also brings about the fact 
that nation states may further the interests of certain dominant classes by exporting the 
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class struggle to the international world. Another analytical aspect sourced from Marxism 
is that relations between the EU and Jordan also exist at the level of dominant and 
dominated classes, because the states are each at a different stage of development when it 
comes to class struggle, and thus the relations between the states cannot be at an equal 
level as would have been the case if the parties were at the same stage of development. 
  
3.2  Theoretical Context 
When intending to analyse negotiations, several bargaining theories present themselves: 
cooperative bargaining, non-cooperative bargaining, and the theory of fair division. Since 
no transcripts of the EU-Jordanian negotiations were made available, we have no insight 
in terms of the numbers, quantities, or percentages that were discussed during the actual 
negotiations. This makes the application of calculation-based analytical tools impossible. 
In the work of Nash (1950) on non-cooperative bargaining, however, strategic 
equilibrium is a key component of the division of the spoils during negotiations. The final 
division of the value of the object being negotiated is a function of all the components 
that constitute the strategic equilibrium. Thus, the strategic equilibrium addresses more 
aspects than only the division of ‘the pie’. Therefore, without the transcripts of the actual 
negotiations, a step-by-step analysis of offers and counteroffers is not feasible, but we 
will examine to what extent aspects of the strategic equilibrium in non-cooperative 
bargaining theory could be helpful in giving insights regarding the relative level of 
advantage at which the EU and Jordan were operating during the negotiations. However, 
these theoretical frameworks cannot, by their very nature, be viewed as a comprehensive 
tool for a complete analysis (Carraro, Marchiori, & Sgobbi, 2005, p. 1) but should be seen 
as isolated theoretical approaches. Furthermore, in this research, only selected aspects of 
the strategic equilibrium that tie in with the available information about the negotiations 
will be examined, with the aim of exposing factors in the negotiations that may have had 
a significant role with regard to the final outcome. 
  
 
 
 
119 
3.2.1  Bargaining theory 
  
The model for ‘cooperative bargaining’ developed by Nash (1950) is based on several 
assumptions that are explored in the next paragraph. Furthermore, Nash’s model does not 
provide for a strategic component in bargaining. Since, realistically, the absence of a 
strategic component cannot be assumed in the negotiations between international partners 
from different continents, non-cooperative theories appear to provide a more reasonable 
starting point. Furthermore, in view of the asymmetry between the EU and Jordan as 
economic powers, the theory of fair division is proposed to identify aspects that are not 
directed exclusively at the efficiency of the outcome, like equity or being invulnerable to 
strategic manipulation. 
3.2.2 Applicable model: cooperative versus non-cooperative bargaining models 
  
Cooperative bargaining as proposed by Nash (1950, p. 156) sets out to determine the 
expected satisfaction of each participant and the value of the negotiation itself to the 
participants, since, in the end, a participant can simply walk away if he/she so choses. 
Nash recognises a degree of idealisation in his model (Nash, 1950, p. 155), since 
participants are, among other things, supposedly fully aware of each other’s priorities and 
can accurately assess how desirable the various options are for each other. Regarding the 
negotiations between Jordan and the EU, each party may have had an idea of each other’s 
priorities and preferences, but certainly not in full. Furthermore, Nash (1950, p. 159) 
assumes symmetry of the participants in the negotiation; that is, they are identical. 
Clearly, Jordan and the EU are far from identical as economic entities. 
 
For the reasons mentioned above, the cooperative bargaining model sways far from the 
realities of the EU-Jordan relationship. Therefore, it might be worthwhile to explore to 
what extent the non-cooperative model provides a better approach in an attempt to find 
indications of a relative advantage for one of the parties. Bearing in mind that the non-
cooperative model is, by its very nature, also a reduction of the realities of the 
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negotiations, there are a few points of interest. Like the actual negotiations, the non-
cooperative model suggests a turn-based approach. Furthermore, disagreement, in other 
words, failed negotiations not leading to an AA, would be the least desirable outcome for 
the parties. It is reasonable to assume that it is highly likely that failed negotiations were 
indeed the least desirable outcome, since both the EU and Jordan wanted an AA in the 
first place. On the other hand, loss owing to delay is an always-increasing function of 
negotiation. One may wonder to what extent the passage of time in the case of the EU-
Jordanian negotiations would actually lead to a loss by any of the two parties. Another 
assumption that is part of the balance in the solutions found by the players in the 
sequential bargaining steps is the presumed advantage of the party that makes the first 
proposal in the negotiations; in other words, the one who begins the negotiations. 
Although it is not certain to what extent solely beginning the negotiations is an advantage 
in this particular situation—in which proposals were semi-fixed in the sense that both 
parties had little room for actual bargaining—the EU, in the role of initiator and larger 
power, which was also proposing AAs to other countries in the region, could most 
probably be regarded as the party in the advantageous role. 
The starting point for Rubinstein’s model of non-cooperative bargaining, as is the case 
with Nash’s model, is that there is one single pie to be divided between the players 
(Carraro, Marchiori, & Sgobbi, 2005, pp. 13–14). Translated to the EU-Jordanian 
negotiations, that would mean there was only one issue to negotiate about. Since the AA 
to be negotiated encompassed a multitude of issues in many different fields, it may be 
observed that there was more than a single pie to divide. 
There are two approaches to the multiple issue complication of the non-cooperative 
bargaining model. In the first approach, the multiple issues would be bundled into one 
package, and then that package would be negotiated in one set of bargaining rounds. In 
this way, when multiple issues are approached as one pie, the same rules would apply as 
in Rubinstein’s classical non-cooperative model. If multiple issues were negotiated one at 
a time, the negotiations would comprise several sequential sets of bargaining rounds. 
Since issues are negotiated sequentially, the order in which issues are being negotiated 
might influence the outcome of the bargaining game. Thus, the negotiators could make 
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strategic use of the agenda of the negotiations by influencing the order of issues to be 
negotiated. In this respect, one might consider, for example, a certain time constraint that 
one party might have that could be exploited by the other party (Carraro, Marchiori, & 
Sgobbi, 2005, p. 15). Another and more likely manipulation in the case of a trade 
agreement might be that the interest of party A is actually directed towards one or two 
issues only, i1 and i2, while the interest of party B is focused on several issues, i3 to i7, and 
party B is only mildly interested in i1 and i2. Thus, for party A, the willingness to negotiate 
on issues other than i1 and i2 and to have the agreement at all depends, in effect, 
exclusively on the outcome of bargaining regarding i1 and i2. If party B now would 
succeed in putting i1 and i2 at the end of the agenda, then party A might negotiate and 
agree to points regarding i3 to i7 only to reach the end of the agenda and hope for a 
favourable outcome regarding i1 and i2. Thus, it is likely that party A would give more of 
the pie of i3 to i7 to party B when i1 and i2 were at the end of the agenda. Thus, party B’s 
power to influence the agenda to a degree would be directly proportional to party B’s 
extra gain in the sequential negotiations. Research by Inderst (2000) further underlines 
that an ‘agenda can have a marked impact on pay-offs’ (Carraro, Marchiori, & Sgobbi, 
2005, p. 16), regardless of the level of patience demonstrated by the negotiators. It is 
worth noting that all bargaining models mentioned offer only a static approach and 
assume an exclusively rational pursuit of pure self-interest. 
Theories of repeated bargaining are not addressed, since no information was made 
available about the Jordanian delegation. Therefore, it is not possible to assess whether 
contact moments continued afterwards or took place before the end of the negotiations for 
the AA. 
3.2.3 Connecting the model to the negotiations 
  
What needs to be investigated now is the extent to which the EU-Jordanian negotiations 
for the AA were sequential or in the form of a package. Another issue is that negotiation 
agendas, strictly speaking, might contain multiple sequential packages rather than purely 
sequential issues. As an example, referring to the previous paragraph, on day one, issues 
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i1 and i2 might be on the agenda to be discussed together, while issues i3 to i7 might be 
scheduled for day two. In the case of an agenda with multiple sequential packages, since a 
sequence is applied, the possible advantages associated with sequential bargaining would 
still apply. The Aide Memoire from the EU delegation in Appendix V with the attached 
agenda suggests that negotiations took place in a sequential manner and therefore that the 
ability to influence the agenda may be advantageous in a bargaining game. 
It should be noted that the limited information made available about the actual 
negotiations restricts the practical application of the models. The available information 
does not allow the examination of negotiation steps, for example, simply because no 
transcripts were made available. 
However, some interesting points emerged in the examination of bargaining theory, 
which may help to shed light on whether parties were in advantageous roles. First, in non-
cooperative bargaining theory, the party that begins the negotiations is regarded as having 
an advantage. The European Commission, being the disproportionately larger party and 
initiator of its own plans for the Southern Mediterranean, of which Jordan is but a small 
component, may be seen as the initiator of all agreements on a regional scale, and 
therefore, may also be seen as the initiator at the national Jordanian level for that AA. In 
this context, the relevance of who made the first proposal during the actual negotiations 
remains debatable from the viewpoint of bargaining theory. 
The EU, with the Barcelona Process and its other plans for the Southern Mediterranean, 
has a clear economic vision of the contents of the AAs it wants to close in that region. 
Several countries in North Africa preceded Jordan in negotiating with the EU. It can be 
observed that the EU has a standard template for the AAs. In addition, the EU went 
through multiple negotiation sessions with these countries, which meant that the EU has 
substantial experience in negotiating different elements of the AA and was already 
prepared for any eventual disagreement from the Jordanian side. When examining the AA 
of Jordan and other countries in the region, it can be observed that these AAs were not all 
that different from each other, supporting the notion of a standard template—a template, 
of course, that reflected the EU’s interests. This is underlined by the fact that the only 
issue for which a detailed follow-up was stipulated in the action plans was the reduction 
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of tariffs, arguably the most interesting issue for the EU from an economic point of view. 
According to Villani, one of the members of the EU delegation who responded to the 
questionnaire, Jordan was cooperative during the negotiation process but wanted to 
negotiate the best conditions for itself regarding gradual tariff reduction. Another 
delegation member, Zangl, remarked that the actual importance of the AA for Jordan was 
perhaps found in the opportunity to enter into a relationship with the EU more quickly 
than in the actual contents of the agreement. What does this tell us about Jordan? Though 
Jordan was trying to negotiate the content of the agreement, Jordan had a globalization 
strategy in the back of its mind when negotiating the conditions. It seems the ultimate 
goal of the agreement was to be partners with a global economic power like the EU and 
serve as a step towards other western partnerships. The facts that the early 1990s Jordan 
economy was hampered by the Gulf crisis, that it lost its main trading partner, Iraq, of its 
tense relations with other Arab countries, and that Jordan was under pressure to find other 
partners meant that the only real economic choice left was to partner with Western 
economic power like the EU, followed by an agreement with the US.  
 
All this leads to the notion that the contents of the negotiations were, to a certain extent, 
declared by the EU rather than discussed bilaterally. Not only does this give the EU the 
advantage of experience and knowledge, but the EU’s ability to, at least to an important 
degree, determine the very contents of the negotiations also had an impact on the 
negotiation process itself. This is explored below. 
Second, the power to set or influence the agenda is considered an advantage in 
negotiations (Fershtman, 1990; Inderst, 2000). As mentioned, the agreement’s structure, 
intent, and content were all designed by the EU as part of its overall regional plans. 
Therefore, the EU, to begin with, largely determined what was on the agenda. 
Furthermore, the contents of the Aide Memoire sent internally by the EU delegation on 
22 October 1996 and still to be discussed with the Jordanian Minister of Planning are 
found in the agenda of the EU-Jordanian negotiations on 29 and 30 January 1997 almost 
as a carbon copy. This may lead to the observation that from the side of the Jordanians, 
there was full agreement with the suggested issues for the agenda or possibly that content 
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was pre-discussed but not the agenda as such. The likelihood that the EU, to an important 
extent, determined the issues to be negotiated and the possibility that the EU was largely 
responsible for setting the agenda would put the EU in a highly advantageous position as 
a negotiator and stakeholder. 
  
3.3 Empirical Context 
  
The negotiation process from the EU perspective had multiple steps. After internal 
discussion and assessment of the impact of trade agreement, the European Commission 
would hold public consultations on the impact of the trade agreement with that specific 
country. Then, the commission would initiate an informal talk with the country in 
question. Thereafter, the commission would request official authorisation Negotiation 
Directives from the European Council to start the negotiations (European Commission - 
Directorate General Trade, 2013). In June 1995, the council approved the negotiation 
directive to initiate negotiations with Jordan, and the commission started negotiations 
with Jordan in July 1995 (Commission of the European Communities, 1997). In October 
1997, the commission submitted a proposal for the council to sign and conclude a Euro-
Mediterranean FTA with Jordan. Thus, the negotiation between Jordan and the EU lasted 
for a period of two years. According to the proposal, Jordan was not willing to accept the 
points as proposed; thus, the negotiation had to be extended to two more sessions to come 
to a compromise (Commission of the European Communities, 1997, p. 3). 
The negotiation process was led by the EU’s chief negotiator with the help of experts in 
the field of EU external relations, service, rules of origin, agricultural affairs, intellectual 
and industrial property, and legal services. On the Jordanian side, the negotiators included 
the head of the delegation from the Ministry of Planning, the Ambassador of Jordan in 
Belgium, the Secretary General from the Ministry of Industry and Trade, the Director 
General of the Budget from the Ministry of Finance, the Director General of Customs, the 
Secretary General from the Ministry of Agriculture, the Director of the Central Bank of 
Jordan, the Agricultural Marketing Corporation, the Head of the Technical Department, 
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Ministry of Planning, and representative of the Customs and Duties Department from the 
Ministry of Finance. The rounds of negotiations took place in the EU and Jordan. 
In the second half of the 1990s, Jordan was focused on globalising Jordan; thus, Crown 
Prince Hassan oversaw the Jordanian negotiation process with the EU over the AA (El-
Said & Becker, 2001, p. 184). Abu Dalbouh (2005) maintains that the EU and Jordan 
went through marathon negotiation rounds on the economic and financial aspects of the 
AA, while the political aspects were less favoured. 
The negotiation process that the EU followed was bilateral with the negotiating country. 
This meant that Jordan, as an individual country, needed to face 15 strong opponents in 
the negotiations, which put Jordan in a disadvantaged position and weakened any 
negotiating power from the start (El-Said & Becker, 2001, p. 184). 
 
 3.4 Jordan’s Input into the Process  
 
Jordan’s perspective on the agreement needs to cover both the public and private sectors, 
among which there were mixed expectations. The government built up lofty expectations 
for the EMP. With the urge to integrate into the global market, terminate its isolation, and 
build a healthier trade balance, Jordan embarked on the process expecting great things. 
This was evident from Dr. Rima Khalaf’s, then Jordan Minister of Planning, statement to 
the lower house about the agreement with the EU: ‘if we don't sign the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership association agreement, our industries will shrink because 
other Arab countries would have privileges that we don't … In this case, who would want 
to invest in a market that is closing itself off from a quarter of the world’s economy? (Abu 
Dalbouh, 2005, p. 140). In his speech addressing the Jordanian Parliament in 1996 and 
1997 (prior to signing the AA), King Hussein (1996; 1997) declared that in an effort to 
enhance Jordan’s economy regionally and globally and continue in the open market 
economy, there were negotiations with the EU for an AA where the open market would 
be gradual, and it would increase Jordan’s capability and competitiveness in the world 
economy. The Jordanian Senate (1997), in their response to the King Hussein speech, 
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underlined that the global economic direction was oriented towards trade unions and free 
markets to facilitate the free movement of capital. Thus, Jordan’s agreement with the EU 
would open doors for it to enter the world economy and improve its chances to increase 
its exports and foreign investments.  
  
Prince Hassan (1997), when addressing the Chamber of Commerce in its annual meeting, 
pointed out that the agreement that would be signed with the EU would open new 
horizons for cooperation between Jordan and the EU that would benefit both parties. The 
government did try to include the private sector in discussions on the agreement. 
Mohammad Asfour, The Minister of Industry and Trade, held a discussion meeting about 
the agreement with the private sector in the Finance Committee of the Chamber of 
Deputies (Carroll, 2001, p. 157). In an open discussion on the agreement arranged by the 
Jordan Europe Business Association (JEBA) in 1997, the private sector, Jordanian 
economists, and businessmen recognized that the agreement would bring benefits to the 
Jordanian economy and would reflect the liberalization policy of Jordan; however, the 
country needed to address economic imbalances to be able to benefit from the agreement 
(Aloul, 1997, p. 9). The former Jordan minister of Finance, Mr. Anis Mouasher, said that 
the private and public sector needed to modernize and that liberalization should be 
preceded by reducing bureaucracy, increasing the role of the private sector (Aloul, 1997, 
p. 9). Mouasher said that Jordan should learn from the experience of other countries who 
negotiated an AA with the EU, and Jordan should seek advice from international 
consultants and local legal teams to seal a good deal with the EU (Aloul, 1997, p. 9). 
Mouasher added that one of the major issues to address was the proprietary rights Jordan 
had to amend its legislation to meet its international standards (Aloul, 1997, p. 9).  
 
In the Al Rai newspaper (2002) the General Secretary of the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry, Samer Al Taweel, outlined that the AA would be one of the attracting factors 
for foreign investment in Jordan’s export industries. However, this agreement would put 
the Jordanian industries in direct competition with European industries, and these 
industries needed rehabilitation to be able to compete. The President of the Union of 
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Jordan Chambers of Commerce, Haidar Murad, (Al Rai, 2002) indicated that the AA 
would open a market of 450 million consumers to the Jordanian industries, which 
represents a great opportunity for the Jordanian industries. However, the biggest 
challenge would be rehabilitating these industries through specialized supporting 
programs to modernize it and reach the level that would guarantee its entry into the EU 
market (Al Rai, 2002). He also underlined that, in spite of the negative impact that would 
face Jordan’s economy due to this AA, including the loss of import duties and replacing 
that with local taxes, he still saw that there would be a lot of positive impact, like 
attracting foreign investment (Al Rai, 2002). Munir Hamarneh, from Jordan University 
(Al Rai, 2002), commented that the first goal of this AA that the EU offered to the 
Mediterranean countries, including Jordan, was to maintain its interest in the region, and 
the association between a group of highly developed industrial countries with one 
individual country would create great pressure on an individual country like Jordan. To 
face this pressure, it would be better to enter into regional groups and negotiate as a 
group, not as individual countries. Then, the partnership would be symmetrical (Al Rai, 
2002). Mr. Outhman Budair (Al Rai, 2002), president of the Amman Chamber of 
Industry, said that the AA with the EU would enhance economic relations with the EU 
and increase Jordan’s exports to the EU, and thus improve the trade balance, which was 
then in favour of the EU. Thus, the expectation would have been to establish joint 
investment projects based on the AA’s preferred treatment (Al Rai, 2002). Budair also 
highlighted that the AA would open the EU market to the Jordanian industries and would 
motivate foreign and local investors to invest in Jordan in industries aimed at exporting to 
the EU.  
 
Yet, in an interview with parliament member Ahmad Abadi, Abu Dalbouh (2005, p. 140) 
mentioned that only 10% of the MP were informed about the EMP when it presented to 
the Jordanian Lower House for approval. In an interview with Abdulatif Arabyat, 
secretary general of the Islamic Action Front, on 27 September 2003 (Abu Dalbouh, 
2005, p. 141), Arabyat mentioned that civil society, especially the Islamist opposition 
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group, did not expect any benefit from the EU-Jordan agreement (Abu Dalbouh, 2005, p. 
141). 
 
The private sector clearly voiced concerns regarding the opening of the Jordan market 
and the competition that it would create for weak local industries (Abu Dalbouh, 2005, p. 
141). Carroll (2001, p. 157) mentioned that the private sector in Jordan did not mobilise 
against signing the agreement because of the economic incentives inherent in aid and 
assistance. For the private sector, cautious acceptance was encouraged by the promise of 
technical and financial assistance to update their infrastructure and support investment 
policies (Carroll, 2001, p. 160) 
 
In the Al Rai newspaper, Nadin Namari (2005) expressed that there was a growing gap 
for the Jordanians in meeting their expectations of the agreement with the EU. Namari 
(2005) highlighted that the agreement did bring to Jordan financial aid and increased its 
exports, but she saw the performance as being less than expected in terms of improving 
the trade balance with the EU, as the imports from the EU far exceeded exports, thus, the 
trade balance was still in favour of the EU.  
 
In the Al Distour newspaper, it was reported that in spite of the agreement Jordan had 
with the EU, it perceived the result as below expectations, and that the private sector in 
Jordan was facing several problems with exports to the EU, particularly the rule of origin, 
and in order to improve exports to the EU, major efforts should be exercised by the 
government to re-negotiate the rules of country of origin and to reach an agreement to 
free the services sector (Al Shawabkeh, 2008). 
 
In the Jordan Times, Fahed Fanek (Fanek, 2016) stated that the trade agreement condition 
on country of origin was unfair, that the requirements for Jordanian goods to qualify to 
enter into the EU under the trade agreement were very demanding, and that the Jordanian 
industries would not be able to meet them. He made a comparison with the US 
  
 
 
 
129 
agreement, which requires only 30% of Jordanian origin to qualify, which is a better 
condition than that of the EU agreement. 
 
In the Al Madenah news (2017) the private sector urged the Jordanian government to re-
negotiate some of the FTAs with Jordan, like the EU agreement, which caused an influx 
of goods, putting pressure on the Jordanian market and weakening local industries. The 
article is referring to the complexity of the country of origin procedure as one of the main 
reasons causing the Jordanian industries not to optimise their exports to the EU.  
 
Thus, the Jordanian perspective on the AA can be summed up as follows: The public 
sector was very enthusiastic about the AA, and that was clear in view of their 
publications. It had high expectations that the agreement would attract investment and 
improve the Jordanian economy and industries. The private sector was concerned about 
opening up the market to European competition, the rule of origin, and the adequacy of 
the Jordanian industries to face this competition but was expecting aid and assistance and 
thus did not object strongly to the agreement.  
3.5 Points in the Negotiations 
  
In the Proposal for a Decision of the Council and the Commission on the signature and 
conclusion of the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement with Jordan (Commission of the 
European Communities, 1997), the commission pointed out that Jordan had three main 
issues to be addressed: 1) trade in agricultural products, 2) readmission of illegal 
immigrants, and 3) Jordanian nationals working in the EC. 
The main countries that orchestrated the negotiation of the AAs within the framework of 
the Barcelona Process were France and Spain, combined with the European Commission. 
Negotiations took place in Brussels and the capitals of the Mediterranean countries. The 
EU dictated details, and the Mediterranean countries were cooperative rather than 
demanding (Richard, 1998, p. 96). Villani (2016), a member of the EU negotiating team, 
mentioned that no specific country on the EU side dominated the negotiations. 
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Jordan piloted negotiations with the EU from the Mashreq countries, preceded by 
Morocco, Tunisia in the Maghreb, and Israel, and followed by Egypt, Lebanon, and Syria 
(Zangl, 2016). Thus, the process with Jordan formed the building block for negotiations 
with other Mashreq countries, such as Syria and Lebanon (Villani, 2016; Zangl, 2016). 
The negotiation for the AA between Jordan and the EU concentrated mainly on the 
economic and financial partnership, while the political aspect was given a much lower 
priority (Abu Dalbouh, 2005, p. 140). The cultural and human aspects were also given 
extremely low priority (El-Said & Becker, 2001, p. 184). The EU’s protectionism of the 
agricultural products of Spain and Italy ensured that this would remain a main point in the 
negotiations with the Mediterranean countries and Jordan. 
Another issue in the negotiations was the rule of country of origin (Richard, 1998, p. 5). 
Zangl and Villani (EU Negotiators with Jordan) (2016) highlighted that, were they to 
have been on the Jordanian side of the negotiations, the rule of origin would be one of the 
points to tackle to benefit the Jordanian side. Villani referred to the need for the diagonal 
accumulation of the operationalisation of the rule of origin to facilitate regional 
integration. In addition, Zangl (2016) highlighted the need to request greater flexibility on 
the rules of origin. However, Zangl (2016) indicated that the negotiations on the rules of 
origin were not flexible, since the rule of origin needed to be coherent with the rules of 
origin of all the other AAs, both existing and future ones. According to a report on the 
rules of origin (United States Agency for International Development, 2008, p. XV), the 
EU rules of origin are more complex and costly for Jordanian exporters compared with 
the US-Jordan FTA. These complex rules laid out in Protocol 3 of the AA in 2006 had 
another impact on Jordanian exports. The fact that there are different levels of complexity 
and costs of the rules of origin requirement for different Jordanian AAs prevents 
scalability for Jordanian exporters by creating ‘destination-specific industries’ (United 
States Agency for International Development, 2008, p. XV). Fanek, in the Jordan Times 
(Fanek, 2016) indicated that the trade agreement condition on country of origin between 
the EU and Jordan was unfair. The private sector urged the government to renegotiate the 
rule of origin (Al Shawabkeh, 2008). 
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The Jordanian negotiators worked hard to obtain more concessions on agricultural 
products and more aid (El-Said & Becker, 2001, p. 184). Thus, the Jordanians negotiated 
certain sensitive quotas. The commission was willing to grant concessions on the EU 
quota in return for Jordan signing onto the monitoring of illegal asylum seekers going to 
Europe from Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria through Jordan. The EU needed a country in the 
Mashreq to accept this requirement. Other countries in the Maghreb, which preceded 
Jordan in the negotiations, and, contrary to Jordan, had high numbers of immigrants to the 
EU, refused this clause. However, Jordan accepted it in return for a higher quota for its 
agricultural products (El-Said & Becker, 2001, p. 184). These quotas were covered in 
Article 16 Protocol I, and even though the Jordanian negotiators might have obtained 
concession on quota levels, it was still a limitation in the form of a volume quota, and it 
was a one-way limitation on Jordan that was not reciprocal to the EU.  
The news of the negotiations on some of the agricultural products reached Spain, which 
was angered by this outcome, and the signing of the agreement was delayed by EU 
bureaucratic measures. In addition, Jordanian criticism of the agreement emerged. Local 
businesses considered that the agreement would work in favour of the EU and not Jordan 
(El-Said & Becker, 2001, p. 184). Furthermore, Prince Hassan highlighted in his speech 
to the commission in 1997 that little attention had been paid by the EU to cultural 
interchange, and the focus of the EU had been mainly economic. To Prince Hassan, little 
time had been dedicated to discussing and developing ethnic and people-to-people 
relationships (El-Said & Becker, 2001, p. 184). Further negotiations were directed 
towards policies in the fields of admission and migration.  
Zangl highlighted that fundamental human rights (Article 2) and the ‘readmission clause’ 
for illegal immigrants were difficult negotiation topics for most of the negotiating partner 
countries, but, as far as he could recollect, this was not the case for Jordan.  
The negotiations on the rights of establishment were concluded to the disadvantage of 
Jordanian companies. Jordan was expected to grant European companies national 
privileges, while the EU granted only the most favoured national benefits to Jordanian 
companies (Abu Dalbouh, 2005, p. 141). Thus, after intense negotiations, which led to 
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mistrust between the EU and Mediterranean countries, Jordan signed off agricultural 
access in return for non-MEDA (Mesures D’Accompagnement Financieres et 
Techniques) aid (Richard, 1998, p. 3). 
  
Based on the minutes of the meeting between the commission and the Jordanian 
delegation on 28 October 1996 and the meeting agenda dated 29-30 January 1997 (Annex 
V), the main points of disagreement were as follows: 
1. Agricultural products embodied in Article 10 of the agreement on processed 
agricultural products, agriculture package, council decision of 1 October 1996 on 
agriculture re-admission 
2. Intellectual property rights and the text in Annex 8, protection of pharmaceutical 
products, and Jordanian draft patent law 
3. Liberalisation of services and the Jordanian reaction to comments by the commission 
on the exclusion list for services proposed by Jordan 
4. The gradual elimination of tariffs on industrial products 
The Jordanian private sector was not happy with the parts pertaining to services and urged 
the government to reach an agreement to free the services sector (Al Shawabkeh, 2008), 
because the negotiation was not, in that aspect, successfully in favour of Jordan.  
 
According to Villani (2016), throughout the negotiations, Jordan was ‘cooperative’ but 
also ‘adamant to make the best out of this agreement’. Jordan negotiated strongly for the 
gradual elimination of tariffs on sensitive products or gradual tariff dismantling. Zangl 
(2016) concurred that Jordan was cooperative throughout the negotiations but pointed out 
that Jordan was aware it that was the first country from the Mashreq to negotiate with the 
EU and wanted to conclude the negotiations quickly, and with positive results. 
When inquiring if the agreement was beneficial to Jordan, Zangl (2016) pointed out that 
the agreement was a ‘declaration of intent’ for both parties to cooperate. The AA was, for 
Jordan, the start of quick cooperation between the parties and ‘goes beyond the provisions 
of the agreement itself’, although the situation in the region hindered Jordan from 
benefiting most from the agreement. Villani (2016) highlighted two facts about the 
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benefits of the agreement. He drew on the fact that there was assistance both to 
implement the AA and to support economic, civil society, and sectorial reforms, which 
benefited Jordan in terms of governance, but on the other hand, in terms of results, he 
considered the agreement to have reached a minimal level. Abu Dalbouh (2012, p. 301) 
highlights that financial assistance brings the opposite effects to the economic 
development of Jordan. Financial assistance confirms the ‘dependency’ of Mediterranean 
countries on the EU and directs the cooperation process towards the economic interests of 
the dominant partner, in this case, the EU. 
Conclusion 
This chapter is based upon the following archive sources: minutes of a meeting, an aide 
memoire, a list of negotiators and a negotiation agenda, Jordanian private and public 
expectations, and parliamentary input on the agreement made available for the benefit of 
this research. The kind cooperation of several members of the EU delegation provided 
this study with insightful comments from some of the direct participants in the 
negotiations. The help of the archive teams in Jordanian newspapers gave some views and 
parliament debate on the Jordanian feedback regarding expectations for the agreement 
with the EU.  
 
It is clear from the start that the EU was the bigger economic power, that it considered 
programs for regional cooperation, and thus, had vast knowledge and experience 
regarding the negotiation of AAs, putting it in an advantageous position regarding power 
and knowledge vis-à-vis Jordan. Munir Hamarneh from Jordan University (Al Rai, 2002) 
underlines that disadvantage and the asymmetry of the process of negotiation between a 
group of highly developed industrial countries with one individual country, putting great 
pressure on the individual country. It would have been better to enter into the negotiation 
as a regional group and negotiate as a group, which would have made the positions 
symmetrical, instead of as individual countries (Al Rai, 2002).  
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Empirically, the terms of agreement for the negotiations were not to the advantage of 
Jordan; the EU was mainly concerned with the elimination of tariffs and the economic 
aspects and had little interest in cultural interchange and the development of ethnic and 
people-to-people relationships (El-Said & Becker, 2001, p. 184; Prince Hassan Speech to 
the Commission in 1997). Jordan negotiated well with regard to the gradual elimination 
of tariffs (Villani, 2016), but the negotiations on rights of establishment were concluded 
to the disadvantage of Jordanian companies (Abu Dalbouh, 2005, p. 141). The rule of 
origin was a point of negotiation, but the EU did not give any concessions, and this rule 
was unfair for the Jordanian industries (Fanek, 2016). As Zangl (2016) indicated from the 
EU side, the rules of origin needed to be the same as the rules of origin agreed upon in 
other AAs, and that if they were changed, then they needed to be changed in all the other 
AAs. The rules of origin were too complex, which set up Jordanian industries and 
exporters for a disadvantage, since a different FTA with Jordan would mean that 
Jordanian industries and exporters had to establish country of origin processes based on a 
specific destination (United States Agency for International Development [USAID], 
2008, p. XV). As indicated by Zangl (2016), the agreement was a ‘declaration of intent’ 
for both parties to cooperate, and the negotiation process was aimed at that goal. This 
means that, during the negotiation, concessions were made to reach this goal. As Zangl 
said: ‘Jordan was aware of being a front runner compared in particular to other Mashrak 
countries and was keen and interested in coming rapidly to a positive result’. Abu 
Dalbouh (2005) maintained that the EU and Jordan had gone through marathon 
negotiation rounds on the economic and financial aspects of the AA, but the political 
aspects were less favoured. 
  
Thus, during the negotiation process, the EU had the upper hand in the terms of the 
agreement. This was evident when imposing its own rules of origin that were difficult for 
the Jordanian industries to meet. The rules were perceived by the Jordanian private sector 
to be unfair (Fanek, 2016). Jordan lost the negotiation when it came to agricultural 
production; this is evident in the quotas imposed in the agreement on tomato paste. 
However, Jordan served its goals in the agreement by terminating the economic and 
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political isolation that the Gulf Crisis imposed on Jordan. Also, the Jordanian public 
sector expected that the agreement would attract foreign investment to Jordan that 
targeted exports to the EU. As for the private sector, they were cautious in their 
expectations and had concerns about opening the market and the industries to European 
products and competition, but they did not mobilise any objections to the agreement and 
were expecting financial aid and technical assistance to address the shortcomings for their 
industries. The next chapter will explore how much improvement the agreement achieved 
in the Jordanian economy.  
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Chapter Four 
 
The Impact of the EU-Jordanian Preferential Free 
Trade Agreement on Jordan’s Economy 
 
Introduction 
 
The AA between the EU and Jordan imposed conditions on Jordan to amend its 
economic, political, and social structure. Did this FTA bring improvements to Jordanian 
welfare? To answer this question, we need to use an assessment model to examine the 
impact of the agreement on Jordan. 
The aim of this chapter is to analyse the extent to which the AA between Jordan and the 
EU, which was put into effect in 2002, was beneficial for Jordan from an economic 
perspective. This is achieved by comparing economic data in the periods prior to and after 
the signing of the AA. It should be noted that, with regard to content and intent, the 2002 
AA can be considered an FTA, especially since the establishment of a free trade area was 
one of the major goals, perhaps even the major goal, outlined in the agreement. This free 
trade aspect of the agreement is a key factor in choosing the most appropriate tools and 
methods in this chapter. 
The analysis is based on the different models of assessment available for an FTA. The 
strengths and weaknesses of each model are outlined. Subsequently, the most suitable 
model is chosen in terms of data and resource availability, practical feasibility, expected 
accuracy, and suitability of the outcome regarding the intended purpose of this study, for 
application to the FTA between Jordan and the EU. 
The structure of the chapter will follow the same overall structure of the thesis, first 
discussing the different FTA assessment methods to set up the framework for this 
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chapter; second, comparing each method to identify the best method to implement in view 
of the data availability; third, identifying the best method; fourth, applying this method to 
the AA; and finally, analysing the outcome and drawing a conclusion.  
 
4.  Different Models to Assess Free Trade Agreements 
 
There are different assessment models used to check the effect of an FTA. For the policy-
maker to decide on how to proceed with an FTA and to assess the project impact, the ex-
ante assessment model is used. However, for policy-makers to assess to what extent they 
have reached the desired goals of the FTA, an ex-post assessment model is used. 
Until 1950, the general idea was that FTAs between countries would have a positive 
impact on the welfare of these countries. However, Jacob Viner, Princeton economist, 
developed a new model in 1950, in which an FTA might have a negative impact on the 
partner countries, and thus, he introduced the two concepts of trade creation and trade 
diversion (Plummer, Cheong, & Hamanaka, 2010, pp. 9–10). Viner argued that cutting 
tariffs would not always bring welfare or work to the country (Bhagwati & Krishna, 1997, 
p. 441). The Viner’s key concept is quoted as follows.  
 
Trade creation is the displacement of less efficient national production in favour of more 
efficient partner-country production, while trade diversion is the displacement of more 
efficient non-partner imports in favour of less efficient partner-country sourced imports 
(Plummer, Cheong, & Hamanaka, 2010, p. 9). 
 
Viner’s model is important for trade assessment, since it laid the framework for the 
international trade theories that followed, like the ‘general theory of second best’4 ( 
                                               
 
 
4 The second-best theory holds that, given a distorted economic system, eliminating one set of distortions does not guarantee an 
improvement in overall economic welfare so long as other economic distortions remain unchanged. In the context of an FTA, this 
theory implies that reducing tariffs on a discriminatory basis might not improve welfare for individual countries or the world economy, 
because some tariffs are still maintained (Plummer, Cheong, & Hamanaka, 2010, p. 11). 
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Lipsey & Lancaste, 1956), that expanded upon the Viner model (Bhagwati & Krishna, 
1997, p. 442). The Viner model is based on one product exchange, and thus, the 
international trade theorist, Lispsey, developed a multiple goods model (Plummer, 
Cheong, & Hamanaka, 2010, p. 11). The ex-post and ex-ante model FTA assessments 
stemmed from this framework. 
4.1 Ex-ante Assessment Models 
 
These models are applied prior to signing to assess the projection of the aspects of an 
agreement. There are different ex-ante assessment models, as described by Plummer, 
Cheong, and Hamanaka (2010), as follows: trade indicators to evaluate the potential 
economic effects of an FTA, estimating the potential economic effects of an FTA in an 
individual market, and a computable general equilibrium estimation of the potential. 
4.1.1 Trade indicators  
 
The assessment of the trade indicators is based on the dependency of the partner countries 
in the trade agreement. It is examined based on imports of goods prior to the agreement 
and the tendency of imports to increase or decrease. Thus, the inter- and extra-regional 
trade share is calculated on the basis of the following formula (Haddoud, Salamon, Jones, 
& Newbery, 2011): 
Formula 1: ITS = Sum of imports and exports between the EU and Jordan/Sum of imports 
and exports between Jordan and the world  
The extra-regional share is:  
Formula 2: ETS = 1−ITS 
In addition, the inter- and extra-regional intensity indicators based on Formula 3 below 
are calculated. The trade intensity index (TII) establishes whether the value of trade 
between Jordan and the EU is as expected relative to their share in the world’s trade. It is 
calculated as follows:  
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Formula 3. Tij = (xij/Xit)/(xwj/Xwt) 
where xij and xwj are the values of country i’s exports and of world exports to country j, 
and Xit and Xwt are country i’s total exports and total world exports, respectively (World 
Bank, 2011).  
The comparative advantages of the partners should be measured (Haddoud, Salamon, 
Jones, & Newbery, 2011). The revealed comparative advantage (RCA) gives an 
indication of the country’s specialisation in specific products, and it assesses a country’s 
export potential by measuring its success in exporting to a specific partner. Countries with 
different RCAs have a higher possibility of being successful trade partners than countries 
with similar RCA profiles (World Bank, 2011).  
The next indicator to be calculated is regional orientation (ROI), which indicates the 
extent to which a country’s exports are oriented towards one region more than to another. 
The ROI is higher in the most favourable sectors of a country, that is, the sectors in which 
the country is most specialised and has the highest RCA. Thereafter, the trade 
complementarity index (TCI) can be calculated. The complementarity index matches the 
exports of a country with the imports of a region. The higher the complementarity indices, 
the higher the prospect of success of the trade agreement (Plummer, Cheong, & 
Hamanaka, 2010, p. 35). The main strength of this model is that it is a simple and direct 
method. The data needed for this model are straightforward and available in country 
statistics. However, its weakness is that it cannot explain the trends of trade flows. 
4.1.2 The SMART model 
 
The Software for Market Analysis and Restrictions on Trade (SMART) model is a 
software-based model. The focus of this model is the effect of trade policies on imports 
(Cheong, 2010, p. 13). The FTA in the SMART model influences the price index of a 
product and the domestic prices of relevant items. This is because in the case of an FTA, 
the prices from the partner would decrease and thus, demand would shift to imports from 
  
 
 
 
140 
the partner country and away from other imports from the non-partner country (Cheong, 
2010, p. 13). 
The strength of this model is that it is easy to calculate using the data from the World 
Integrated Trade Solution (WITS). The main weakness of the SMART model is its 
exclusive consideration of the direct effect of the trade agreement. It does not consider the 
indirect effects of trade, such as internal factors.  
4.1.3  Computable general equilibrium 
An FTA includes a reduction in tariffs across the board of the product spectrum between 
two countries. The computable general equilibrium (CGE) method, or estimation of the 
potential effect of an FTA, computes the direct effect of tariff reduction as well as the 
indirect effect on individual markets (Cheong, 2010, p. 17). The CGE studies the 
equilibrium between multiple markets (Gilbert, 2001, p. 89). The model that is most used 
within this CGE is the global trade analysis project (GTAP). This model assumes constant 
circumstances (perfect competition and return-to-scale technology) and electricity on the 
production side, as well as constant circumstances (fixed values for government income 
and households) on the demand side (Gilbert, 2001, p. 92).  
 
The advantage of this computer model is that it links supply and demand within the 
different variables (exogenous or endogenous) and provides equilibrium numbers for 
policy-makers. However, its disadvantage is that it requires extensive data, which are not 
always available. Second, it cannot provide a timeframe for reaching the point of 
equilibrium between demand and supply. Finally, the model cannot consider the non-
tariff barriers to trade that are included in FTAs, such as sanitary and technical barriers 
(Plummer, Cheong, & Hamanaka, 2010, pp. 20–21).  
4.2  Ex-post Assessment Models  
 
According to Plummer, Cheong, and Hamanaka (2010, p. 73), ex-post models should 
address three main questions relevant to the impact of the FTA on the country, as follows. 
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Did the FTA affect the trade and the welfare of the trading country? How did trade affect 
welfare? Through which methods did trade affect welfare?  
In a study on South Asia, Plummer, Cheong, and Hamanaka (2010) outline three models 
for ex-ante assessments: the FTA preference indicators, FTA trade and welfare indicators, 
and the gravity model.  
4.2.1 Free Trade Agreement preference indicators 
 
An FTA translates into lower duties imposed on imports of the partner countries 
compared to duties imposed on the non-partner countries. The difference between the two 
rates is referred to as the ‘preference margin’. 
To calculate the effect of the FTA under the free trade preference indicators, we need to 
calculate first the coverage, utility, and utilisation rates, and finally, the value of FTA 
preferences (Plummer, Cheong, & Hamanaka, 2010, p. 73; Cheong, 2010, p. 2). 
 
Calculation of the coverage rate enables us to understand how many of the dutiable goods 
are covered by the FTA; the bigger the coverage rate, the bigger the scope of the FTA on 
the product range within countries.  
The formula for the coverage rate is 
Formula 4: 
  
where i is the line tariff;  
M is the value of imports in the tariff line from FTA members; 
D is the set of all tariff lines with dutiable imports from FTA members; and 
P is the set of all dutiable tariff lines that are eligible for preferences under the FTA 
(Plummer, Cheong, & Hamanaka, 2010, p. 73; Cheong, 2010, p 2). 
One of the downsides to calculating the coverage rate is that companies in the countries 
may not apply for the preferential rates simply because of the administrative burden 
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associated with the use of the preferential agreement. In addition, the rules of origin 
imposed by the agreement could add costs for companies with regard to all dutiable tariff 
lines that are eligible for preferences under the FTA (Plummer, Cheong, & Hamanaka, 
2010, p. 75). The second aspect that needs to be covered is the extent to which companies 
are using the preferential agreement. This is calculated using the following:  
Formula 5: 
 
where i is the tariff line; 
Mi is the value of imports in tariff line i from FTA members; 
Mi U is the value of imports from FTA members that utilised the agreement’s preferential 
rate in tariff line i; and 
P is the set of all dutiable tariff lines that are eligible for preferences under the FTA. 
Thus, the higher the utilisation rate, the more likely it becomes that the companies in the 
countries consider the costs of using the tariff advantages created by the preferential 
agreement worth the effort.  
A third aspect that needs to be calculated to complement the coverage rate is the utility 
rate, which computes imports using the actual advantageous tariffs of the preferential 
agreement in relation to all the dutiable imports. Thus, the higher that ratio, the higher the 
use of the preferential agreement (Plummer, Cheong, & Hamanaka, 2010, p. 75) (Cheong, 
2010, p. 4). 
Formula 6: 
 
Where 
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Finally, to calculate the value of the FTA, we need to calculate the interest over the 
savings realised by the exporters and importers benefiting from the agreement’s 
preferential tariffs. These savings are distributed between the exporter paying less or no 
duties and possibly the importer as well, if the importer changes buying habits in the 
domestic country (Plummer, Cheong, & Hamanaka, 2010, p. 76). 
 
This method is a direct calculation of the scope and the utilisation of the advantages of the 
FTA by the partner countries. However, it cannot provide an explanation for the reasons 
behind the utilisation, nor does it provide the amount of impact of the FTA on the 
agreement’s partners (Plummer, Cheong, & Hamanaka, 2010, p. 77).  
4.2.2  FTA and welfare indicators  
 
This is another method to assess the impact of the FTA on the participating countries. 
However, this method goes beyond the direct figures of the scope and utility rates. It 
investigates the impact on the welfare and economy of the country rather than on the 
direct trade data. Plummer, Cheong, and Hamanaka (2010, p. 80) suggest two approaches 
to assess this impact: qualitative and quantitative. 
 
The main indicators for the qualitative are trade creation and trade diversion. Trade 
creation refers to the expansion of trade as a result of the trade agreement. On the other 
hand, trade diversion is the expansion of trade between FTA partners, which supplants 
erstwhile imports from non-trade agreement partners at higher costs (Haddoud, Salamon, 
Jones, & Newbery, 2011; Dalimov, 2009).  
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To achieve positive welfare, trade creation should be larger than trade diversion. Thus, 
the emphasis is on domestic production and trade with the region or beyond. To assess the 
extent of trade creation/diversion, the following aspects before and after the FTA need to 
be investigated (Plummer, Cheong, & Hamanaka, 2010, p. 81), as shown in Table 4.1.  
 
Table 4.1 Trade creation and trade diversion impact on welfare  
Positive/negative 
welfare effect  
Criteria  Imports 
from FTA 
partner  
Imports from 
non-FTA partner  
Domestic 
production  
Total 
imports  
 Trade creation  Increase   Decrease  
 Trade 
diversion 
Increase  Decrease    
Positive welfare 
effect 
No trade 
diversion 
 Constant/increasing   Increase  
Negative welfare 
effect 
Trade 
diversion 
exceeds trade 
creation 
 Decrease  Decrease (less 
than the decrease 
in imports from 
non-FTA 
partner) 
Increase 
Positive welfare 
effect. 
Trade creation 
exceeds trade 
diversion 
 Decrease  Decrease (larger 
than the decrease 
in imports from 
non-FTA 
partner) 
Increase 
Negative welfare 
effect 
    Decrease 
 
The quantitative approach for assessing welfare indicators depends mainly on the changes 
in trade volume, intra-union terms of trade, and extra-union terms of trade. The welfare of 
the country’s economy is positively affected in direct proportion to the positive changes 
in the three key indicators: trade volume, intra-union terms of trade, and extra-union 
terms of trade. Change in trade volume is measured using the following formula 
(Plummer, Cheong, & Hamanaka, 2010, p. 81; Cheong, 2010, p. 15).  
The formula for the change in trade volume is 
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Formula 7: 
 
where P indicates a partner country; 
Tmp is the import-weighted ad valorem tariff on imports from partner country p in the 
base period; 
U0 mp is the unit value of imports from partner country p in the base period; 
m1mp is the quantity of imports from partner country p in the new period; and 
m0mp is the quantity of imports from partner country p in the base period. 
 
According to Lloyd and Maclaren’s model (Plummer, Cheong, & Hamanaka, 2010, p. 
15), the change in terms of trade should be weighted by base period trade quantities. 
 
However, the effect of the FTA needs to be investigated while taking out of the equation 
other effects on welfare indicators, such as changes in the costs of fuel and income. To 
achieve that, the effects should be evaluated against the backdrop of an FTA and without 
an FTA (Plummer, Cheong, & Hamanaka, 2010, p. 82; Cheong, 2010, p. 15).  
 
This model is the only model that uses both quantitative and qualitative approaches to 
assess an FTA. The strength of the qualitative approach is that it provides a quick 
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overview of the effects. However, its main flaw is that it is only descriptive with regard to 
the effects. Meanwhile, the main advantage of the quantitative approach is the simplicity 
of its application. However, the quantitative approach does not differentiate between the 
non-FTA effects and the FTA effects on the welfare indicators. 
4.2.3  Gravity model  
 
This model positively correlates the bilateral trade of country X and country Y to the 
GDP of both countries but negatively correlates this trade to the geographical distance 
between country X and Y.  
Formula 7: Bilateral trade = GDP/distance  
This means that the greater is the distance between the two countries, the higher are the 
costs and hindrances related to trade, leading to an increasing impediment to bilateral 
trade (Deardorff, 1998, p. 8). 
The gravity model is considered a tool capable of describing the size of the trade flow 
between two countries (UN and WTO, 2012, p. 103). The name ‘gravity model’ is 
derived from Newton’s gravity theory, which describes the attraction between planets 
being directly proportional to their size and inversely proportional to their proximity. The 
trade flows between countries would be determined by the size of their GDP and the 
distance between them. Thus, an increase in GDP would have a positive influence on 
bilateral trade flow, while an increase in geographic distance would negatively affect the 
bilateral trade flow. 
The gravity model has proved to be empirically sound but is simultaneously time 
criticised as merely an econometric tool that lacks a theoretical basis. Now, there is 
awareness that gravity is necessary to make most models work, but, at the time, the 
theoretical validity of the gravity model was questioned (Deardorff, 1998, p. 7; UN and 
WTO, 2012, pp. 103–104). One of the prevailing models in the second half of the 
previous century, the Heckscher-Ohlin model, initially provided little hope for a 
theoretical foundation, since GDP size was not an important component of that model. 
Despite earlier obstacles for a theoretical basis for the gravity model, in the 1980s and 
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1990s, it was found that a variety of trade models might lead to the gravity model. 
Particular reference is given in this respect to the works of Bergstrand (1985).  
A typical database necessary for the gravity model is substantial. The large size of the 
database is because to assess the impact of, for example, a free trade zone in one country, 
the data of all countries must be included in the database in order to assess gravity 
properly. In addition, given that, in general, data must be studied over a period of years, it 
becomes clear that a database needs to be a substantial size to be able to serve the gravity 
model properly. Another complicating factor is that, given the sheer size of the amount of 
data, it is almost inevitable that data from different sources must be incorporated into the 
database. Therefore, it is necessary that the units used, the measurement method, the 
definition of periods, etc., be exactly the same between the different sources. Since this is 
unlikely to be the case, either considerable effort would have to be made to make the 
datasets with different sources compatible or there is a risk of facing irreparable 
incompatibility between the different sources (UN and WTO, 2012). 
 
A common advantage of the gravity model is the easy availability of data (Paas, 2000, p. 
633). The model provides measurable indicators on changes in the welfare of an economy 
for countries participating in FTAs. However, if the different datasets used are not correct 
or not fully compatible in all relevant aspects, the results could be misleading. Thus, the 
weakness of this model is that useable results are highly dependent on the correctness, 
completeness, and compatibility of the data used, as outlined earlier in Section 3.2.3. 
(Plummer, Cheong, & Hamanaka, 2010, p. 93). 
 
4.3  Identifying the Appropriate Model to Assess the EU-
Jordan AA 
 
When comparing analytical models to examine the EU-Jordanian FTA, one of the 
primary factors in choosing the best model to apply is the availability of data needed for 
the model. Other factors are the model’s approach and how the model address economic 
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aspects. Table 4.2 presents the advantages and disadvantages of the different model types, 
both before entry into force of the FTA (ex-ante models) and after entry into force (ex-
post models), to highlight the logic of choosing the models most applicable to the EU-
Jordan FTA. 
Data are collected on Jordan’s imports and exports both globally and from and to the EU. 
The primary resources for this data are the WITS (WTO, 2014), EU (European 
Commission - Trade, 2013) and the Jordan’s Department of Statistics.  
Table 4.2 Model advantages and disadvantages 
Model Advantages Disadvantages 
Ex-ante Models 
Trade 
indicators 
model 
This is a simple method, and the 
data needed are available. Given 
its simplicity, it gives an initial 
indication to policy-makers.  
These indicators cannot 
determine the causes of a 
particular state or of a trend in 
trade flows.  
SMART model This model is easy to calculate 
using data from the WITS.  
This model is limited, 
considering only the direct effect 
of the trade agreement; it does 
not consider the indirect effects, 
such as internal factors.  
Computable 
general 
equilibrium 
model for 
estimation of 
the potential 
effect of an 
FTA 
 
This computer model links supply 
and demand within the different 
variables (exogenous or 
endogenous), and provides 
equilibrium numbers for policy-
makers.  
The data required are not always 
available. Moreover, the model 
is not able to provide a 
timeframe to reach the point of 
equilibrium between demand 
and supply. Finally, the model is 
not able to take into 
consideration non-tariff barriers 
to trade that are included in 
FTAs, such as sanitary and 
technical barriers.  
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Ex-post Models 
FTA preference 
indicators 
This method is a direct 
calculation of the scope and use 
of the advantages of the FTA by 
the partner countries. 
It cannot assess the reasons 
behind the use, nor does it 
measure the impact of the FTA 
on the partners of the FTA 
(Plummer, Cheong, and 
Hamanaka, 2010, p. 77). 
FTA and 
welfare 
indicators 
This is the only model that 
provides qualitative and 
quantitative approaches to data 
analysis. The strength of the 
qualitative approach is that it 
provides a quick overview of the 
effects. The quantitative approach 
has the advantage of simplicity of 
its application. 
The main flaw in the qualitative 
approach is that it is only 
descriptive with regard to the 
effects. The quantitative 
approach does not differentiate 
non-FTA effects from FTA 
effects on welfare indicators.  
Gravity model  The gravity model is widely used, 
and data needed are usually 
available from different sources, 
such as the IMF, World Bank, 
and UN Commodity database.  
The common advantage of this 
model is the accessibility and 
availability of the data. It 
provides measurable indicators on 
changes in the welfare of the 
economy for countries 
participating in FTAs. 
If different data sets used are not 
correct or not fully compatible in 
all relevant aspects, the results 
could be misleading. Thus, the 
weakness of this model is that 
useable results are highly 
dependent on the correctness, 
completeness, and compatibility 
of the data used. This model 
lacks a theoretical basis.  
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Based on Table 4.2, of the ex-ante models, the SMART model and the trade indicators 
model are easy to calculate, and the data are available for this case study. However, the 
SMART model considers only the direct effects of the FTA, and not the indirect effects, 
while the trade indicator model cannot determine the causes of a trend. The CGE model 
requires extensive data and does not provide a timeframe to indicate the point at which 
the model reaches equilibrium. Thus, the CGE model is not considered as a useful ex-ante 
model, which leaves us with the two former models. Of these two, the SMART model 
considers only the direct effects on the import side, while the trade indicators model 
considers both imports and exports as well as internal factors. Thus, among the ex-ante 
models, the trade indicator model is the best option to apply to the EU-Jordan FTA for the 
three-year period of 2000 to 2002 (the years prior to the FTA entering into force). 
Regarding the ex-post models, both the gravity model and the FTA preference indicators 
address the quantitative aspects of the assessments of FTA indicators. The FTA 
preference model is a direct calculation of the scope and utility of the FTA with regard to 
partner countries. However, it cannot assess the reasons for the use, nor does it provide 
the size of the effects of an FTA on its partners (Plummer, Cheong, & Hamanaka, 2010, 
p. 77).  
The FTA and welfare indicators, however, assess both aspects of FTAs—quantitative and 
qualitative aspects—and the required data are available. Thus, the current research uses 
the FTA trade and welfare indicators to examine the period before and after the FTA with 
the EU was signed by Jordan (Plummer, Cheong, & Hamanaka, 2010, p. 77; Cheong, 
2010, p. 16) 
Thus, this research applies the ex-ante assessment model of trade indicators on the 
Jordan-EU FTA and the FTA and welfare indicators for the ex-post assessment.  
 
As for the sources of data, the first source of data used for this research is the WITS from 
the WTO. The selection of data sources was prioritised on the basis of the quality, 
availability, and reliability of the data resource. The information extraction was focused 
on the EU sources owing to the reliability of the EU data. Thus, export and import data 
from and to Jordan were taken from the EU reported figures and the Eurostat: EU exports 
to Jordan (or Jordan’s imports from the EU) and EU imports from Jordan (or Jordan’s 
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exports to the EU). The second data source was the Jordanian Department of Statistics for 
Jordanian domestic production. 
To verify the accuracy of the data sourced from the Jordanian Department of Statistics, 
we needed to verify the level of economic corruption in Jordan. This is necessary to 
verify corruption in Jordan, since economic corruption directly affects public resources 
and decisions on the utilisation of national wealth. Corruption leads to wasted resources 
that otherwise would have been efficiently invested in projects for the benefit of public 
welfare. Thus, corruption affects businesses directly. Fair competition is distorted, thus 
hinders investment, and thereby affects the imports and exports of the country 
(Transparency International, Global Coalition Against Corruption, 2014).  
 
According to Transparency International (2014), Jordan ranked 55 out of 174 countries in 
2012, 2013, and 2014 in the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), as illustrated in Table 
4.3, which is a composite of multiple corruption indicators based on assessments 
undertaken by multiple institutions. These institutions specialise in analysing business 
and government behaviour. The 2014 CPI drew information from 12 data sources, as 
follows: 1) African Development Bank Governance Ratings, 2013, 2) Bertelsmann 
Foundation Sustainable Governance Indicators, 2014, 3) Bertelsmann Foundation 
Transformation Index, 2014, 4) Economist Intelligence Unit Country Risk Ratings, 2014, 
5) Freedom House Nations in Transit, 2013, 6) Global Insight Country Risk Ratings, 
2014, 7) IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook, 2014, 8) Political and Economic Risk 
Consultancy Asian Intelligence, 2014, 10) Political Risk Services International Country 
Risk Guide, 2014, 11) World Bank— Country Policy and Institutional Assessment, 2013, 
12) World Economic Forum Executive Opinion Survey, 2014, and 13) World Justice 
Project Rule of Law Index, 2014.  
The CPI Index ranks countries on the basis of how corrupt their public sector is perceived 
to be. The ranking is based on the number of countries in the index, from 1 to 174; the 
lower the rank is, the less corrupt is the country’s public sector. Scores of 0 to 100 points 
are given; the higher the score, the less corrupt the public sector. In 2014, Denmark was 
ranked first, with a score of 92, while Somalia was ranked last, with a score of 8.  
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When comparing Jordan with some EU member states, we observed, as shown in Table 
4.3, that Jordan ranked 55, just after Slovakia in the CPI, which is much higher in the 
index than several EU member states, like Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, and Romania. 
Table 4.3 CPI ranking for 2012, 2013 and 2014  
CPI Rank  Country 2014 score 2013 score 2012 score 
1 Denmark 92 91 90 
54 Slovakia 50 47 46 
55 Jordan 49 45 48 
69 Bulgaria 43 41 41 
69 Greece 43 40 36 
69 Italy 43 43 42 
69 Romania 43 43 44 
174 Somalia 8 8 8 
Source: Transparency International, http://www.transparency.org/. 
Over the years from 2002 to 2011, Table 4.4, which covers the period when Jordan and 
the EU entered into an AA, Jordan ranked better than some EU member states. 
Table 4.4 CPI ranking for the period covering the EU Jordan agreement 2002-2012 
Country 
Rank in 
2011  
Rank in 
2010 
Rank in 
2009 
Rank in 
2008 
Rank in 
2007  
Rank in 
2006 
Rank in 
2005  
Rank in 
2004 
Rank in 
2003 
Rank in 
2002  
Denmark  2 1  2 1  1 4 4 3 3 2 
Jordan  56 50  49 47   53 40 37 37 43 40 
Slovakia   66 59 56 52   49 49 47 57 59 52 
Bulgaria  86 73  71 72   64 57 55  54 54 45 
Greece  80 78  71 57   56 54 47 49 50 44 
Italy  69 67  63 55   41 45 40 42 35 31 
Romania  75 69  71 70   69 84 85 87 83 77 
Latvia  61 59  56 52   51 49 51 57 57 52 
Source: Transparency International, http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview 
Thus, in terms of reliability, the data from Jordan could be similar to or even better than 
the data from six EU member states.  
The first data used in this research are imports and exports between Jordan and the world, 
by product, using Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) revision 2 (Table 
4.1) for 1998 to 2012, to cover the period before and after the signing of the EU-Jordan 
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FTA. Then, the second dataset comprises EU exports to Jordan, which should equal 
Jordanian imports from the EU. 
The division of trade products between Jordan and the EU is based on the SITC revision 
2. The availability of data dictated the choice of revision used. The product group is as 
follows: agricultural raw materials, chemicals, food, fuel, machinery, and transport 
equipment, manufactures, ores and metals, and textiles. 
4.4  Applying the Identified Model to the Jordan-EU AA 
Based on the analysis in the previous section, this section will apply the ex-ante 
assessment model of trade indicators, and the FTA and welfare indicators for the ex-post 
assessment on the Jordan-EU FTA. 
 
4.4.1 Ex-ante assessment: the trade indicators  
 
To follow the model, we start by measuring the inter- and extra-regional share between 
Jordan and the EU.  
Figure 4.1: Inter- and extra-regional trade shares 
 
Source: Compiled by the author based on the WITS (World Bank) 
 
Figure 4.1 shows that the interdependency between Jordan and the EU was higher in the 
period prior to the signing of the agreement in 2002; immediately after the agreement 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
ITS 0.27 0.23 0.33 0.26 0.28 0.27 0.23 0.23 0.22 0.21 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.17
ETS 0.79 0.70 0.67 0.74 0.72 0.73 0.77 0.77 0.78 0.79 0.81 0.81 0.82 0.83 0.83
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started, in 2003, the regional interdependency between Jordan and the EU began to 
decrease, while the inter-dependency between Jordan and other regions began to increase. 
Based on the inter-regional trade share and extra-regional trade share, the latter is 
constant and progressive with regard to the non-EU partners of Jordan. Figure 4.1 shows 
that the inter-regional trade share between the EU and Jordan has the tendency to 
decrease at the time the agreement was put into effect in 2002. 
 
The second indicator to measure is the trade intensity index of Jordan with the EU, 
extracted from the WITS, which shows only data from 2002, when the FTA was put into 
effect. The trade intensity index moved from 17.62 in 2002 to a low in 2010 of 7.16, 
followed by a surge in 2011 to 13.03, but the linear representation of the index is a 
downward slope. However, since the index values are above 1, there is an indication of 
bias towards trading between Jordan and the EU. 
 
However, according to Plummer, Cheong, and Hamanaka (2010, p. 36), the trade 
intensity index has disadvantages, since it may lead to contradictory interpretations. It is 
mathematically possible that both inter-regional and extra-regional trade intensity both 
move in the same direction. This would present a challenge in interpretation. Another 
limitation is the comparison between the numerator and the denominator. While the 
numerator may exceed double-digit figures, the denominator is in the range of 1 or less. 
The third limitation is that the denominator is dependent on total trade with the world. 
This means it differs by region, thereby making comparisons difficult (Plummer, Cheong, 
& Hamanaka, 2010, p. 36). Therefore, based on the above discussion, it can be observed 
that the trade intensity index for Jordan and the EU dropped by about 60% in the year 
following the signing of the FTA, from 17.63 in 2002 to 7.16 in 2003, as seen in Figure 
4.2.  
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Figure 4.2: Trade intensity index for Jordan and the EU for 2002–2012 
 
 
Source: WITS, compiled by the author 
The third indicator is the Revealed Comparative Advantages (RCA): The RCA must be 
calculated for Jordan and the EU, since the benefits of the FTA should be yielded from 
sectors in which Jordan has the highest comparative advantage. 
Jordan’s revealed comparative advantage is calculated in Figure 4.3. 
 
Figure 4.3: Jordan’s revealed comparative advantage by SITC (Revision 2) 
 
Source: Compiled by the author based on WITS (World Bank) 
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Figure 4.3 shows that Jordan has a comparative advantage in the chemicals sector, where 
the RCA was consistently higher than 1 both before and after the FTA with the EU. It 
increased from 1.72 to 2.11 over the period from 2000 to 2012. The food RCA was 
consistently above 1 and hovered around 1.5 throughout the 13 years from 2000 to 2013. 
The ore and metals RCA was above 1 but on the decline from 2.93 to 1.67. Finally, the 
textiles RCA was above 1 and increased until 2006, when it reached 4.13, after which it 
began to decrease. 
 
The EU’s revealed comparative advantage is calculated in Figure 4.4.  
 
Figure 4.4: Revealed comparative advantage of the EU by SITC (Revision 2) 
 
 
Source: Compiled by the author based on WITS  
 
Figure 4.4 shows that the EU has a comparative advantage in the chemicals sector, where 
the RCA was constantly above 1 and hovered around 1.5 throughout the 13 years from 
2000 to 2013. The RCA of manufactured goods was above 1 and was relatively constant 
around 1.2. Finally, the machinery and equipment RCA was above 1, increasing from 
1.07 to 1.23 over 2000–2014.  
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The fourth indicator to be calculated is the Regional Orientation Index (ROI). The ROI 
shows the orientation of a country towards exporting to a specific region. In Table 4.5 and 
Figure 4.5, the ROI shows that Jordan was less oriented towards exporting to the EU. The 
agricultural raw materials ROI was 1.23 prior to the trade agreement, increased until 2002 
to 7.53, and then declined to 0.59 in 2012. The ROI of chemicals, in which Jordan has a 
comparative advantage, reached 1.73 in 2006 but declined to less than 1 thereafter (0.88). 
Regarding machinery and transport equipment, the trend showed an exceptional increase 
to 6.93 in 2006 followed again by a decline. Overall, prior to the agreement, the ROI was 
1.94 and in 2012 decreased to 1. The ores and metals ROI increased from less than 1 to 
4.49. The ROI for textiles and food was less than 1. Thus, the regional orientation for 
trade between Jordan and the EU decreased in most of the sectors over the period of the 
study. 
Table 4.5: Regional orientation index 
Regional Orientation Index 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Agricultural 
Raw 
Materials 1.23 3.53 7.53 1.71 1.73 0.75 1.82 1.51 0.43 0.88 0.66 0.61 0.59 
Chemicals 0.50 1.31 0.73 1.03 1.00 0.85 1.73 1.05 1.04 0.68 0.71 0.78 0.88 
Food 0.26 0.21 0.14 0.26 0.15 0.17 0.49 0.65 0.39 0.57 0.44 0.39 0.34 
Machinery 
and 
Transport 
Equipment 1.94 1.44 2.43 4.20 3.51 6.38 0.92 0.92 0.96 1.71 1.48 0.80 1.00 
Manufacture
d Goods 1.02 1.03 0.77 1.08 0.93 1.11 0.90 0.81 0.81 0.86 0.74 0.65 0.67 
Ores and 
Metals 0.83 0.88 0.40 1.30 2.50 1.24 2.35 4.66 3.49 1.02 2.73 4.02 4.49 
Textiles 0.91 0.55 0.17 0.23 0.13 0.08 0.17 0.21 0.27 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.22 
Source: Compiled by the author based on WITS (World Bank) 
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Figure 4.5: Regional orientation index for Jordan and the EU by product SITC (Revision 2) 
 
Source: Compiled by the author based on WITS database  
 
The fifth indicator is TCI between Jordan and the EU. A high degree of complementarity  
in trade indicates a higher prospect of a successful trade agreement. 
  
According to Figure 4.6, most product categories (as per SITC revision 2) for Jordanian 
exports show high complementarity with EU imports. This means that there is a high 
possibility for successful matching between Jordanian exports and EU imports. However, 
the trend for the complementarity index in chemicals shows a decrease from 0.977 prior 
to the signing of the agreement to 0.903 in 2012. The ores and metals complementarity 
index decreased from 0.974 in 2000, prior to the agreement entering into force, to 0.840 
in 2012. However, the complementarity index for agricultural raw materials increased 
from 0.992 in 2000 to 0.996 in 2012. As for textiles, the index also increased, from 0.975 
in 2000 to 0.990 in 2012.  
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Figure 4.6: Complementarity index for Jordanian exports and EU imports by product 
SITC (Revision 2) 
 
Source: Compiled by the author based on WITS database  
 
Thus, based on the above, the findings on the ex-ante approach for the EU-Jordan FTA 
can be as follows: Based on the inter-regional trade share and extra-regional trade share 
calculated in Figure 4.1, the latter is constant and progressive with Jordan’s non-EU 
partners. The graph shows that the inter-regional trade share between the EU and Jordan 
tends to decline from the time of the AA entering into force in 2002. 
The RCA for Jordan shows that the country has comparative advantage in chemicals, 
food, and textiles. In addition, the TCI reveals high complementarity for trade between 
Jordan and the EU in chemicals, ores and metals, agricultural raw materials, and textiles, 
meaning that regional orientation with the EU should show an increase. However, the 
results show that the regional orientation between Jordan and the EU was on the decline. 
4.4.2 Ex-post assessment: FTA trade and welfare indicators 
 
The FTA trade and welfare indicators were compared for the EU-Jordan FTA. The 
qualitative and quantitative approaches were tested over the evolution of Jordan’s trade 
values with the EU and non-EU partners, measured in $ millions, during the period from 
2000 to 2012. The period covers before and after the EU-Jordan FTA was put into effect 
in May 2002. 
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To start with the qualitative approach, we needed to examine the trends in international 
trade for Jordan; trade creation and trade diversion were reviewed alongside domestic 
production (Plummer, Cheong, & Hamanaka, 2010, p. 80). 
The basic starting point is the use of Jordan’s imports and exports from and to the world 
in general and the EU specifically. The data resource was the WTO and the WITS for a 
period of 13 years covering before and after the signing of the trade agreement in 2002. 
Then, data for domestic production of Jordan’s main sectors were used. 
  
As shown in Figure 4.7, as a starting point, there is an increasing trend for both imports 
and exports of Jordan to and from the world, although the increase in imports over the 
years is at a higher in volume than that for exports. The average increase rate in imports 
from 20025 to 2012 was 16%, while the average rate of export from 2002 to 2012 was 
around 12%. The average increase rate from 1998 to 2002 (prior to the AA entering into 
force) for export to the world was 25%, and the average increase rate for imports was 7%. 
This has resulted in an increase in Jordan’s trade deficit with the world.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
 
 
5 The increase rate is calculated as the difference in volume between the year at hand and the previous year, divided by the previous 
year’s volume. The starting point is 2002, since 2002 was the year of the signing of the agreement; therefore, the difference was calculated 
between 2003 and 2002. The average is that of all the increases over the years.   
  
 
 
 
161 
Figure 4.7: Jordanian imports from and exports to the world 
 
Source: Compiled by the author based on WITS (World Bank) 
Regarding Jordan’s trade with the EU and the world, Figure 4.8 shows that export to non-
EU partners were at a higher volume than that of the export to the EU.  
The exports increased at a higher rate (12%) to non-EU partner compared to that to the 
EU partners (10%) starting in 2002. The export increasing rate prior to the agreement 
(1998 to 2002) with the EU was at 41%, while to the non-EU it was 25%.  
 
Figure 4.8: Jordanian exports to the world and the EU 
 
Source: Compiled by the author based on WITS (World Bank) 
0
10000
20000
30000
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Jorand Export to the world 1382 1821 1293 2294 2770 3082 3891 4279 5167 5700 7782 6366 7023 7963 7877
Jorand Import from the world 3828 3677 4013 4871 5020 5653 8144 10455 11447 13531 16872 14075 15262 18301 20691
1382 1821 1293 2294 2770
3082 3891 4279
5167 5700
7782 6366 7023
7963 78773828 3677 4013 4871 5020
5653
8144
10455 11447
13531
16872
14075 15262
18301
20691
Value in 
Million USD 
Evolution of Jordan Trade with the world 
before and after the Trade Agreement with the EU (2002) 
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Export to th EU 101 88 175 149 286 247 353 486 293 305 444 243 330 436 440
Export to the World 1382 1821 1293 2294 2770 3082 3891 4279 5167 5700 7782 6366 7023 7963 7877
101 88 175 149 286 247 353
486 293 305 444 243 330 436 440
1382
1821
1293
2294
2770
3082
3891
4279
5167
5700
7782
6366
7023
7963 7877
Value of export
in Million 
USD
Jordan Export  to the World and to the EU
for year 1998 till  2012
  
 
 
 
162 
 
Figure 4.9 shows that imports from non-EU partners were at a higher volume of those 
from EU partners. 
 
Figure 4.9: Jordanian imports from the world and the EU  
 
Source: Compiled by the author based on WITS (World Bank) 
 
The third issue is to establish the trend of domestic production in Jordan’s main sectors. 
The data resource was the Central Bank of Jordan (2012). Values are in Jordanian dinars 
only. To exchange to US dollars, the official exchange rate (yearly average) published by 
the Central Bank of Jordan for the corresponding year is used. It must be noted that in the 
13 years in question, from 2000 to 2012, the exchange rate was constant at 1.00 USD to 
JD 0.709. The published information was categorised as electricity and water, 
manufacturing, mining and quarrying, and agriculture, forestry, and fishing, Figure 4.10. 
No reference is made in these documents to the SITC categories. The author sent a 
request to the Central Bank of Jordan to obtain more detailed information based on the 
SITC categories but received no response. Thus, the data were used based on the general 
descriptions outlined above and were used to show the general trends of domestic 
production. 
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Figure 4.10: Jordanian domestic production in main sectors 
 
 
Source: Jordan Central Bank: http://www.cbj.gov.jo/pages.php 
 
Jordanian domestic production in the main sections of agriculture, mining, and 
manufacturing showed an increase in volume year over year. The year 2006 was notable 
for production increasing at a faster rate. 
Based on the quantitative analysis of trade creation and trade diversion, the FTA is 
considered to have had a positive effect if trade creation was greater than trade diversion. 
Trade creation occurs if imports from the EU increase with a simultaneous drop in 
domestic production. From the findings in Figures 4.11, 4.12, and 4.13 below, it can be 
observed that imports from the EU increased, but also that Jordanian domestic production 
increased for the chemicals, manufactured goods, and agricultural raw materials sectors. 
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Figure 4.11: Jordanian chemical imports to EU/non-EU partners and domestic production 
 
Source: World Bank, WITS, and Jordan Central Bank (Values from the Jordan Central 
Bank are provided in Jordanian dinar. The average exchange rate of JD to USD$ is 
published by the Jordan Central Bank) 
http://wits.worldbank.org/WITS/WITS/AdvanceQuery/RawTradeData/QueryDefinition.a
spx?Page=RawTradeData 
 
Figure 4.12: Jordanian manufacturing imports from EU/non-EU partners and domestic 
production 
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Source: World Bank, WITS, and Jordan Central Bank (Values from the Jordan Central 
Bank are provided in Jordanian dinar. The average exchange rate of JD to USD$ is 
published by the Jordan Central Bank) 
 
Figure 4.13: Jordanian agricultural raw materials imports from EU/non-EU partners and 
domestic production 
 
Source: World Bank, WITS, and Jordan Central Bank (Values from the Jordan Central 
Bank are provided in Jordanian dinar. The average exchange rate of JD to USD$ is 
published by the Jordan Central Bank) 
 
Thus, for the findings in the field of trade creation, it can be noted that there was an 
increase in domestic production as well as in imports. Therefore, it cannot be stated that 
the preferential tariff replaced domestic production—supposedly inefficient domestic 
production—since this production also increased at a considerable rate. 
However, a drop in total imports would imply a negative welfare effect, and thus, 
inversely, an increase in total imports (EU and non-EU) would imply a positive welfare 
effect. Therefore, the fact that there was an increase in total imports suggests the 
existence of trade creation. However, the findings are not conclusive with regard to trade 
creation. 
Trade diversion is the result of an increase in imports from EU partners and a decrease in 
non-EU imports. The findings in Figures 4.11, 4.12, and 4.13 below suggest an increase 
in imports from the EU, but also an increase in imports from non-EU partners, which 
would indicate that no trade diversion took place. 
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Thus, while the observations regarding trade creation are not conclusive because there 
was an increase in imports as well as in domestic production, the observations regarding 
trade diversion were clear; that is, imports from EU and non-EU partners increased, and 
thus there was no trade diversion. 
 
As for the quantitative approach, regarding the EU-Jordanian trade agreement, the 
analyses entail the calculation of changes in trade and the volume of trade. To calculate 
the change of volume, Formula 8 was used on product sections as proposed in SITC 
Revision 3 (Haddoud, Salamon, Jones, & Newbery, 2011, p. 25; Plummer, Cheong, & 
Hamanaka, 2010).  
Formula 8: 
 
As per Plummer et al. (2010, p. 83), to be able to calculate the change in trade volumes, 
we need the following data: 
• P as per the formula: Jordan’s partner country is the EU  
• T imported weight tariff from Jordan’s partner (EU) for the base period as shown 
in Table 4.7 
• Unit values of imports from the EU to Jordan in the base period, which is 2002, 
the year the EU-Jordan FTA was put into effect, as shown in Table 4.6. The 
source of data is the International Customs Tariff bureau.  
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• Quantities of imports from the EU to Jordan in the new period, which is 2009, 
covering eight years after the implementation of the FTA. The source of the data 
is EuroStat (Eurostat - European Commission, 2014). 
• Quantities of imports from the EU to Jordan in the base period, which is 2002. 
The source is EuroStat (Eurostat - European Commission, 2014). 
Table 4.6. Quantity and value of Jordanian imports and exports with the EU for the base 
year 2002 and the new year 2009. The source of the data is EuroStat (Eurostat - European 
Commission, 2014). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
168 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.7. Weighted average for the start year 2002 and end year 2009 
 
Source: To obtain the average weight, information was obtained from WITS using the 
Trade Analysis Information System (TRAINS) for both the EU and the world for the base 
year 2002 and the new year 2009.  
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Table 4.8. Change in trade volume 
Source: WITS (TRAINS), values were compiled by the author 
 
Table 4.8 suggests an increase in trade volume with the EU in most product categories 
except for food and live animals, as well as the commodities and transactions not 
elsewhere classified. However, there is a negative trade volume with non-EU countries 
for food and live animals, mineral fuels, manufactured goods, miscellaneous 
manufactured articles, and commodities and transactions not elsewhere classified. This 
negative trade volume with non-EU countries means that for those sectors, there is a 
negative welfare effect on Jordan. However, considering all the different sectors, the total 
trade volume has a positive value of 36 billion euros, indicating a positive welfare effect 
for Jordan, which mainly comes from the chemicals and related products sector and the 
machinery and transport equipment sector. 
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The changes in terms of trade between Jordan and the EU as well as non-EU countries 
were calculated based on Formula 9 (Plummer, Cheong, & Hamanaka, 2010, p. 83): 
Formula 9: 
 
The change in the terms of trade was calculated based on data sourced from WITS in 
Table 4.5. The import-export quantities and values for Jordan with the world, as 
represented in Table 4.9 below, are from the Department of Statistics of Jordan at the 
request of the author. This is the case for both imports and exports during the base period 
(2002) and the new period (2009). The unit values of imports and exports are calculated 
as follows:  
- unit value for imports = value of imports/quantity of imports from the partner country.  
- unit value for exports = value of exports/quantity of exports to the partner country. 
Finally, it should be underlined that the values provided by the Jordanian Department of 
Statistics were in Jordanian dinars. The exchange rate for the new year was obtained from 
the EU Financial Programming and Budget. However, the exchange rate for the base year 
is not published by either the EU or the Jordanian Central Bank and Department of 
Statistics. Thus, the most appropriate approach is to use the exchange rate based on the 
historical exchange rate. 
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Table 4.9. External trade statistics by SITC classification 
 
Based on the formula, Table 4.10 below shows the results of the change in the terms of 
trade between Jordan, the EU, and its non-EU partners. 
 
 
Table 4.10. Changes in Jordan’s terms of trade 
Change in terms of trade with the EU; base period is 2002 and 
new year is 2009 
Change in terms of trade 
with the EU  
Change in terms of 
trade with the 
whole world  
Change in terms 
of trade with 
non–EU  
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JORDAN EU Food and live animals -90601609 -289656778.0 -199055169.3 
JORDAN EU Beverages and tobacco -5087578 -20468482.6 -15380904.6 
JORDAN EU Crude materials, inedible, except fuels 48815247 54585488.1 5770240.9 
JORDAN EU 
Mineral fuels, lubricants and related 
materials 250834 -363277487.1 -363528320.9 
JORDAN EU 
Animal and vegetable oils, fats and 
waxes 99845 41235181.6 41135336.2 
JORDAN EU Chemicals and related products, n.e.s. 48274234 -144067654.7 -192341888.3 
JORDAN EU 
Manufactured goods classified chiefly 
by material 42822549 616260482.8 573437933.4 
JORDAN EU Machinery and transport equipment 177304284 -52099107.7 -229403391.3 
JORDAN EU Miscellaneous manufactured articles -140301529 -88790855.7 51510673.5 
JORDAN EU 
Commodities and transactions not 
classified elsewhere in the sitc -123196341 19727801.7 142924142.7 
    Total  -41620064 -226551411.6 -184931347.6 
 
Source: WITS and direct request to the Jordanian Department of Statistics, compiled by 
the author  
The data in Table 4.10 show a positive increase in the change in terms of trade in the 
crude material, animal and vegetable oils, and manufactured goods categories. This 
means there is a positive welfare effect on Jordan for these sectors. There is a negative 
change in the terms of trade in food and live animals, beverages and tobacco, mineral 
fuels, manufactured goods, miscellaneous manufactured articles, and commodities and 
transactions not classified elsewhere. The negative change in the terms of trade in these 
sector means there is a negative welfare effect on Jordan for those sectors. The overall 
change in the terms of trade has a negative value of 226 million euro. This is an indication 
of a negative welfare effect for Jordan (UN and WTO, 2012). 
 
4.5  Trade Agreement Impact on Jordan’s Internal Economic 
Indicators 
 
One weakness of the models presented in this study is the lack of consideration of internal 
factors and the impact of trade on the welfare of the country. The internal impact that is 
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influenced by external trade and that is the direct result of trade is a country’s trade 
balance, proportion of GDP, external debt, unemployment rate, and the sectors affected 
most by imported goods from the year the FTA with the EU started until 10 years after its 
implementation.  
4.5.1 Jordanian trade balance  
 
To understand the impact of trade on the GDP of Jordan, we need to analyse the size of 
trade in Jordan’s GDP, thereby determining the size of external trade.  
 
As shown in Figure 4.14, Jordan’s exports and imports with the world, including the EU, 
represent a high percentage of Jordan’s GDP. Import values in 2005 reached 94% of the 
total value of Jordan’s GDP. While imports were increasing, their percentage of the GDP 
also increased. From 1998, when the value of imports was 64% of GDP, the proportion 
peaked at 94% in 2005, but then decreased to 73.4% in 2012. Thus, by the end of the 
period under review, there was an average 10% increase in the value of imports as a 
percentage of GDP. In contrast, the proportion of the value of exports of GDP started at 
44.8% in 1998, peaked in 2007 at 56.5%, and returned to 45.7% in 2012. Thus, there was 
an average 3% increase in export value as a percentage of Jordan’s GDP over a period of 
15 years.  
Figure 4.14: Jordanian exports and imports as a percentage of GDP 
 
Source: WITS, compiled by the author 
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Jordanian trade with the EU as a percentage of Jordan’s GDP (shown in Figure 4.15), was 
18.3% in 2000. The percentage increased in 2002—the year the FTA with the EU was 
signed—to 19.92%. The percentage peaked in 2005 at 23.17%, but as the year 
progressed, it decreased to 14.16%. Thus, imports decreased on average in the years 
following the signing of the FTA by 5%. 
Exports to the EU as a percentage of Jordanian GDP were 2.07% in 2000, prior to the 
signing of the FTA. In 2002, the percentage of exports increased to 2.98%. In the year 
following the signing of the agreement, the percentage decreased to 1.41%. Thus, exports 
to the EU as a percentage of the value of Jordan’s GDP decreased by an average of 1.4%. 
Figure 4.15: Jordanian imports and exports with the EU as a percentage of GDP 
 
Source: WITS, compiled by the author.  
 
The trade balance of Jordan with the world as shown in Figure 4.16 shows an increase in 
Jordan’s negative balance over the period under review from 2000 to 2012. There is trade 
creation, as illustrated in the Section 4.4.2 Ex-post Assessment. When evaluating increase 
in imports as was done in this chapter with the qualitative analysis of trade creation and 
trade diversion, one can assume that the FTA has had a positive effect if trade creation 
exceeds trade diversion. Imports increased from non-FTA partners as well as from the 
EU. Thus, trade creation was higher than trade diversion, but trade creation in Jordan has 
only increased on the import side. The exports did not match the imports in speed or 
volume. This leaves Jordan in the end with a negative trade balance and thus, external 
debts. This applies to Jordan's trade with the world, as well as its trade with the EU, 
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although it is worth noting that the negative trade balance with the world is increasing at a 
higher pace than the negative trade balance with the EU.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.16: Jordan’s negative trade balance with the world and the EU 
  
Source: World Bank, WITS 
http://wits.worldbank.org/WITS/WITS/AdvanceQuery/RawTradeData/QueryDefinition.a
spx?Page=RawTradeData 
 
Figure 4.17 shows the trade balance for Jordan as a proportion of GDP. Jordan’s negative 
trade balance peaked in 2005, three years after the signing of the agreement in 2002, at 
41.5% of Jordan’s GDP. The negative trade balance began to improve and reached 27% 
by 2012.  
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Figure 4.17: Trade Balance as a percentage of GDP 
 
Source World Bank, WITS 
4.5.2 Losses from elimination of import duty trade 
 
Among the goals of the EU-Jordan FTA was to contribute positively to the welfare of 
Jordan, to improve Jordan’s competitive position, and to decrease consumer prices in 
Jordan. One of the tools to accomplish these goals was the creation of a free trade zone 
between the EU and Jordan within a period of 12 years and hence to eliminate customs 
duties and taxes within the same period. However, as shown in Figure 4.18, before the 
agreement was put into effect in May 2002, Jordan relied heavily on revenues from duties 
and taxes levied on imports. Customs and import duties represented around one-third of 
Jordan’s tax revenue in 1998 (Feraboli, 2003, p. 2). By 2002, customs and import duties 
made up 18.5% of the tax revenue, which decreased further to 8% by 2012. Due to the 
loss of customs and import duties as part of tax revenues, the Jordanian government had 
to implement several tax reforms to compensate for this loss and had to broaden the tax 
base. Thus, the general sales tax rates on domestic and imported goods was replaced by a 
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sales tax in 2000, and income tax reform took place in 2001 (Feraboli, 2003, p. 3). The 
extent of the implementation of tax reforms based on the Jordan action plan will be 
examined in Chapter Four.  
 
Figure 4.18: Customs/import duties as a proportion of tax revenue 
 
Source: World Bank, WITS, compiled by the author 
4.5.3 Unemployment rates6 
 
Unemployment rates can provide an indication of the increase or decrease of economic 
activities related to imports and exports in a given area. Generally, the unemployment rate 
is expected to decrease in a situation of increased economic activity and the associated 
positive changes in the areas of imports and exports. As shown in Figure 4.19, the 
unemployment rate in Jordan, as published by the Jordanian Department of Statistics, was 
14.4% prior to the FTA entering into force, and this increased to 15.3% in 2002, the year 
the FTA was put into effect. In the first five years after the agreement, the unemployment 
rate remained around 14%. In 2007, it began to decrease, and in 2012, it reached 12.2%. 
The unemployment rate in Jordan is higher among females. In 2002, when the FTA was 
signed, male unemployment was 14%, and after 12 years of the FTA the male 
                                               
 
 
6 The unemployment rate is the number of unemployed people divided by the labour force (Department of 
Statistics, Jordan Statistical Yearbook, 2012). 
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unemployment rate was 10.4%. Thus, there was a decrease of 3.6% in the unemployment 
rate of the male labour force. However, for female unemployment, a slightly different 
picture emerges. The unemployment rate of the female labour force in 2002 was 21.9% 
and 12 years later, in 2012, it was 19.9%. Thus, the unemployment rate for females 
decreased by only 2%. 
Figure 4.19: Unemployment rate in Jordan 
   
Source: Employment and Unemployment Survey 1993–2012 
Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to test the 2002 AA between Jordan and the EU and to 
determine whether the agreement was beneficial for Jordan from an economic 
perspective. One of the challenges was to determine methods for comparing economic 
data over the periods preceding and following the EU-Jordan FTA of 2002. These 
methods had to yield results that were reliable and meaningful for the purposes of this 
study. In addition, the data methodology should not exceed what is available locally and 
in (semi-) public repositories of socio-economic data maintained by various national and 
international organisations. In a few instances, where no relevant data were available, the 
author sent requests for the data to the Jordanian Department of Statistics, which provided 
the requested data.  
The findings regarding the impact of the EU-Jordanian trade agreement are as follows.  
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Curiously, the inter-regional share of trade between Jordan and the EU showed a decrease 
starting in 2002, the year the agreement was signed. At the same time, the trade share 
with regions other than the EU increased. The EU-Jordan trade intensity index began to 
decrease starting in 2002. The decrease was a substantial 48% in one year.  
In the period following the agreement, Jordan experienced a relatively stable or slightly 
growing RCA in the chemical and food sectors, whereas the RCA of the textiles sector 
increased until 2006 and then decreased. The ores and metals sector had an advantage 
throughout the period investigated but experienced a decline. 
Regarding the trade share with the EU, the chemicals and manufacturing sectors had a 
stable advantage, while the advantage in the machinery and equipment sector amounted 
to a 20% increase. 
The formation of a trade deal may be considered cost-effective when trade creation 
exceeds trade diversion. In other words, more attractive products from the perspective of 
price and tariffs are traded more within the new trade partners, lowering costs and 
enabling new trade flows, based solely on the fact that these products originate from a 
country that has become part of the new trade deal. When considering only trade creation, 
the picture is ambiguous. While the increase in imports into Jordan suggests that trade 
creation occurred, a simultaneous increase in local production might suggest the contrary, 
or at least that there was a relative decrease in trade between the regions of the trade deal 
because local producers still deemed certain productions competitive. However, the 
increased imports from both the EU and other trade partners would suggest that it is 
unlikely that significant trade diversion took place. Thus, the overall increase in imports 
as well as the increase in domestic production suggests that a general increase in 
economic activity took place. However, since the inter-regional trade share between the 
EU and Jordan decreased after the agreement, trade creation was likely to have taken 
place as a result of the EU-Jordanian trade agreement but with less intensity than with 
Jordan’s other trade partners. 
The fact that Jordan’s trade with partners other than the EU grew more makes it difficult 
to assess the expected relative value of the EU-Jordan FTA for Jordan’s economy without 
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a thorough understanding of the possible incentives or lack thereof that the relationships 
with other trade partners offered. 
The quantitative approach to trade volume data reveals an increase in trade volume with 
the EU in most product categories, except for food, live animals, and commodities and 
transactions. This increase in trade volumes is an indication of a positive welfare effect on 
Jordan. It is notable that the sectors that did not experience growth in trade volumes with 
the EU experienced negative trade volumes with other countries. This may indicate that 
the sectors that did not experience trade volume growth with the EU were dealt with 
differently by Jordan itself, via more local production. 
What changes were there in trade itself? The overall change in terms of trade had a 
negative value of 226 million Euro. This may indicate a negative welfare effect for 
Jordan. 
Total imports and exports as a percentage of Jordan’s GDP both increased in the period 
under investigation; imports increased by an average of 10% and exports by 3%. 
However, imports and exports with the EU both decreased on average after the signing of 
the agreement. In other words, trade with the world increased, while trade with the EU 
did not. It is especially noteworthy, however, that all trade peaked around 2005. Based on 
the models used in this research, it is difficult to attribute a meaning to this peak. Was the 
2005 increase a delayed reaction to the agreement with the EU? Was there a demographic 
change caused by an influx from the region? Alternatively, was something entirely 
different going on? 
As Figure 4.9 shows, imports increased from other trade partners as well as the EU. 
However, the increase in exports shown in Figure 4.8 did not match the imports in either 
speed or volume. This left Jordan in the end with an increasing negative trade balance. In 
this respect, it is noteworthy that Jordan’s negative trade balance with the world was 
increasing at a higher pace than its negative trade balance with the EU. Although this may 
be a far-fetched explanation, it could indicate that, despite trade between Jordan and the 
EU decreasing on average, the balance between imports and exports was deepening at a 
lower rate and thus may be explained as being better for Jordan, or on the other hand can 
be explained by the fact that the import and export to the EU is at a lower rate than that of 
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the rest of the world. But under both explanations, the trade balance with the EU was still 
deepening in disfavour to Jordan, thus being negative for Jordan.  
 
In addition, the negative trade balance peaked in 2005, underlining that Jordan’s overall 
increase in trade in 2005 and the preceding years took place more on the export side. 
Unemployment rates for both men and women decreased on average after the EU-
Jordanian trade agreement was put into effect in 2002. In addition, in the case of 
unemployment rates, an initial increase was experienced in the aftermath of the 
agreement, after which the rate decreased. 
Revenues from taxes levied on imports decreased from one-third of Jordan’s total tax 
revenues to 18.5% in 2002 and decreased further to 8% in 2012. It is probable that the 
free trade zone with the EU, which was established in 2002, was an important reason for 
the significant reduction in revenue from import duties. Jordan had to compensate for this 
reduced tax income by introducing sales taxes and income tax reform. In this respect, 
Jordan most probably did not benefit from the agreement, since imports grew more than 
exports; thus, any gains for Jordan on the export side would not outweigh the loss of 
import taxes. 
 
Before attempting to come to any conclusions based on the analysis of the above-
mentioned findings, two points must be considered. All models used make comparisons 
over time based on all other things being equal, and therefore are descriptive in nature. 
Thus, the explanatory value of these models has limitations. This study is focused on 
revealing to what extent the EU-Jordanian agreement was beneficial for Jordan. 
Therefore, explanations beyond this scope are not sought. 
First, the following points present the indicators that show a decreasing tendency in the 
period following the EU-Jordanian agreement: 
• The interregional trade share and the trade intensity index both showed a 
decrease for trade with the EU. This meant that the trade between two EU and 
Jordan was less attractive or the country of origin played a role in creating a 
burden on the Jordanian partners.  
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• The overall change in the terms of trade had a negative value of 226 million 
euro. This may indicate a negative welfare effect for Jordan. 
• Imports and exports with the EU both decreased on average after the 
agreement was signed, while trade with the rest of the world increased. 
• Revenues from taxes levied on imports decreased from one-third of Jordan’s 
total tax revenues to 18.5% in 2002 and further decreased to 8% in 2012. 
• Jordan’s trade balance and external debt increased with negative effects on 
Jordan. 
The following points might be indicators that Jordan benefited from the agreement. 
• Trade creation was likely to have taken place because of the EU-Jordanian trade 
agreement but with less intensity than with Jordan’s other trade partners and more 
intensity on the import side. 
• The increase in trade volume is an indication of a positive welfare effect on 
Jordan.  
• Unemployment rates for both men and women decreased on average after the 
agreement. 
Finally, the following points are indicators of more or less neutral benefits to Jordan from 
the EU-Jordanian agreement. 
• Jordan and the EU had RCAs in some of the same fields and in a complementary 
way, indicating opportunities for trade. 
• Jordan’s negative trade balance with the world was increasing at a higher pace 
than its negative trade balance with the EU. 
The decreasing inter-regional trade share of the EU in the period following the agreement 
is an indication that trade with the EU did not become more attractive, and therefore was 
more intense, following the agreement. A similar signal is given by decreasing imports 
and exports. In addition, the considerable decrease in tax revenues forced Jordan to 
undertake domestic tax reform. Trade creation most likely took place, indicating a 
beneficial influence on Jordan’s economy, but more so with partners other than the EU, 
and more so for imports than for exports. The increase in trade volume is a signal of a 
positive welfare effect, as is decreasing unemployment. There was complementarity in 
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the comparative advantages of both the EU and Jordan. However, the EU’s decreasing 
trade share is an indication that neither Jordan nor the EU took advantage of this in a 
significant way. Jordan’s trade balance became more negative, but less so with the EU 
than with the rest of the world. 
Jordan appeared to gravitate towards trade with others rather than the EU after the 
agreement. On the other hand, the EU’s influence on Jordan’s negative trade balance was 
less negative than with other trade partners, indicating a step in the direction of a more 
beneficial balance between imports and exports for Jordan. 
Overall trade increased, and unemployment decreased but was still exceedingly high in 
the period under investigation, although it is not possible to tie these findings to the EU-
Jordanian agreement in any certain way. 
 
Thus, if we put all these points in a table (Table 4.11) we can, at a glance, have the 
output:  
 
Table 4.11. Impact of the trade agreement on Jordan  
Model  Indicator  Findings  Impact  
Ex-Ante Mode    
Inter-Regional 
dependence between 
Jordan and EU  ITS  Is decreasing  Negative 
Trade Intensity Index  TII Is decreasing  Negative 
Revealed Comparative 
Advantage  RCA There is potential advantage   
Regional Orientation 
Index  ROI There is potential advantage   
Trade Complementary 
index  TCI There is potential advantage   
    
Ex-Post model     
Quantitative approach     
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Trade creation   
There is an increase in domestic production 
and increase in imports. Therefore, it 
cannot be stated that the preferential tariff 
replaced supposedly ‘inefficient’ domestic 
production  Not decisive   
Trade diversion   There is no diversion  Positive 
Trade creation 
exceeds trade 
diversion   
There is trade creation (though indecisive) 
but there is no trade diversion, so trade 
creation exceeds trade  diversion  Positive  
Qualitative approach    
Change in trade 
volume  5 out 10 products are decrease Positive 
Change in terms of 
trade   Negative results for the trade with the EU Negative  
Other indicators     
Trade balance  Balance is negative  Negative 
Customs duties   Decreased  Negative  
Unemployment   Decreased  Positive  
 
Examining pure numbers in Table 4.11 yields five negative impacts on Jordan’s 
economy, four positive ones, and one indecisive. Thus, on one side of the conclusion is 
that the EU-Jordanian trade agreement was not exploited as expected; the EU did not 
become a more important trade partner to Jordan, and the negative trade balance of 
Jordan deepened, which is a sign that the trade with the EU alone might suggest that the 
AA with the EU did not bring the economic benefits that Jordan had expected. However, 
Jordan had other goals when signing the AA, as outlined in Chapter Two, through its 
globalisation policy: Integrate into the global market, exit its isolation, and build a 
healthier trade balance. The overarching direction of Jordan’s economic reform was 
towards a market economy. Jordan’s economic policy was to facilitate trade through 
international and regional trade and adhere to the international standards of trade and 
economic policies (El Anis, 2010, p. 62) Chapter Five will detail these changes to adhere 
to international standards.  
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King Hussein, in his speech addressing the Jordanian Parliament in 1996 and 1997, 
outlined the goals of the AA, and he underlined that the AA would enhance Jordan’s 
economy regionally and globally and continue in the open market economy, and that it 
would increase Jordan’s capability and competitiveness in the world economy.  
Jordan's most important trade partner, Iraq was a nation in ruins with little economic 
importance for Jordan. In the 1990s, Jordan had major economic pressures. Therefore, 
Jordan’s goals were to diversify its international trade partners, and signing an agreement 
with the EU provided Jordan with another major economic partner that would serve this 
purpose.  
Through the agreement with the EU, Jordan has managed to integrate itself into the global 
economy, since the EU is one major player in world trade.  
Jordan managed, with the EU agreement, to completely anchor its free-market image. 
Through the EU agreement, Jordan triggered and motivated further regional integration 
with other Arab countries when signing the Agadir Agreement to better benefit from the 
AA. 
By signing the free trade agreement with the EU and US and its participation in the peace 
process with Israel, Jordan re-established itself as an important regional partner to the 
Western world and ended the early 1990s’ isolation that their stance in the Gulf War had 
brought them.  
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Chapter Five  
 
EU-Jordanian Preferential Agreement 
Progress over the Seven Years of 2006 to 2012 
 
Introduction 
This chapter first assesses the action plans put in place for Jordan that aimed at reaching 
the goals stipulated in the AA signed by the EU and Jordan. Second, it reviews Jordan’s 
progress reports over a seven-year period from 2006 to 2012. This review is 
accomplished by comparing the action plans and corresponding progress reports for that 
period. The expectation is that this side-by-side review of action plans and progress 
reports will shed light on the nature and mechanics of the practical implementation of the 
agreement. This review will check whether the reforms that Jordan undertook resulted in 
improvements in Jordan’s economic performance. The period studied in this chapter 
largely corresponds to the period studied in Chapter Four. This is aimed at further 
developing the analysis in Chapter Four and complementing the analysis covering the 
period prior to the signing of the AA, that is, 1998 to 2002, and then 2002 (when the AA 
was put into effect) to 2012. The overlapping period of the action plans, 2006 to 2012, is 
analysed in this chapter. 
Jordan’s relationship with the EU evolved at the institutional level in the period between 
1977 and 2010, when Jordan became a signatory to various agreements that have led to 
various levels of cooperation with the EU and commitments towards the EU as shown in 
Figure 5.1.  
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Figure 5.1: EU-Jordanian relations  
 
Source: Compiled by the author 
 
After becoming a partner to the Barcelona Process and signing the AA, Jordan committed 
to two action plans stipulating the implementation of the ENP in Jordan. The first action 
plan was agreed upon in 2005 and covered a five-year period from 2005 to 2010, while 
the second action plan, adopted in October 2010, was for the period from 2010 to 2015.  
For the purpose of this study, five aspects of the action plan are assessed: (1) the 
macroeconomic framework and functioning of the market economy, (2) trade-related 
issues as well as market and regulatory reform, (3) employment and social policy, (4) 
transport, energy, information society, and environment, and (5) other areas. Political 
reform and person-to-person contact are not within the scope of this research.  
To assess the progress methodology, I refer to Del Sarto and Schumacher (2011, p. 936) 
regarding benchmarking as a tool to assess progress. This benchmarking tool requires 
certain prerequisites: (1) clear indicators, both quantitative and qualitative, (2) a 
timeframe, (3) and agreed-upon methods of collecting data to measure progress. As 
demonstrated in Section 5.1 on the action plans, the action plans for Jordan lack these 
three criteria, and therefore this method cannot be used in this section.  
The only component of the action plans that has a structured methodology for assessment 
is the enterprise policy section. The assessment process is based on the enterprise charter 
indicators, as developed by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), and implemented with regard to enterprise policy in the Balkan 
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countries (European Commission, OECD, European Training Foundation, 2008, p. 135). 
In this assessment methodology, each policy area has policy indicators that are identified. 
The progress on each indicator is subsequently rated. For the rating process, a scale from 
1 to 5 is used, in which 1 is no policy whatsoever and 5 represents a situation in which a 
full policy is in place, also meeting international standards (European Commission, 
OECD, European Training Foundation, 2008, p. 135). 
Thus, in the absence of the elements needed to utilise the benchmarking methodology, I 
draw on the enterprise policy method to implement the assessment for all other aspects of 
the progress reports over the seven-year period under review. The five aspects of the 
action plans within the scope of this research each has several indicators outlined as 
reference for progress. I used the 1-to-5 rating method described above for each indicator 
and for every year. The rating is based on the enterprise charter methodology. It ranks the 
rating per indicator detailing the expected results per level from 1 to 5. For the purpose of 
this research, the rating is as follows (European Commission, OECD, European Training 
Foundation, 2008, p. 135): score 1 is given for no policy, structure, or improvement. 
Score 2 is given for strategies under development or discussion at the government level: 
that is, preparation for plans but no approval yet; score 3 is given for multi-year strategies 
that are approved by the government while institutions are in place; score 4 is given for 
solid evidence of implementation with indications of key targets being achieved and 
instances in which funds are also received; score 5 is given for a fully implemented and 
proactive global policy based on international standards. In this case, institutions are fully 
functional. 
The strength of this methodology is that it results in a numerical value to assess Jordan’s 
progress regarding the targets stipulated in the action plans. This provides an instant and 
comparable indication of the extent of Jordan’s performance compared to the stipulated 
results in the action plan. The weakness of this method is that when a policy has been 
developed and implemented, it is designated a score of 3. However, the score gives no 
indication of the content, the goals of the policy, or its effectiveness in achieving the set 
goals. It indicates only that a policy relevant to the issue was approved; the level of the 
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content can be at an initial or advanced level, but in either case the score is 3. The same 
applies to scores of 4 or 5 in terms of the full implementation of the approved policies.  
5.1 Action Plans for Jordan  
 
The legal basis of EU-Jordanian relations is the FTA Agreement, which was put into 
effect in May 2002. The ENP laid the basis for the action plan with Jordan (European 
External Action Service, 2013). The first action plan of Jordan was adopted on 11 January 
2005 for a period of five years. The second action plan was adopted in October 2010.  
5.1.1 EU-Jordan action plan for 2005 
 
The action plan of 2005 covers a five-year period. In the introduction of the action plan, 
the EU lists the reasons for political and economic cooperation with Jordan (European 
Commission, 2005).  
The action plan divides the action expected from Jordan into the short and medium terms 
for each set of sub-priorities: 1) Political reforms, 2) Economic and Social Reform and 
Development, 3) Trade-related Issues, Markets, and Regulatory Reform, 4) Cooperation 
in Justice and Home Affairs 5) Cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs reforms 6) 
Transport, Energy, Information Society, and Environment reforms, 7) Person-to-Person 
Contact. If we compare Jordan’s action plan with Morocco’s and Tunisia’s, all three 
action plans have exactly the same seven elements listed above, with the same sub-
elements, and all three 2005 action plans had short-, medium-, and long-term objectives. 
In the three action plans of 2005, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia had to approximate their 
regulations and standards to that of the EU in many areas for the goal of integration into 
the EU’s internal market and its regulatory structures. This means that the EU had an 
action plan template that it was implementing with every partner, though there might be 
slight alterations adapted to the different countries in view of their geopolitical situations 
and importance, for instance, Jordan’s role towards in Israeli-Palestinian peace process 
versus migration and the proximity of Tunisia and Morocco to Europe.  
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The political reforms imposed in the action plans covered three subjects: (1) democracy 
and the rule of law, (2) human rights and freedom, (3) cooperation on foreign and security 
policy, and (4) conflict prevention at regional and international levels. Jordan, on both 
short-term and long-term bases, needed to strengthen its institutions through dialogue to 
reach democracy and support freedom of speech and women’s equality (European 
Commission, 2005). Dalbouh (2005) has underlined that the EU, in the case of Jordan, 
pursued a rather imbalanced strategy that has favoured economic and financial 
cooperation over political objectives.  
The conflict prevention goal had the highest attention from the EU, since it had the 
longest list of action points spread over the short, medium, and long terms. This goal was 
oriented towards serving Europe’s security goals. In addition, there was a focus on the 
role of Jordan in the peace process involving Iraq and other neighbouring countries where 
Jordan has played a pivotal role in mediation.  
 
The economic and social reform and development goal covers the reform of fiscal 
policies to achieve macro-economic stability and growth with fiscal stability, a decrease 
in public debt, price stability, and a sustainable fiscal and pension system (European 
Commission, 2005). This goal justifiably falls within the Jordan privatisation policy that 
was re-launched after 1999 by King Abdullah; therefore, this action plan would supply 
momentum for the privatisation process.  
 
The trade-related issues, markets, and regulatory reform goal involves a long list of 
reforms required to ensure the free movement of goods. This action point covers reforms 
in trade relations, customs, conformity with technical regulations, and EU standards.  
The trade-related action point mainly concentrated on tariffs and the elimination of non-
tariff barriers for industrial goods. Meanwhile, for agricultural goods, the action point was 
to ‘examine the possibility’ of further liberalising agricultural goods (European 
Commission, 2005). This keen attention of the EU to trade related issues and setting a 
lengthy list of reforms confirms the EU’s major interest in achieving these reforms over 
any other elements of the action plan.  
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As for the customs aspect, the action point revolved around improving and simplifying 
the customs system as per the Palermo recommendations (European Commission, 2005). 
With regard to conformity with technical regulations and EU standards, this action 
promoted the free movement of industrial products into the EU market, thereby meeting 
EU standards prior to entry (European Commission, 2005).  
  
As for the right of establishment. Jordan had to facilitate the establishment of companies 
by creating a suitable environment for companies and investment in line with EU 
standards (European Commission, 2005)  
  
The action plan also covered the taxation system. Jordan had to introduce reforms to meet 
WTO standards and improve tax administration as well as intellectual and industrial 
property, for which Jordan had to strengthen the directorate to improve intellectual and 
industrial property and fight against trade in counterfeit goods. Also included was the 
statistics system, in which Jordan had to develop its statistical system to meet EU 
standards in areas of interest to the EU (European Commission, 2005). 
 
For cooperation in justice and home affairs reforms, the main action was immigration, 
both legal and illegal. For visa management, the EU and Jordan had to cooperate on the 
visa system according to the Acquis Communautaire. Jordan was required to enhance 
border management (European Commission, 2005). Here, again, EU standards were set 
as the reference point for Jordan to improve border management efficiency. 
 
In the transport, energy, information society, and environment reforms, Jordan had to 
develop its transport system by developing a national transport policy, prioritising 
development by sector (European Commission, 2005). Jordan was expected, in the short 
and medium terms, to adapt its energy policy and standards to those of the EU (European 
Commission, 2005), 
 
Person-to-person contact was relevant to education, training, and youth. In this aspect, 
Jordan was to adjust the national system aimed at closer connection to EU systems. Key 
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areas were vocational training programmes, institution building, licensing and 
accreditation (European Commission, 2005). 
5.1.2 EU-Jordan action plan for 2010  
 
The action plan of 2010 (European External Action Service, 2013) was based on three 
pillars: political, economic and social, and scientific and human dimensions. An action 
plan is the ENP tool used to bring relations between Jordan and the EU to an ‘advanced 
status’. This ‘advanced status’ partnership meant that Jordan could participate in ENP-
specific initiatives.  
The action plan starts with an introduction about EU-Jordanian relations, which started in 
1977 with the signing of the Cooperation Agreement. The relations between the parties 
picked up momentum 20 years later in 1997, when negotiations for the AA commenced, 
resulting in the AA entering into force in 2002, followed by the ENP in 2005 (European 
External Action Service, 2013). 
In the introduction to the action plan, a direct link was established between the advanced 
status that Jordan could reach and the objectives of peace and prosperity based on 
democratic principles, rule of law, and respect for human rights (European External 
Action Service, 2013).  
5.1.3 Financial instruments of EU-Jordan relations  
 
The EU provided multiple financial instruments in support of Jordanian efforts to 
implement economic and political reforms. The first programme was MEDA, which was 
the main instrument of economic and financial cooperation under the Euro-Mediterranean 
partnership. MEDA I was established in 1996 and was amended by MEDA II in 2000. 
The MEDA objectives were to support the economic transition of the partner countries, 
sustainable socio-economic development, and regional, sub-regional and cross-border 
cooperation. MEDA allocations to Jordan were 423 million euro until 2003. In 2004, 
Jordan received 36.5 million euro in funds for poverty reduction and water resource 
management (European Commission, 2004c). 
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Under the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) Jordan received 
488 million euro for the period of 2007-2013. By 2014, the ENPI was replaced by the 
European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI). This instrument was directed towards key 
political and socio-economic reforms. From 2012 to 2013 the EU advanced 91 million 
euro under the Support for Partnership, Reform and Inclusive Growth (SPRING) to assist 
in economic and good governance reforms (EEAS, 1995). 
The operation and financial activities of the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) were expanded to Jordan in December 2011. The contribution of 
EBRD was 1 billion 39 million euros cumulative EBRD investment for 2017. For the 
period of the study, the one year in scope is 2012, in which the EBRD had three projects 
planned for Jordan. Two projects were cancelled, and one project went through. The 
EBRD funded a loan of USD 360 million for a power plant (European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, 2018) that is in repayment status.  
 
The European Investment Bank has been supporting Jordan since 1978 and has since 
provided Jordan with a total of 940 million euro. The European Investment Bank’s 
Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership (FEMIP) is the financial 
instrument between the European Investment Bank and the and the Mediterranean.  
FEMIP activities focus on two areas: developing the private sector and creating an 
investment-friendly environment to facilitate the opening up of the economies of the 
Mediterranean partner countries (European Investment Bank, 2013). 
 
How can we analyse EU financial aid to Jordan under the umbrella of the AA? First, the 
private sector in Jordan depended on the financial support that was expected with the 
signing of the AA with the EU to modernize Jordan’s industry. The modernization of 
Jordan’s industries would bring it to the level where it could compete on the global 
market. The President of the Union of Jordan Chambers of Commerce, Haidar Murad, (Al 
Rai, 2002) highlighted that the biggest challenge for Jordan would be to rehabilitate its 
industries through specialised supporting programs to modernize it and reach a level that 
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would guarantee its entry into the EU market (Al Rai, 2002). Carroll (2001, p. 157) 
mentioned that the private sector accepted signing of the agreement because of the 
economic incentives inherent in aid and assistance. 
The private sector’s cautious acceptance was encouraged by the promise of technical and 
financial assistance to update their infrastructure and to support investment policies 
(Carroll, 2001, p. 160). Villani (2016), the EU negotiator, mentioned that the financial 
support from the EU to assist Jordan in social, political, and economic reforms was one of 
the benefits that the agreement brought to Jordan.  
On the other hand, one can argue that financial assistance might bring the opposite effects 
to the economic development of Jordan. Financial assistance perpetuates the dependency 
of Jordan on the EU and directs the cooperation process towards the economic interests of 
the dominant partner, in this case, the EU (Abu Dalbouh, 2012, p. 301). All financial aid 
was directly linked to a programme under the AA and served the policy related to it.  
5.1.4 Analysis of the EU-Jordan action plans for 2005 and 2010  
 
The analysis of the action plans will follow two paths: 1) compare the action plan of 2005 
to the action plan of 2010 to understand perception by the EU and Jordan and the progress 
that was achieved in the 2005 action plan; 2) follow the theoretical framework set in 
Chapter One.  
 
Initially, one can observe that the action plans did not have a legally binding 
characteristic and thus depended mainly on political will to implement changes in the 
local legislation to meet the objectives of the action plans (Pieters, 2009, p. 159). As a 
result, it would depend on Jordan’s motivation to implement the different reforms and its 
political economy interests.  
The Commission describes the action plans as political tools in the framework of the 
ENP. The reason behind the action plans was to offer a tool that provided certain 
continuity and that could, in one document, address all issues within the scope of the EU 
relationship with an ENP partner (Van Vooren, 2011, p. 192). The action plans served a 
‘steering function’ and as such were flexible and adaptable to changing political relations 
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(Van Vooren, 2011, p. 194). The action plans, being an instrument of soft law, lacked a 
mechanism of enforcement (Van Vooren, 2011, p. 195) 
 
In the two action plans of 2005 and 2010, it can be observed that the priorities of the 2005 
action plan were repeated in the 2010 action plan priorities. However, in the 2005 action 
plan, the goals were set for the short and medium term, while in the 2010 action plan, 
there is no reference to medium-term implementation. The fact that the priorities are 
repeated indicates that the EU and Jordan were aware that the first five years of reforms 
did not achieve the set goals in action plan 2005. This might be an indication that the 
goals were too ambitious, and Jordan needed more time to adjust to the list of reforms, or 
Jordan had other internal challenges to achieve these goals. 
 
In the introduction to the 2005 action plan, a direct link is established between the level of 
commitment and achievement of Jordan and the level of ‘ambition’ of the EU-Jordanian 
relationship. The approach of the EU to achieve the action plan is ‘positive conditionality’ 
and abandoning ‘negative conditionality’. However, the incentive to Jordan is not 
comparable to the incentive provided by the prospect of joining the EU (Del Sarto & 
Schumacher, 2011, pp. 933–934).  
 
One aspect clearly highlighted in the introduction to the action plan of 2005 is the 
objective of approximating Jordanian legislation and norms to those of the EU. The 
objective of the action plan is to ensure that Jordan promotes reforms at the political, 
economic, and social levels to be able to meet European standards. The same appears in 
the action plans of Morocco and Tunisia, which is a sign of EU dominance in the whole 
process.  
 
The action plan of 2005 implies that Jordan, to harmonize its standards for industrial 
products, will review its own legislation to remove any discrimination against imported 
goods from the EU. In addition, Jordan will cooperate with the private sector to solicit its 
input on the reviewed legislation (Pieters, 2009, p. 169). 
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In the action plan of 2005, the EU put forward incentives for Jordan to fulfil the plans. It 
mentioned the possibility of new contractual relations. The incentives included increased 
financial and technical support linked to fulfilling the action plan, especially political and 
economic reforms; the possibility for Jordan to move from economic cooperation to 
economic integration; increased political cooperation; convergence of economic 
legislation to simulate investment; strengthening economic ties; and extending 
cooperation to include the agricultural and service sectors.  
The EU outlined clear priorities in the action plan; political reform and democratisation 
were at the top of this list, yet Del Sarto and Schumacher (2011) question the seriousness 
of the EU commitment to the democratisation process in Jordan. Within the call for 
political reform and democratisation, an independent judiciary and ensuring individual 
liberties and freedom of speech was developing. Another top action plan priority was 
political dialogue for the Palestinian-Israeli peace process. After political reform, 
economic improvement was the second priority for the EU. Economic priorities included 
improving business conditions and the liberalisation of trade in goods and services. The 
next-highest priorities related to migration and cooperation in managing the movement of 
people. The last set of priorities related to poverty reduction and developing the energy, 
transport, and information sectors to interconnect with EU networks. The final priority 
was scientific and technological cooperation (European Commission, 2005). The 
priorities set in the 2010 action plan were democracy and rule of law, judicial 
independence, equal treatment of women, the liberalisation of markets, foreign security 
policy, transport, energy, environment, and finally, technological cooperation (European 
External Action Service, 2013). 
 
The action plans have elements of reform that Jordan must achieve; however, they have 
no concrete measurable goals against which they can be assessed. The reforms are not 
linked to any specific regulation that Jordan must address. This leaves room for 
interpretation of what should be changed. The approach of the EU to achieve the action 
plans was ‘positive conditionality’; however, the incentive is not comparable to joining 
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the EU (Del Sarto & Schumacher, 2011). In every aspect of the action plans, political and 
economic reforms must be directed towards EU standards. There was no reference to 
Jordanian standards or criteria in the action plans. Jordan’s input into the action plans was 
not recorded, and the action plans aimed to bring Jordanian legalisation approximately in 
line with the standards of the EU.  
In the action plans, it can be observed that the EU policy was to impose Washington 
Consensus elements on Jordan. The Washington Consensus imposed the so-called ‘Ten 
Commandments’ or policy instruments that countries should follow to reform their 
economies and reduce debt (Williamson J., 2004, p. 3): ‘1) Fiscal Discipline to reduce 
inflation, 2) Reordering public expenditure priorities, To reduce government subsidies 
and from education health d and infrastructure to growth economic activities sector, 3) 
Tax Reform, 4) Liberalising interest rates, 5) A Competitive exchange rate, 6) Trade 
Liberalization. Open market to international trade, 7) Liberalization of Inward Foreign 
Direct Investment, 8) Privatization of government owned services, 9) Deregulation, 10) 
Property Rights’ (Williamson J., 2004).  
 
 
In the action plans, EU emphasises privatisation, liberalisation of markets, tax reforms, 
and the rule of law. The Washington Consensus advocates free markets, trade 
liberalisation, and reducing government support, principles that major international 
organization like the IMF supports. The EU is a major defender of the Washington 
Consensus and its support of these principles is shown in the action plans with Jordan and 
through its loan strategies for countries like Latvia (Lütz & Kranke, 2010, p. 2).  
 
Within the theoretical framework, if we look at the action plans of 2005 and 2010 from 
the liberalism lens, one can observe that the EU was promoting liberalisation in goods, 
capital, privatisation, and the free market economy. The EU was promoting all legislative 
reforms in enterprise, trade, and free market to bring Jordan’s economic approach closer 
to that of the EU and thus achieve sustainable development and reduce poverty. The EU 
was also promoting financial system reforms in Jordan to attract foreign investment. 
These steps within liberalism would mean prosperity for Jordan, that the EU was 
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extending the basic principle of free trade to enable countries to deal with each other on 
peaceful terms. 
  
However, realism might suggest that the EU, by imposing their own standards 
economically, politically, and financially (in the same path as the agreement itself), was 
exercising its dominance on Jordan’s economy to serve its own economic interest by 
approximating Jordan’s standards to its own. In realism, when applied to the action plans, 
the EU used the international economy to emphasise its powers, and by rendering Jordan 
dependent on the EU, this dependency makes dependents weak. The fact that the action 
plans of Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia addressed the same seven elements and sub-
elements and imposed on these countries the approximation of the EU’s regulations and 
standards, confirms the EU dominance not only over Jordan but over other partners.  
 
Here, Marxism might bring up the imperialism of EU relations with Jordan, in which the 
EU is trying to maintain the power status quo to serve its own economic interests by 
setting a structured action plan for Jordan on tariff reductions on industrial goods that was 
based on its Eurocentric standards, while keeping its agricultural goods protected, and its 
financial structure and banking structure set up. This, according to Marxism, would 
perpetuate the wealth of the EU over Jordan, since the EU had no fear of competition for 
its industrial goods due to its strong industrial base, while they did have concerns about 
competition from Jordan’s agricultural products.  
 
If it is possible to apply the best of intentions to the EU and consider the EU as a ‘power 
of good’ that genuinely wants to spread prosperity to its neighbours and bring peace to 
the Mediterranean region, let us consider the following: 1) the EU used Eurocentric 
standards based on their own geopolitical history as the standards to follow, 2) the EU 
imposed these standards on the Mediterranean using ‘positive conditionality’ and 
abandoning ‘negative conditionality’ (Del Sarto and Schumacher, 2011, pp. 933–934), 3) 
the EU went as far as using the Acquis Communautaire in certain cases, such as 
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intellectual and industrial property, as standards for countries that have no prospects to 
become EU member states. All combined, this brings us back to imperialism.  
 
5.2 The Impact of the Action Plans for 2006 to 2012 
 
In the following sections, the impact of the action plan on Jordan will be examined. It will 
be done by analysing yearly progress reports while, in the background, keeping scores of 
the five elements (underlined) of the action plans based on the OECD method. By the end 
of the analysis of all the years, I will present the overall scoring in Table 5.5 to give an 
evaluation of the process through which Jordan has gone.  
The methodology of analysis will be done by using the information about each element in 
the report to explain the impact of that element on the Jordanian population, and where 
possible, by using statistics to support or negate the reported progress and its benefit (or 
lack of benefit) to the Jordanian population. 
5.2.1 The impact of the action plan in 2006 
 
According to the progress report of 2006 (Commission of the European Communities, 
2006), economic growth in Jordan from 2004 to 2005 averaged 7.5%. The value of the 
GDP increased constantly (see Figure 5.2), but the national income growth rate lagged 
behind.  
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Figure 5.2: Jordanian GDP and national income growth rate  
 
Figure 5.2: Jordanian GDP and national income growth rate   
Source: Source: Central Bank of Jordan, www.cbj.gov.jo (Saieq, 2013) 
The national income and GDP growth rate are being compared because both GDP and 
national income are indicators of the economic health of the country. Choosing to report 
one indicator that reflects a positive image and failing to report the other less positive 
indicator means that both the EU and Jordan wanted to make the results look good. One 
might surmise that the EU was keen on keeping Jordan motivated to continue its 
participation in view of its pivotal role in the region, and that Jordan was motivated to 
show its population that the agreement was yielding good results for the economy.  
Regarding another marker of financial progress, Jordan maintained a strict monetary 
regime of ‘pegging’7 to the US dollar to maintain a stable exchange rate for the Jordanian 
dinar. However, the inflation rate has remained high at up to 6% (Commission of the 
European Communities, 2006). According to Ghosh et al. (1996), pegging a currency to 
another could lead to higher confidence in the currency, bring about monetary policy 
discipline, and reduce the inflation rate. Pegging the Jordanian dinar to the dollar 
indicates Jordan’s strong monetary discipline. Why did Jordan follow this strict policy? 
Jordan was, as mentioned in Chapter Two, following globalization policy to bring foreign 
                                               
 
 
7 Pegging to US dollar,   when a country maintains its currency's value at a fixed exchange rate to the U.S. 
dollar.(Kimberly,  2019)  
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investment to its country. This discipline brings confidence in the currency and induces 
investment, but Jordan was not able to curb inflation despite its strict discipline.  
 
Jordan stopped subsidising fuel to curb government debt (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2006). These fuel subsidy cuts have increased the income burden on the 
Jordanian population (Green Fiscal Policy Organization, 2013). From 2002 to 2005, oil 
prices increased significantly, resulting in a substantial increase in Jordan’s fuel subsidies 
from 1.2% of GDP in 2003 to 5.6% of GDP in 2005 (Figure 5.3), (Coady, El Said, 
Gillingham, Kpodar, Medas, & Newhouse, 2006; Green Fiscal Policy Organization, 
2013). 
 
Figure 5.3: Jordanian energy from 2002 to 2010 
 
 Source: http://www.greenfiscalpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/Jordan.pdf 
 
These cuts had the heaviest impact on the income of the poorest in Jordan, both directly 
and indirectly. The subsidy cuts caused lower-income families to lose 2% of their income 
as a direct result of the increase in fuel prices, and to lose 2.4% of their income in indirect 
effects (increased prices of goods and services), or a total income loss of 4.4%, despite 
the support received from the Jordanian government (Coady, El Said, Gillingham, 
Kpodar, Medas, & Newhouse, 2006; Green Fiscal Policy Organization, 2013). As a result 
of this, major protests took place in Jordan. In response to these protests, the Jordanian 
government gave salary increases to civil servants, military personnel, and private 
employees earning less than $1000/year. In addition, the Jordanian government supported 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Petroleum 0.6 1.2 3.2 5.6 2.8 2.7 1.2 0.3 0.4
Food 0 0 0 0.6 0.8 1.8 1.4 0.8 0.5
0
2
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8
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the beneficiaries of the National Aid Fund, which was established to help widows and 
orphans (Jones, et al., 2009, p. 19). 
 
Jordan had tackled poverty reduction and unemployment, yet youth unemployment was 
still a major issue, with the youth unemployment rate at about 30.1% in 2006 (World 
Bank, 2015c). By May 2006, Jordan had installed a national strategy for poverty 
reduction and worked with the ILO on workers’ rights. Jordan continued to pursue the 
1996 ‘Agenda 21, Towards Sustainable Development’. However, a coherent approach 
was lacking regarding integrating sustainable development in the planning cycle 
(Commission of the European Communities, 2006).  
 
When analysing trade-related issues and market and regulatory reform, one will notice 
another choice of attributes that beautifies the trade balance. The progress report indicates 
a successful growth year for Jordan by highlighting that Jordan’s 2004 exports to the EU 
increased by 30%, and in 2005 increased by 41%.  
However, the original figures for exports from Jordan to the EU were exceptionally low 
(Figure 4.8), so any minor amount of increase would be considered a high percentage. 
Exports from Jordan to the world were much higher than are those from Jordan to the EU, 
which, based on Chapter Four (Figure 4.8), confirmed that trade with the EU was less 
than that with the other partners. In addition, the report fails to mention the increase in 
imports to Jordan during the same period (Figure 4.9) that resulted in a perpetuating 
negative trade balance for Jordan.  
 
One action point that required following a schedule was the dismantling of tariffs for 
industrial and agricultural products. The industrial tariff negotiations between the EU and 
Jordan were in progress, while the agreement on the agricultural tariff had been 
concluded between Jordan and the EU (Commission of the European Communities, 
2006). The seriousness of implementing this aspect is apparent because a schedule was 
set for it, while other issues were left open-ended.  
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The Jordan Standards and Metrology Organisation began to implement EU standards and 
prepare a priority list for approximating sanitary and phytosanitary legislation with the 
EU Acquis Communautaire (Commission of the European Communities, 2006). This 
resulted in the high EU-imposed standards required at the Acquis Communautaire for EU 
candidates being imposed on a Jordan, even though Jordan did not have a prospect of 
becoming an EU member state.  
 
Jordan adopted Competition Law No. 33 in 2004. The original drafts of the legislation 
went through several failed attempts from 1996 to 1998, until recent versions of the 
redrafts took place in 2002 in a cooperative effort between Jordanian authorities and the 
Euro-Jordanian Action for Development Enterprise. The 2002 provisional law No. 49 was 
issued and endorsed by Parliament in 2004 (Abbadi, 2006, p. 81). Shortly after the law 
was put into effect, the Jordanian Magistrate’s Court ruled in favour of a foreign company 
that filed a lawsuit against a local company that made copies of a foreign product. The 
implementation of competition law in Jordan has resulted in the establishment of 
institutional support for implementing laws (Abbadi, 2006, p. 82).  
 
In the field of energy, since Jordan depended solely on oil imports from Iraq and Saudi 
Arabia, Jordan worked to develop a master plan to move from oil to gas. According to the 
progress report (Commission of the European Communities, 2006), this pipeline would 
contribute to EU energy security. With the financial support of the EU, the Euro-Mashrek 
gas centre was established in Damascus. According to a congressional study on Europe’s 
energy security (Belkin, Nichol, Ratner, & Woehrel, 2013, p. 25), for Europe, the North 
African supply of gas would have been a good supply alternative to the Russian gas 
supply. However, owing to uncertainty, there is not a conducive political situation for 
foreign investment in the energy field. The Egyptian revolution between 2011 and 2012 
resulted in the gas pipeline from Egypt through Jordan being attacked multiple times by 
fundamentalists in the Sinai, interrupting gas supply, and again leaving Jordan vulnerable 
due to its dependence on external energy resources (Belkin, Nichol, Ratner, & Woehrel, 
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2013, p. 25). The interruption of gas cost Jordan millions of dinars for diesel replacement  
(European Commission, 2012c).  
 
Jordan did make some improvements to electricity regulations to encourage privatisation. 
According to a study on the evaluation of solar energy in Jordan (Badran, Abdulhadi, & 
Mamlook, 2010), Jordan is considered one of the world’s sun-belt countries. Jaber and 
Mohsen (2008, p. 279) show that in 2004, Jordan’s spending on fuel comprised about 
15% of GDP. However, the EU was funding the Arab gas pipeline for its potential energy 
security, and there was no serious commitment from the EU to renewable energy 
resources for Jordan, despite Jordan’s abundance of solar energy (Badran, Abdulhadi, & 
Mamlook, 2010; Jaber & Mohsen, 2008; Qasaimeh, 2012).  
 
Therefore, in an overall evaluation of the progress of 2006, Jordan scored 2.2 (details in 
table 5.5), which indicated that it had strategies under discussion or in development. The 
impact on Jordan during this year was, on one hand, not optimistic: trade balance was still 
in favour of the EU, cut off subsidies mostly impacted the poor, and the inflation rate did 
not improve. Most of the focus was on tariff reduction, and energy focus was on the Arab 
National Gas pipeline, instead of building solar energy that might sustain Jordan and 
minimize its fuel bill. On the other hand, there was growth in Jordan’s GDP. 
Unemployment in general was improving, although it was still remarkably high among 
youth. There was discussion on competition law and the establishment of institutional 
support.  
If we align the progress with Jordan’s globalization goals, Jordan scored 3, which meant 
that they were achieving results. Jordan amended their bilateral trade agreement with 
Israel, and they were in the final phases of negotiating a Free Trade Area (FTA) with 
Turkey. In addition, major regional integration was embodied in the Agadir Agreement 
for the establishment of a free trade zone among four Mediterranean nations, which was 
put into effect in July 2006. 
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5.2.2 The impact of the action plan in 2007 
  
Jordan made little progress towards economic stability in the medium term. The report 
puts the burden of growth to boost the economy on structural reform, and if Jordan did 
not take the necessary steps to ensure stability, economic growth could decline 
(Commission of the European Communities, 2008). In 2007, there was a slowdown in 
growth, and inflation continued to raise fuel and food prices, but it was kept under control 
via monetary policy. The budget deficit, as shown in Figure 5.4, taken from Shahateet et 
al. (2014, p. 269), shows that the overall trend for deficit-to-GDP ratio was on the rise, 
although between 2006 and 2007, there was a slight decrease in the ratio. 
Figure 5.4: Growth rates of budget deficits as a proportion of GDP ratio 
 
Source: Central Bank of Jordan, Shahateet et al. (2014, p. 269) 
 
However, in terms of the actual deficit, Jordan’s public deficit increased in 2007. Jordan 
continued to depend significantly on grants, and no progress was made in reducing debt, 
even though the debt-to-GDP ratio improved slightly, as shown in Figure 5.5.  
Figure 5.5: Public finance: deficit/surplus, including grants 
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Source: Jordanian Department of Statistics (Central Bank of Jordan, 2010) 
Note: Public finance: overall deficit/surplus (including grants): equals total revenues and 
grants minus total expenditure in million Jordanian dinar (Central Bank of Jordan, 2010). 
 
Jordan was committed to privatisation, but in 2007, the process slowed (Commission of 
the European Communities, 2008). Privatisation, according to Saieq (Economic 
Dimensions of Jordan’s Privatization Policy , 2013, p. 497), should contribute to 
improving the following indicators: GDP, inflation rate, government debt reduction, 
government revenue, and the competitiveness of Jordan on the international market. In 
2007, Jordan’s GDP growth rate was highest (Figure 5.2) at 8.2%, and its debt-to-GDP 
ratio was lowest (Figure 5.6) at 24% (Saieq, 2013, pp. 496–497).  
Figure 5.6: Internal and external debt-to-GDP ratio 
 
Figure 5.6: Internal and external debt-to-GDP ratio 
Source: Central Bank of Jordan, www.cbj.gov.jo (Saieq, 2013, p. 496) 
 
However, the inflation rate for 2007 increased in Jordan to 5.4% from 4.8% in 2006 
(Saieq, 2013, p. 496). With regard to poverty reduction, Jordan’s strategy, according to 
the report (Commission of the European Communities, 2008), was inconsistent, which 
meant that the EU delayed assistance for poverty alleviation through local development 
programmes. In addition, middle-class income shrank due to this distortion. 
The report (Commission of the European Communities, 2008) attributed the increasing 
unemployment rate in Jordan to a mismatch between the labour market and the 
educational system, especially for youth. However, the report highlighted Jordan’s 
achievement in reducing the unemployment rate through the cooperation of four bodies— 
the Jordanian Company for Training, the Ministry of Labour, the Jordanian armed forces, 
and the Jordan Contractors’ Association—in training Jordanians to work in the 
construction sector (Commission of the European Communities, 2008). In addition, 
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Jordan was working on a labour law that included the rights of foreign workers; yet the 
report indicated that societal discrimination against foreign workers was still present in 
Jordan.  
The female unemployment rate, as shown in Figure 5.7, increased by 0.9% in 2007 from 
25% to 25.9%, while the male unemployment rate decreased by 1.7% from 11.9% to 
10.3%. 
Figure 5.7: Unemployment rate in Jordan from 1998 to 2012 
 
Source: Employment and Unemployment Survey 1993–2012 (Jordan Department of 
Statistics, 2012) 
 
The youth unemployment rate, as per Figure 5.8, was high at 29.4% in 2007, even though 
this was a decrease of 0.7% over the previous year’s rate of 30.1%. The highest youth 
unemployment rate was among young educated females. Stevenson (2011) gives two 
reasons for this: first, employers prefer male employees to females owing to the 
possibility of females taking family leave, and second, the educated female population 
does not accept low-skilled, low-paid jobs.  
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Figure 5.8 Jordanian youth unemployment rate 
 
Source: (World Bank, 2015c) 
  
Jordan’s trade with the EU increased for both exports and imports; according to the 
report, this was positive. Jordan’s exports to the world increased 10% in 2007 over the 
previous year. This occurred for the same reason in 2007 as the previous year: Jordan’s 
exports to the EU were exceptionally low. Jordan’s total exports to the EU represented 
only 5.3% of its exports worldwide. Thus, a slight increase would represent a high 
percentage of overall exports to the EU. However, to clarify the picture, as shown in 
Figure 4.8, the increase in exports to the EU was minimal compared to the overall 
increase of Jordanian exports—only 4% higher than the previous year. The report 
attributes Jordan’s inability to increase exports to its limited range of export products, 
thus, there was a need to develop a national export promotion strategy (Commission of 
the European Communities, 2008). However, the actual reason for Jordan’s problems in 
exporting to the EU was the rule of origin (Al Shawabkeh, 2008). 
  
The 2007 score is 2.4 (Table 5.5), which is a slight improvement over 2006, showing 
progress in certain fields. Jordan did experience a slowdown, and trade balance did not 
improve; yet there was improvement on unemployment and government debts. In terms 
of regional integration, Jordan made some progress; Jordan signed an FTA with the 
European Free Trade Association, expanded bilateral FTAs, and negotiated FTAs with 
Turkey, Canada, and Kazakhstan. 
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5.2.3 The impact of the action plan in 2008 
  
Two major events in 2008 stood out regarding Jordan’s relations with the EU. First, in 
July 2008, during the Paris Summit, the UfM was launched to revitalise relations between 
the EU and Mediterranean countries. Sarkozy’s initial idea for the UfM was a 
‘Mediterranean Union’, but after negotiation with Germany, Sarkozy’s Mediterranean 
Union was renamed the ‘Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean’ (Gillespie, 
2008, p. 277).  
Second, in December 2008, Jordan submitted a report to the General Affairs and External 
Relations Council meeting, ‘Upgrading of Jordan-EU relations’, to bolster its relations 
with the EU. The aim of the report was to intensify relations with the EU at political and 
economic levels. Jordan, in this report, outlined its intent to enhance relations with the EU 
through increased dialogue (Council of the European Union, 2009). The lack of progress 
in terms of trade balance might have motivated Jordan’s request to upgrade its relations 
with the EU. 
The 2008 progress report indicated that Jordan’s real GDP growth was around 5.5% (real 
GDP growth is nominal GDP growth adjusted for inflation). As shown in Figure 5.2, 
Jordan’s nominal GDP growth was 7.2%, and thus the growth rate decreased by 1% from 
8.2% in 2007. Jordan’s inflation rate for oil and food increased during 2008, as per Figure 
5.9. The inflation rate reached around 18% in the last quarter of 2008 compared to an 
inflation rate in the Eurozone for the same period of around 4% (Commission of the 
European Communities, 2009). 
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Figure 5.9: Jordanian inflation rate versus Eurozone inflation rate  
 
Source: Trading Economics http://www.tradingeconomics.com/jordan/inflation-cpi 
(Trading Economics 1, 2015) 
 
In 2008, Jordan linked salaries to the inflation rate, adding to the budget deficit. However, 
Jordan launched government financial management to introduce better fiscal 
management, and government debt decreased to around 62% of GDP at the end of 2008 
as indicated in Figure 5.10 (Commission of the European Communities, 2009). 
Figure 5.10: Jordanian government debt to GDP 
 
Source: Trading Economics http://www.tradingeconomics.com/jordan/government-debt-
to-gdp (Trading Economics 2, 2015) 
 
Jordan continued to peg the dinar to the dollar during 2008, giving financial confidence to 
the local currency. However, the prices of chemicals, Jordan’s primary export, declined, 
and oil and food prices increased, resulting in an increase in the deficit (Commission of 
the European Communities, 2009).  
Regarding poverty, during 2008, 14% of the Jordanian population was under the poverty 
line, although the country had adopted a three-year programme for national social and 
economic development with the help of the EU Poverty Alleviation program. With regard 
to employment, Jordan exported skilled labour to the Gulf countries and imported low-
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skilled labour. The unemployment rate decreased during 2008 from 13.1% to 12.7%; the 
unemployment rate declined mainly for females by about 1%, as shown in Figure 5.7. In 
addition, the youth unemployment rate fell from 29.4% to 28.9%, as shown in Figure 5.8. 
Jordan worked on social inclusion and social protection by creating a safety net for the 
poorest by stabilising the prices of bread, water, and electricity and increasing the salaries 
of public servants who, on average, earned 110 JD per month.  
 
There increases in exports and imports persisted in 2008. However, imports from the EU 
were much higher in volume than exports to the EU, resulting in a higher trade deficit 
with the EU, as shown in Figure 5.11. Tariff dismantling continued throughout 2008 for 
two product groups: (1) used vehicles and (2) textiles and furniture (Commission of the 
European Communities, 2009).  
 Figure 5.11: Jordanian trade deficit with the EU and the world 
  
Source: Source World Bank, WITS  
 
Jordan made little progress on regional integration in 2008. Negotiations with Turkey on 
an FTA were not yet completed, although Jordan was keen to maintain its relationship 
with Turkey. For Jordan, Turkey was a good success story to follow, while Turkey 
considered Jordan an important partner to expand and diversify its trade routes to the Gulf 
countries via the port of Aqaba in the Indian Ocean (Bozkurt, 2013).  
In terms of customs progress, according to the progress report (Commission of the 
European Communities, 2009), Jordan continued to roll out the use of the Automated 
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System for Customs Data (ASYCUDA), a global system for customs declarations 
processing, but a study funded by USAID in 2006 (Dvorsky, 2006) outlined that 
Jordanian customs had decided to replace ASYCUDA due to the system’s inability to 
meet increasing demands to communicate with other IT systems, and to implement a 
customs system that was easier to use. Jordan continued to work on its Golden List 
programme and managed to sign a mutual recognition agreement with the US in June 
2008 (US Customs and Border Protection, 2014).  
The free movement of goods in Jordan remained in progress, with Jordan preparing for 
the Agreement on Conformity Assessment and Acceptance of Industrial Products 
(ACAA), while a product safety law was prepared but not passed in the Parliament. These 
two pieces of legislation would bring Jordanian legislation on safety and conformity in 
line with that of the EU.  
Regarding the business climate, Jordan scored high in terms of a safe climate, property 
rights, and protection. According to the report, Jordan scored well in terms of perceptions 
of corruption, even better than some of the EU member states, as shown in Table 5.1 
(Transparency International, Global Coalition Against Corruption, 2014).  
Table 5.1 Corruption perceptions index  
Country 
Rank 
in 
2012 
Rank 
in 
2011  
Rank 
in 
2010 
Rank 
in 
2009 
Rank 
in 
2008 
Rank 
in 
2007  
Rank 
in 
2006 
Rank 
in 
2005  
Rank 
in 
2004 
Rank 
in 
2003 
Rank 
in 
2002  
Denmark 1  2 1  2 1  1 4 4 3 3 2 
Jordan 58  56 50  49 47   53 40 37 37 43 40 
Latvia 54  61 59  56 52   51 49 51 57 57 52 
Slovakia  62  66 59 56 52   49 49 47 57 59 52 
Bulgaria 75  86 73  71 72   64 57 55  54 54 45 
Greece 94  80 78  71 57   56 54 47 49 50 44 
Italy 72  69 67  63 55   41 45 40 42 35 31 
Romania 66  75 69  71 70   69 84 85 87 83 77 
Source: Transparency International, http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview 
  
Competition law, like previous years, was still under revision, with the key issues 
revolving around the transport, telecommunications, and energy sectors. However, there 
was major progress in the field of intellectual property rights. Jordan submitted its 
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accession to three international agreements on registrations of marks and patents 
procedures: the Nice Agreement, the Vienna Agreement, and the Budapest Treaty. These 
agreements were put into effect by the end of 2008 (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2009). These accesses increased Jordan’s integration with the international 
business environment and thus served Jordan’s globalization policy. 
In a 2008 report, the European Commission rated Jordan an average of 2.8 out of 5 in 10 
areas for enterprise policy (Figure 5.12). This is the only section using structural 
methodology to assess the progress of Jordan and other states. 
Figure 5.12: Jordan’s rating in 10 areas for enterprise policy 
 
Source: (European Commission, OECD, European Training Foundation, 2008, p. 106) 
 
Jordan reviewed its 2008 to 2010 transport plan for the next period. The country was in 
the process of bringing the private sector into the transport sector through joint projects. 
In the aviation sector, Jordan was gradually liberalising the market. In 2008, major 
progress was made in the aviation sector with the establishment of the Jordanian Civil 
Aviation Regulatory Commission (CARC) (Commission of the European Communities, 
2009). The CARC would manage airports until an independent airport company was 
established. The Jordanian government worked with the International Finance 
Corporation to hand over Jordan’s main airport, Queen Alia Airport, which accounts for 
97% of Jordan’s air traffic, to the Airport International Group by November 2009 
(Airport Technology, 2015).  
In the energy sector, the Arab gas pipeline was still the focus of energy activities in 2008. 
Jordan became a partner in the Regional Centre for Renewable Energy and Energy 
Efficiency and endorsed the Development of the Mediterranean Solar Plan (Commission 
of the European Communities, 2009).  
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The overall score was 2.4 for 2008, which is similar to that of 2007. The impact of the 
action on 2008 is still similar to that of 2007 in terms of negative trade balance. Yet there 
was growth registered in Jordan’s GDP. In terms of Jordan’s privatisation policy, there 
was also progress on that goal in the transport sector and major progress in the aviation 
sector. The energy sector still focused on the gas pipeline, but efforts were made to 
encourage and endorse a solar plan. There was progress in the business environment in 
Jordan, which falls into Jordan’s policy to make Jordan attractive to the international 
business community.  
5.2.4 The impact of the action plan in 2009 
 
To follow up on its December 2008 request for advanced status in its relations with the 
EU, in 2009, Jordan set up a steering committee to implement the advanced status 
requirements. Jordan’s motivation outlined methods to develop relations with the EU on 
the political, economic, trade, and social levels, and to reach strong collaboration with the 
EU in energy, water, transport, agriculture, and science and technology (Selleslaghs, 
2014).  
The year 2009 was marked by several global events, most notably the economic crisis, 
which had an indirect effect on Jordan. The contribution of remittances to Jordan’s GDP 
fell to 14.5% in 2009 from 16% in 2008 (see Figure 5.13) (World Bank, 2015b) 
 
 Figure 5.13: Jordanian remittances as a percentage of GDP 
 
Source: World Bank (2015c) 
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Remittence as a percentage
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GDP growth in Jordan slowed in 2009, with a real GDP growth of around 3% (real GDP 
growth is the nominal GDP growth adjusted for inflation). As shown in Figure 5.2, 
Jordan’s nominal GPD growth was 5.5%, a decline of 1.7% from the previous year’s 
7.2%. In addition, the national income growth rate declined from 8.2% in 2008 to 2.3% in 
2009, a sharp drop of 5.9% (Saieq, 2013). Inflation in Jordan during 2009 decreased to an 
average of 1% from an average of 14.5% in 2008 (an inflation high of 18% was notched 
up in 2008), as shown in Figure 5.9 (Trading Economics 1, 2015). According to the 
report, the trade balance decreased (European Commission, 2010c). However, as shown 
in Figure 5.11, the trade balance of Jordan with the EU and the world was still negative. 
The decrease in imports was due to the decrease in food and oil prices, not an increase in 
exports. However, the government deficit-to-GDP ratio decreased by 13.53% in 2009 to 
60.24% from 73.77% in 2008, as shown in Figure 5.13 (Trading Economics 2, 2015). 
Thus, implementation of the reforms still did not yield results in the direction of Jordan’s 
goals with respect to improvement in the trade balance.  
Poverty in Jordan in 2009 was about 10%; yet the implementation of the strategy for 
poverty reduction continued, and a survey was implemented in 2009, but results were not 
out at the time of the progress report. The unemployment rate remained high in 2009 at 
12.9%, an increase of 0.2% from the previous year. Male unemployment increased from 
10.1% to 10.3%, while female unemployment decreased from 24.4% to 24.1%, as shown 
in Figure 5.10 (Jordan Department of Statistics, 2012). There was an improvement in 
youth unemployment for 2009, and the unemployment rate decreased by 0.3% from 
28.9% to 29.6%, as shown in Figure 5.11, although this was still a very high percentage 
(World Bank, 2015c). Therefore, in 2009, the unemployment rate worsened for males, but 
improved for youths and for females.  
   
Trade between Jordan and the EU decreased both in terms of imports and exports, as 
shown in Chapter Four (Figures 4.8 and 4.9); however, the figures also show that 
Jordan’s imports and exports with the world decreased during 2009 (WTO, 2014).  
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Regarding regional integration, in December 2009, Jordan signed an FTA with Turkey, 
which came into effect in 2011. This agreement fell within Jordan’s globalization goals; 
thus, this was an improvement for Jordan.  
  
The ease of doing business with Jordan changes every year, as shown in Table 5.2, but its 
average over the years gives it a score of 51%.  
Table 5.2. Ease of doing business ranking in Jordan 
Year  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Jordan rank 83 78 94 104 107 95 96 
Total countries  155 155 181 181 183 183 183 
Source: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank (2006, 
2007, 2008, 2010, 2012) 
  
During 2009, transport in Jordan—land, air, and maritime—was affected by the cabinet-
approved national strategy for transport for 2009 to 2012. Regarding land transport, 
because of the new strategy, plans were made to establish a single regulatory body for 
land transport, and preparations were made for a major rail project connecting Jordan 
with the Gulf countries. Regarding air transport, a new strategy meant that there would be 
more pressure to the complete regulatory framework for civil aviation, and there was a 
push to privatise the sector. The new strategy affected maritime transport by 
recommending a review of all port-related aspects (European Commission, 2010c).  
In the energy sector, in 2009, a draft law on energy and minerals was submitted to the 
Parliament. Jordan announced plans to play a role in EU energy security by allowing the 
Arab gas pipeline to pass through its territory. In the field of renewable energy, new plans 
were made to source 30% of household energy from solar energy by 2020. In the field of 
nuclear energy, in 2009 Jordan ratified the Convention on Nuclear Safety and signed an 
agreement with investors for the exploitation of domestic uranium.  
The overall score of progress for 2009 is 2.3, lower than the previous year. The trade 
balance was still negative, but global integration improved because Jordan signed a trade 
agreement with Turkey, indicating that Jordan was reaching some of its globalisation 
goals.  
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5.2.5 The impact of the action plan in 2010 
The year 2010 was marked by the decision of the EU to grant Jordan advanced status 
partnership. This was granted on 26 October 2010. Advanced status was granted to Jordan 
after Jordan and the EU finished negotiating the new action plan of 2010, which formed 
the basis for the advanced status. Jordan was the first to obtain such status among the 
Mediterranean countries. This status entails further cooperation and commitments from 
both sides (European Commission, 2010a). Why was Jordan keen on obtaining the 
advanced status? Jordan, under the advanced status, sought to enhance cooperation with 
the EU to support its energy, transport and environmental projects and to bring those 
sections to EU-compatible levels (Jaidi, 2009). This again highlights the motives of the 
Jordan cooperative approach with the EU, which was the aim to receive EU financial 
support to upgrade its industries to be able to face international competition.  
 
In 2010, the economy of Jordan began to improve after contracting in 2009. Jordan’s 
GDP increased, as shown in Figure 5.2, from 23.82 billion USD at the beginning of 2010 
to 26.43 USD at the beginning of 2011 (Trading Economics 3, 2015). However, the 
growth rate of the GDP declined from 5.5% in 2009 to 2.3% in 2010 (Saieq, 2013). The 
2010 Progress Report reported only the real growth rate, which increased from 2.4% to 
3.1% (Figure 5.14), and failed to mention that the national income growth rate fell 3.3% 
from 2.3% to −1%, as shown in Figure 5.2 (European Commission, 2011). In addition, 
inflation in 2010 increased from around 3% to approximately 6.1%, as shown in Figure 
5.9 (Trading Economics 1, 2015).  
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Figure 5.14: Jordanian real GDP growth  
 
Source: CIA World Factbook http://www.indexmundi.com/g/g.aspx?c=jo&v=66 (Index 
Mundo, 2011) 
The trade balance in 2010 continued to be negative (see Figure 5.11); imports increased at 
a quicker pace than exports, as shown in Figure 4.9 (Chapter 4). It is noteworthy that 
Jordan’s exports to the EU increased slightly, which meant its trade balance, although still 
negative, was lower than in 2009 (Figure 5.11).  
The female unemployment rate, as indicated by the Jordanian Department of Statistics 
(Jordan Department of Statistics, 2012) , showed some improvement in 2010. The female 
unemployment rate decreased from 24.1% to 21.7%, although it was twice as high as the 
male unemployment rate (Figure 5.7). 
 
According to the report (European Commission, 2011), in 2010, Jordan’s banking and 
financial system was strong, and the Central Bank of Jordan introduced further measures 
to improve the efficiency and supervision of the banking system. Zeitun et al. (2013) 
studies the efficiency of the banking system in Jordan for 2005 to 2010 based on a data 
envelopment analysis of 12 local banks. The top-ranking banks in terms of assets, out of 
19 local and international banks operating in Jordan, are shown in Table 5.3. The study 
proves that many banks were ‘inefficient in managing their financial resources’, and out 
of the 12 local banks in Jordan, Jordan Kuwait Bank was the most efficient, followed by 
Dubai Islamic Bank (Zeitun & Benjelloun, 2013, pp. 16–17). 
 
Table 5.3 List of banks operating in Jordan by ranking of assets 
Arab Bank  1 
Housing Bank for Trade & Finance  2 
0
2
4
6
8
1999 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Real GDP Growth % 2 2 3.5 3.1 5.1 5.8 6.3 6 5.6 2.4 3.1 2.5
Percentage 
Jordan Real GDP Growth%
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Jordan Islamic Bank  3 
Jordan Ahli Bank  4 
Jordan Kuwait Bank  5 
Bank of Jordan  6 
Cairo Amman Bank  7 
Bank al Etihad  8 
Capital Bank of Jordan  9 
Islamic International Arab 10 
Arab Jordan Investment Bank  11 
Jordan Commercial Bank  12 
Arab Banking Corporation 13 
Investment Bank 14 
Egyptian Arab Land Bank  15 
Société Générale de Banque Jordanie 16 
Jordan Dubai Islamic Bank  17 
Philadelphia Investment Bank  18 
National Microfinance Bank 19 
Source: Central Bank of Jordan, Bank Scope, and Bank annual reports (Zeitun & 
Benjelloun, 2013) 
 
According to the agreement (Official Journal of the European Union, 2012), Jordan had 
to adapt its aviation legislation and norms to meet EU legislation and had to open its 
market to European aviation operators to operate on an equal basis to Jordanian operators. 
However, the Centre of Aviation (2012) points out that this agreement was ‘unbalanced’, 
quoting the Royal Jordanian Airline’s comment to the Jordanian government. Jordan’s 10 
air operators would not be able to compete with the 150 EU-registered airlines. In 
addition, the agreement did not come with access to slots. According to an Oxford 
Business Group report on Jordan (Oxford Business Group, 2011, p. 59), the Royal 
Jordanian Airlines faced a major restructuring in its operating environment, with profit 
falling 9.7 million JD in 2010 from 28.6 million JD in 2009 to 18.9 in 2010. Although 
this was partly related to the global financial crisis, a key factor contributing to this loss 
was the agreement to open skies with the EU.  
In 2010, Jordan again scored 2.3 on average, the same as the previous year. This meant 
that, five years after the first action plan, Jordan was still in the initial stages of strategy 
development or discussion at the government level; that is, there was preparation for 
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plans but no approval. However, Jordan secured more funding and enhanced cooperation 
with the EU by obtaining advanced status.  
5.2.6 The impact of the action plan in 2011 
 
The year 2011 was marked by the Arab upheaval in Tunisia and Egypt, which had an 
impact on the political situation in Jordan (Pirolli, 2013). There were demonstrations in 
Jordan asking for reforms. However, Jordan faced demonstrations that differed in both 
demands and size from those in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya.  
The demonstrations in Jordan were lower in intensity and number than those in Tunisia, 
Egypt, and Libya. The protestors did not call for regime change, but rather, changes in the 
political system. The protestors belonged to opposition factions, including the largest 
opposition party, the Islamic Brotherhood. The demands were directed towards political 
reforms and economic goals (Ryan, 2014b). The beginning of discontent in Jordan 
occurred after the shift of the government in 1989 from government-owned services to 
privatisation. This raised fears of reduction in the social support system in Jordan. This 
change of approach impacted Jordan’s internal and external relations (Ryan, 2014b). 
Jordan had to tread carefully, both internally and externally, to maintain the kingdom’s 
stability amid a boiling region. The war in Syria resulted in a new wave of refugees, this 
time, Syrian refugees entering Jordan, which placed a greater strain on an already 
unfavourable economic situation. In 2011, in an attempt to meet demonstrators’ demands, 
the government was changed twice (Pirolli, 2013, p. 8).  
In May 2011, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) extended an invitation to Jordan to 
join. The invitation was also extended to Morocco. Ryan (2014a) attributes this invitation 
to (1) Saudi concerns that the Arab spring would spill over to the Saudi kingdom and 
other Gulf states and (2) the extent of Iranian influence in the region, through the Shiite 
government in Iraq, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and support of the Assad Regime in Syria. 
The invitation was seriously received by Jordan, who felt that it could offer the GCC its 
educated work force and military and intelligence training (Ryan, 2014a).  
The beginning of 2011 witnessed a major economic slowdown in the ME due to the Arab 
Spring, and Jordan was affected by it. However, overall, as shown in Figure 5.2, the 
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economy bounced back in the second half of the year and balanced the impact of the 
slowdown. Jordan’s GDP grew from 23.3 billion USD in 2010 to 26.43 billion USD in 
2011. The GDP growth rate was 2.6% in 2011, up from 2.3% in 2010. In addition, the 
growth rate for national income increased to 4.6% in 2011, rising 5% from the −1% 
growth rate of 2010 (Saieq, 2013). The average inflation rate in Jordan for 2011 fell 0.5% 
from 5% in 2010 to 4.5% in 2011, as shown in Figure 5.12 (European Commission, 
2012c; Trading Economics 1, 2015).  
Jordan’s deficit increased in 2011, and the deficit-to-GDP ratio also increased. This was 
related to the impact of energy sector disruption due to attacks on the gas pipes supplying 
Jordan with gas from Egypt (European Commission, 2012c). The business environment, 
as shown in Table 5.4, improved Jordan’s status with regard to the ease of doing business. 
Jordan improved its rank to 95 in 2011 from 107 in 2010 among 183 countries (European 
Commission, 2012c).  
 
Table 5.4. Ease of doing business ranking in Jordan 
Year  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Jordan rank 83 78 94 104 107 95 96 
Total countries  155 155 181 181 183 183 183 
Source: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank (2006, 
2007, 2008, 2010, 2012)  
 
Unemployment in Jordan increased by 0.4% during 2011 to 12.9% from 12.5% in 2010. 
The male unemployment rate increased by 0.6% from 10.4% in 2010 to 11% in 2011, 
while the female unemployment rate decreased by 0.5% from 21.7% in 2010 to 21.2% in 
2011, as shown in Figure 5.9 (Jordan Department of Statistics, 2012). 
The unemployment rate among youths aged between 15 and 24 years was the hardest hit, 
as shown in Figure 5.11. Youth unemployment rose as high as 31.6% in 2011, increasing 
by 1.5% over the previous year, when unemployment was 30.1% (World Bank, 2015c). 
 
Jordan’s trade balance with the EU grew negatively from −3357.6 million USD to 
−3676.8 USD. Jordan’s imports from the EU increased 401% over the exports increased 
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to the EU in 2011, as shown in Figures 4.8 and 4.9 (WTO, 2014). Nevertheless, 
dismantling Jordanian tariffs continued on schedule (European Commission, 2012c).  
In terms of regionalism, the GCC extended an invitation to Jordan and Morocco to join 
the GCC. Jordan was interested in joining the GCC and had previously applied twice but 
was rejected. The wave of unrest in the ME pushed the Arab monarchs of the Gulf 
countries to seek strategic allies and to consider establishing joint military forces (Ryan, 
2014a). The GCC was wary of the wave of change and was concerned it would spill over 
to their countries. Thus, for the GCC, the timing was suitable for Jordan to join. However, 
Jordan was undergoing political and economic systems reform, and critics in Jordan were 
concerned that accession to the GCC would jeopardise the country’s political reform 
progress (Braizat, 2011).  
 
Jordan’s performance in 2011 scored at 2.0; this can be attributed to the wave of 
demonstrations for reform that passed through Jordan becoming the priority and directing 
the attention of the government towards appeasing the concerns and returning stability to 
the country.  
5.2.7 The impact of the action plan in 2012 
 
During 2012, the demonstrations that started after the Arab Spring in 2011 continued in 
Jordan and caused even more changes to the cabinet. Waves of Syrian refugees continued 
to arrive in Jordan during the same period, and Jordan faced growing economic and 
political strain (Ryan, 2014b). 
  
In 2012, due to higher oil prices and the disruption of gas transported via the Egypt gas 
pipeline, there was no improvement in Jordan’s public balance of payments (European 
Commission, 2013b). The public finance deficit deepened to –1,824 million JD in 2012, 
increasing from −1384 million JD in 2011, as shown in Figure 5.5 (Central Bank of 
Jordan, 2010). The Jordan budget deficit-to-GDP ratio also increased, as shown in Figure 
5.4. In 2012, the budget deficit-to-GDP ratio increased to around 28% from about 26% 
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(Shahateet et al., 2014, p. 269). The government debt-to-GDP ratio reached 80% in 2012 
from around 70% in 2011, as shown in Figure 5.10 (Trading Economics 2, 2015) 
In the second half of 2012, there was an increase in Jordan’s GDP growth rate, but this 
was due to an injection of 2 billion USD from an IMF adjustment programme (European 
Commission, 2013b). As shown in Figure 5.2, Jordan’s GDP growth rate increased to 
2.8% in 2012 from 2.6% in 2011 (Saieq, 2013). The inflation rate in Jordan in 2012 
stayed around 5%, as shown in Figure 5.9 (Trading Economics 1, 2015). 
There were improvements in the unemployment rate in Jordan during 2012, as shown in 
Figure 5.7. The total unemployment rate decreased from 12.9% in 2011 to 12.2% in 2012, 
with improvements for both the male and female workforce. The male unemployment 
rate declined from 11% in 2011 to 10.4% in 2012. The female unemployment rate 
declined from 21.2% to 19.9%, although it was still twice as high as the male 
unemployment rate (Jordan Department of Statistics, 2012). Figure 5.8 shows that the 
unemployment rate among youths remained at 31.6% in 2012, similar to that of 2011 
(World Bank, 2015c). Unemployment among the youth and new graduates remained the 
biggest challenge for Jordan, and thus, during 2012, the Jordanian government launched 
the National Employment Strategy 2012–2020 to improve employment among the female 
and youth workforce through training and better working terms and conditions (European 
Commission, 2013b). For social protection, Jordan implemented a new strategy to include 
the most vulnerable sectors of society with the help of an EU technical assistance team 
(European Commission, 2013b).  
  
Figure 4.8 (Chapter 4) (World Trade Organization [WTO], 2014) shows that Jordan’s 
exports to the EU in 2012 increased by less than 1% over 2011 but decreased by about 
1% to the rest of the world over the previous year. In contrast, Figure 4.9 (Chapter 4) 
shows that Jordan’s imports from the EU in 2012 increased by around 7.6% over the 
previous year. Jordan’s imports from the world in 2012 increased by 13% over the 
previous year’s (WTO, 2014). 
Jordan and the EU began to negotiate the directive for the Deep and Comprehensive Free 
Trade Area (DCFTA), according to the report (European Commission, 2013b). The 
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DCFTA is another level of cooperation to integrate Jordan into the EU market, yet 
according to a study (Liargovas, 2013), the EU FTA agreement is the EU path to 
implement ‘bilateral means to the end of multilateral liberalization and rulemaking’ 
(Liargovas, 2013, p. 2), and the DCFTA is another opportunity for the EU to go ‘beyond 
the border’ with concerns and negotiate regulatory issues. According to a 2013 OCED 
report (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD], 2013, p. 122), 
Jordanian officials indicated that, for the DCFTA, further discussion was needed on EU 
technical standards and rules of origin imposed on exports to the EU. These two aspects 
represent hurdles, in terms of costs and technical support, to Jordanian exporters to 
increase their exports to Jordan (OECD, 2013, pp. 122–123). Thus, in terms of the 
ACAA, Jordan was preparing for negotiations on these standards with the EU. 
 
Regarding customs, Jordan applied the one-window concept, but the pre-arrival and pre-
departure clearance procedure was still not implemented because of delays in adopting 
the new customs law. However, the Golden List customs programme, which grants 
preference to low-risk companies, increased, albeit slowly (European Commission, 
2013b).  
In terms of regional integration, Jordan’s application with the GCC seemed to have 
cooled since the first reservations of the Saudis, and there was not much progress on 
Jordanian membership (Ryan, 2014a). However, Jordan’s FTA with Canada was put into 
effect on 1 October 2012 (OECD, 2013, pp. 122–123).  
Jordan’s policy on small and medium enterprises did not improve during 2012. In fact, 
Jordan’s ranking for ease of doing business dropped (International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development World Bank, 2012). 
  
In 2012, Jordan addressed income tax to impose it progressively to alleviate taxes on 
lower-income categories. In addition, as of September 2012, Jordan became a member 
country of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (European 
Commission, 2013b). In 2012, Jordan spent 100 million USD to build a new Al 
Manakher gas-fired power plant; the project was completed in July 2014 (Zgheib, 2014).  
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Jordanian air carriers were taken off the EU-restricted list of air carriers, because Jordan 
improved its safety procedures and cooperated with the European Aviation Safety 
Agency (EASA). In May 2012, Jordan signed a working arrangement between the EASA 
and Jordan’s CARC on technical cooperation in the field of civil aviation safety. The 
objective of the agreement was for Jordan to cooperate with the EASA to achieve the 
highest level of safety standards (European Aviation Safety Agency, 2012). At the level 
of maritime transport standards, Jordan improved its certification and training standards, 
which led the EU to recognise the Jordanian system of training and certification for 
seafarers (European Commission, 2013b).  
5.2.8 Analysis of progress reports over the seven years  
 
The following scores on the progress reports over the seven years of the assessment 
period are based on the EU enterprise methodology. 
As Table 5.5 shows, Jordan, under a macro-economic framework and functioning of the 
market economy, experienced positive improvements in growth and sustainable 
development, but this was accompanied by budgetary deficits that showed no 
improvement at all and deepened.  
For employment and social policy, Jordan experienced a decrease in the unemployment 
rate, but the unemployment rate remained high, especially among youth and women.  
For trade-related issues and market and regulatory reform, Jordanian trade improved, but 
that was due to increased imports, while the trade balance was negative and worsening 
over the six-year period after the agreement was signed. Customs issues scored well, 
attributed to the fact that there was a schedule and timeframe for Jordan to follow, and the 
EU was interested in ensuring that customs barriers were eliminated. Other aspects of 
trade did not score high, such as services, right of establishment, and company law. In 
other areas, statistics and enterprise policy scored 3, since improvements were 
implemented, but other elements, like public procurement and audit, were still under 
discussion and in the planning phase. Finally, in the fields of transport, energy, 
information society, and environment, Jordan scored around 3 in all aspects: national 
  
 
 
 
226 
transport policy, energy cooperation, environment, information society, and research. 
This means that laws were passed, and progress was achieved, but Jordan’s energy 
expenses remain one of the biggest burdens on its budget.  
Table 5.5. Jordanian progress scores over the seven-year period 
Policy Indicators 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Average  
Macro-economic framework 
and functioning of the 
market economy 
         
 Growth 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 2.9 
 Inflationary pressures 1 2 1 4 1 3 1 1.9 
 Budget deficit 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1.1 
 Government debt 4 4 4 3 1 1 1 2.6 
 
Sustainable 
development 3 3 3 3        3.0 
Employment and social 
policy          
 Unemployment rate  4 4 4 1 4 1 4 3.1 
 
Poverty-reduction 
strategy 2 2 3 2 3 3  2.5 
 Youth unemployment 1.5 1.5 1.5 1 1 1 1 1.2 
 Social dialogue 2 2 3 2  3 3 2.5 
 Labour law  2 3 3 3 3 1 2.5 
Trade-related issues, 
markets, and regulatory 
reforms          
 Trade performance 3 3 3 1 3 3 3 2.7 
 Trade balance 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1.0 
 Customs 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 2.9 
 
Free movement of 
goods and technical 
regulations 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2.0 
 
Services and right of 
establishment 1 1 1 1 1 1.5 2 1.2 
 Regional integration  3 3 1.2 3  3 2 2.5 
 
Sanitary and 
phytosanitary 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2.0 
 Business environment 2 2 3 2 2 3 2 2.3 
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 Company law 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 1.6 
 
Financial sector 
reforms 2 3 3 3 3  2 2.7 
Other key areas          
 
Personal and corporate 
income tax  2 2 2 3 3 3 2 2.4 
 Competition law 1 2 2 2 1 3 1 1.7 
 
Intellectual property 
rights 2 2 3 1 2 3 1 2.0 
 Statistics 2 3 3 2.5  3 2 2.6 
 
Public procurement 
law 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1.9 
 Enterprise policy 3 3 3 3 3 3  3.0 
 Public external audit 2 2 2 2 2 4 2 2.3 
Transport, energy, 
environment, information 
society, research and 
development          
 
National transport 
policy 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 2.6 
 Energy cooperation 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 2.9 
 Environmental issues 3 3 2 3 2.5 2 2 2.5 
 Information society 3 3 2.5 3 3 3 3 2.9 
 
Research and 
technology 2.5 3 3 3 2.5 3 3 2.9 
Average/year  2.2 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.5 2.0 2.3 
Note: An empty box means that nothing was reported for that subject. 
Conclusion  
Using the outcome provided in Table 5.5, one can conclude that the action plans that were 
developed for Jordan described directions rather than prescribed actions to create a 
climate of cooperation rather than achieve a set of goals. The action plan of 2010 repeated 
the priorities of the action plan of 2005, meaning that, for 10 years of cooperation, the 
priorities set by the EU for Jordan remained the same, and there were no lessons learnt 
from the first five years of cooperation. 
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The methods to assess progress were rudimentary compared with the EU process to 
assess member candidates. The EU placed importance on certain aspects, which is 
reflected in linking progress to a schedule, like the customs tariff. 
After 10 years of the AA being in force and seven years of implementing the action plans, 
Jordan’s trade balance is negative and continuing in that direction, and government debt 
is increasing. However, unemployment is decreasing but is still exceedingly high, 
especially among females (double the male unemployment rate) and youth.  
Trade balance scored 1, which is a negative indicator showing an inability of the 
government to set up policies, implement plans, address and improve circumstances for 
local business to export, and slow down declining trends. The EU-Jordanian agreement 
did not manage to encourage local Jordanian business to export to the EU.  
All the indicators covering the two action plans of 2005 and 2010 are in the performance 
range of 2 to 3.  
Over a period of 7 years, progress was limited to setting policies and obtaining 
government approval. This indicates that progress was slow and limited.  
However, if we review the achievement of the action plans, all the reforms that have been 
performed by Jordan over the period of seven years, though slow and not comprehensive, 
would not have been achieved at all had the EU-Jordan action plans not stipulated them 
and set the standards and tools to promote these changes. Jordan set its goals to liberate 
the market and tariff reduction, make reforms in the agricultural sector, remove of all 
subsidies to this sector, simplify the customs procedures, remove the pre-inspection 
procedures, liberalize of the service sector and protect intellectual property (Milkawi, 
2010). One can argue that the EU-Jordan agreement might have given momentum to the 
process, even if it was a slow momentum.  
In view of Jordan’s policy regarding long-term economic objectives to support economic 
growth via trade and regional and global integration, Jordan might have benefited from its 
EU action plans by structuring the experience of trade agreements that prepared it for its 
agreement with the US and Turkey. The EU-Jordan agreement has motivated the regional 
integration of Jordan with other Mediterranean countries; the signing of the Agadir 
Agreement gives evidence of that.  
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Conclusion of the Research 
Chapter One examined different arguments about the Barcelona process that evolved over 
the years and the different processes that followed the Barcelona Process, namely, the 
ENP and UfM. It started with careful optimism and a possible spillover effect, then 
shifted to EU security concerns, and then to the UfM centring on less controversial issues, 
like the environment. The literature examined in this thesis involved three chronological 
steps:  
 
Starting with the Barcelona Process (EMP), the literature review showed that the 
expected spill over from economic liberalization to the social and cultural fields did not 
take place (Youngs, 1999; Gillespie, 2002). It underlined cultural planning and the 
collapse of the Palestinian-Israel peace process (Gillespie, 2002) and the Eurocentric 
approach from a social cultural perspective as potential causes for stagnation in the 
process. It was expected that social and political liberalism would follow improvement 
and liberalism in the economic field. Social and political liberalisation did not appear to 
follow the economic liberalization, yet it seems early in the process to generalise this 
conclusion as applicable to all Southern Mediterranean partners. The initial careful 
positive attitude towards the Barcelona Process quickly changed to a more negative 
outlook when the Barcelona Process appeared to be failing (Attina 2004, p. 140 - 152). 
Reasons for the Barcelona Process failure cited by Mortanari (2007) and Nsouli (2006) 
include a failure to boost trade between the EU and the Southern partners; the EU’s 
internal division of interests between the industrial North and the agricultural South 
caused a lack of financial aid to the Southern Mediterranean partners in favour of the 
protection of the agricultural interests of the countries in the Southern part of the EU. 
 
The ENP showed a shift in the EU policy to more focus on security in view of the  
global security concerns at the time: the 9/11 events, the collapse of the Israeli-Palestinian 
peace process, the invasion of Iraq, and the Algerian crisis (Del Sarto and Schumacher, 
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2005, p. 18). The EU appeared to show preference for stability over liberalization, and for 
the EU, the desire for stability was fed by internal security concerns rather than 
democracy promotion.  
Authors like Young (2002, p. 97) consider it possible that the EU had the real intent to 
promote democracy and wanted to be a genuine power for good; however, the EU’s fear 
of the further Islamisation of the Southern Mediterranean region was related to the lack of 
progress in the field of political reform. Gillespie (2002), in the same vein, shows that the 
social agenda of the Barcelona Process was at risk of being secondary to the EU’s 
security concerns.  
 
During ENP discussions, the EU shifted to more controlled policy changes in the years 
following 9/11—a shift towards a more controlled bilateral relationship with individual 
partners instead of the previously more regional and region building approach. The policy 
shifts appear to have been caused by EU internal security concerns which were in turn 
created by increased external global security and migration concerns. The policy shift was 
thus informed by security concerns in the international realm—the interstate anarchy— 
either in the sense of a constructed anarchy in the spirit of Wendt (1992, p. 394) or the 
more absolute interstate anarchy as proposed by Waltz (2010, p. 91-93). The fact that the 
EU actively changed relations with the partners to a more controlled relationship and 
preferred stability over its own normative core goals of political liberalization and 
democratic values may be an expression of self-help in an increasingly hostile 
international world.  
 
The review of UfM was focused on EU internal issues and the shift of cooperation from 
issues of security to less controversial issues (Gillespie, 2011, p. 1207) like environmental 
issues, for instance, depollution of the Mediterranean Sea, establishing of sea and land 
highways, Mediterranean solar energy, and civil protection against disasters. 
The goals of prosperity, security, and political reform were considered at this stage as 
elusive; however, the process did improve relations between the Union and the partners 
(Gillespie 2008, p. 277). However, many felt that the UfM was the result of power 
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asymmetry and EU internal issues (Cardwell 2011, p. 236), and the role of the partners in 
it was reduced to being informed. While Bicchi acknowledges the lack of true 
partnership, she adds that the shift to bilateral positive conditionality that started in the 
ENP and continued in the UfM, may serve the EU’s security concerns better (Bicchi, 
20011, p. 16). 
 
How does the Jordan case fit into the different views on the Barcelona process?  
 
To answer this question, we needed to first examine the political economy that motived 
Jordan to enter this process in the first place. Chapter Two outlined the progress of 
Jordan’s political economy from its beginning in 1921 to the early 1990s, when Jordan 
negotiated and signed the AA with the EU in 1997 and put it into effect in 2002. The EU-
Jordan negotiation process and the terms of the AA are discussed in Chapter Three, 
examining how it fits within views on power symmetry or asymmetry between the EU 
and Jordan. Following that, Chapter Four analysed whether the agreement was beneficial 
using FTA assessment models, and Chapter Five evaluates the process undergone by 
Jordan under the action plans of 2005 and 2010. 
 
Therefore, what was the political economy of Jordan prior to the joining the Barcelona 
Process? Since the establishment of the Emirate of Transjordan in 1921, and in the 
absence of major financial resources, Jordan depended on financial support from 
England. However, that support was insufficient and fluctuated, so the Emir Abdullah 
turned to the rich elites for funding in exchange for privileges. This started the cycle of 
the dominance of these elites over the economy as well as the main economic institutes: 
The Industrial Bank of Jordan and the Chamber of Commerce of Jordan (Wils, 2001, p. 
126). Until 1948, Jordan’s economy was a market-oriented economy, but by 1950, leftist 
nationalist bureaucrats challenged these policies and adopted policies characterised by 
state-owned interventionist enterprises, the protection of local industries through import-
substitution industrialization policies, and welfare governments. These bureaucrats still 
cooperated with the rich elites, and these policies put a major burden on Jordan’s 
economy.  
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In the 1970s, the first oil boom, together with high government spending, resulted in high 
GDP growth for Jordan; this caused lower exports and more investment in construction 
and services. That changed in the 1980s, when Jordan’s economy slowed down due to 
reduced oil prices—decreasing remittance revenue for Jordan—and an unchanged policy 
of government intervention. In absence of external funding, the economy was dominated 
by wealthy elites, who financed major economic projects that added burdens on the 
economy to secure their losses. This added to the malaise in the economy. As a result, 
Jordan initiated privatisation in 1985 to increase the role of the private sector in the 
economy (El Said, 2001, p. 152), but that did not go far. Jordan’s high debt in 1989 put it 
in urgent need of IMF loans. Jordan had to embark on a fundamental reform of its 
economic structure to meet the demands of the IMF. In the early 1990s, Jordan’s 
economy suffered even more due to the Iraq invasion of Kuwait and the consequences of 
losing its main trader, Iraq. Jordan became isolated due to its pro-Iraq position, but the 
role of Jordan in the peace process with Israel restored Jordan’s pivotal regional 
importance.  
 
Jordan entered into the Barcelona Process and began negotiation on the AA with the EU 
with the following needs: 1) economic reforms, trade liberalisation, and privatisation to 
attract foreign investment privatization, 2) an urgent need for a major economic trading 
partner to replace Iraq, 3) financial support to modernize its infrastructure, 4) support for 
economic growth via trade and regional and global integration, 5) an end to the isolation 
that the Gulf War entailed, 6) high growth rate in the young workforce and demographic 
pressure on the economy in which Jordan needs to absorb into the labour market, and 7) 
the need to offset a global negative trade balance. With that mindset, Jordan entered the 
negotiation process with the EU. Chapter Three analysed the negotiation for the process 
within the theoretical framework, using several resources: first, interviews with the three 
EU negotiators, second, some material on the actual agenda and memos relevant to the 
negotiation itself, third, Jordan’s public and private expectations drawn from Jordanian 
Parliamentary publications and Jordanian newspaper follow up on, and finally, literature 
available on the subject.  
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The content of the Jordan AA was analysed and compared to that of Morocco. Many 
similarities existed between the Jordan and Morocco agreements. Both had the same 
sections and covered the same areas. Political and economic regional integration were 
mentioned in the bilateral agreement with Morocco, while for Jordan the agreement 
mentioned regional dialogue. The section on trade in the Moroccan agreement was more 
detailed than in the agreement with Jordan.  
In the Jordan agreement, special importance was given to migration, and a monitoring 
body was provided for the implementation of these aspects of the agreement. This is an 
indication of priority for the EU. The articles on movement of goods was the largest, also 
indicating importance. Agricultural products and industrial products with an agricultural 
component were out of the scope of tariff abolition. Certain quotas for trade were set, but 
only limiting Jordan’s exports, not the EU’s exports. The EU rules for financial services, 
standardisation, and competition were to be adopted by Jordan in such a way that the 
rules in Jordan would, in due course, be acceptable for the EU, while no approximation of 
the EU rules to the Jordanian rules was provided. All this poses questions about the power 
division between Jordan and the EU during negotiations as well as the level of 
protectionism involved, and the respective benefits expected or intended. 
 
The non-cooperative bargaining theory was applied as an analysis tool for the Jordan-EU 
negotiations. The theory offered some angles from which to approach the matter of 
advantage in negotiations. There are strong suggestions that the EU was in a position of 
advantage regarding being the initiator of the negotiations and having more information 
about the agreement’s intent and content because the same agreement terms were used 
previously for negotiation with other Mediterranean countries. In addition, the EU had the 
possible means to influence the mere existence of an issue on the agenda as well as its 
order of appearance in the negotiations’ agenda. The EU negotiators themselves did not 
have replete manoeuvring space, since the agreement went through multiple steps.  
 At the end of the negotiation, the resulting agreement followed the EU standards and 
kept the agriculture quotas which meant that the EU had the upper hand in negotiations.  
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The next step was to measure if the AA results were beneficial to Jordan using the FTA 
assessment methods. First, the different ex-ante and ex-post models were compared to 
identify the most comprehensive method. The analysis covered three ex-ante and three 
ex-post models as follows. 
Ex-ante Assessment Models: 1) Trade Indicators 2) The SMART Model 3) Computable 
General Equilibrium. Ex-post Assessment Models: 1) FTA Preference Indicators 2) FTA 
and Welfare Indicators 3) Gravity Model 
After reviewing the strength and the weakness of each method, the Trade Indicators 
model was identified as the best ex-ante assessment model, and FTA and Welfare 
Indicators was identified as the best ex-post assessment model to apply. The analysis was 
complemented with additional indicators like unemployment, trade balance, and losses in 
tax revenue. The findings of the chapter showed that, as per the ex-ante Trade Indicators 
model, there was good potential for trade between Jordan and the EU: the RCA indicated 
that Jordan had a comparative advantage in chemicals, food, and textiles. The TCI 
revealed high complementarity for trade between Jordan and the EU in chemicals, ores 
and metals, agricultural raw materials, and textiles, meaning that ROI with the EU should 
show an increase. Despite the good potential, some indications like inter-regional 
dependence and trade intensity between Jordan and EU showed a decrease. The ex-post 
model FTA and Welfare Indicators had quantitative and qualitative approaches: the 
quantitative approach showed that there was more trade creation than trade diversion and 
consequently a positive impact, while the qualitative approach showed one positive 
impact, which was change in trade volume, and one negative impact on welfare, which 
was a change in terms of trade. The other complementary indicators, like trade balance 
and customs duties, still showed a negative impact, while unemployment showed positive 
impact. Pure numbers show more negative impact than positive, but there might be some 
indication that the AA was beneficial on another level. The AA agreement served Jordan 
by allowing it to integrate into the global market and exit its isolation that the Gulf War 
had caused. The AA also helped Jordan to implement economic reform and facilitate 
trade through international and regional integration (El Anis, 2010, p. 62) 
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After the AA was put in effect, action plans were installed to follow up on Jordan’s 
progress in different economic aspects. To measure the progress and the impact of the 
action plan, over seven years, progress reports were analysed and scored. The scores were 
based on the enterprise charter methodology the OECD developed for EU enterprise. It 
ranks the rating per indicator detailing the expected results per level from 1 to 5 
(European Commission, OECD, European Training Foundation, 2008, p. 135). The 
findings of the analyses over seven years show that, in most of the aspects, Jordan scored 
around 1—for progress in trade balance, budget deficit, services and rights of 
establishment, which means there was no progress or improvement in these aspects of the 
action plans—to around 3, which indicates multi-year strategies approved by the 
government while institutions are in place—in sustainable development, economic 
growth, and unemployment. On average, over the seven years that the progress was 
tracked—from 2006 until 2012—Jordan scored about a 2.3, which indicates strategies 
under development or discussion at the government level, confirming that the progress 
was slow, or the action plan was too ambitious. Yet, Jordan began implementing reforms 
that would not have started had the AA not been in place. 
 
How does the Jordan case fit into the different views of the Barcelona Process? 
 
First, we can look at this case through the theoretical framework. If we assume that the 
EU had the best intentions and was aiming to create an environment for peace and 
prosperity by putting liberalism in place, one can see that the method was, in fact, 
Eurocentric and served the best interests of the EU and that the EU was dominant every 
step of the way, thus, indicating that realist thought was used, and that the EU imposed its 
standards to spread its values reflects a Marxist line of thought.  
Thus, at the starting point for Jordan when entering the negotiations for the agreement, 
there was a cautious optimism that the AA with the EU would bring certain economic 
benefits, financial support, and transformation to Jordan’s industrial infrastructure to help 
Jordan to be more competitive globally. However, when entering the negotiation, the EU 
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protectionism over agricultural products was evident when there were restrictions on 
agriculture, such as in the limitations on tomato paste and in quotas.  
The conditions of the agreement were Eurocentric, and in certain conditions, including 
the standards imposed by the EU such as the rule of origin, competition laws, and 
reaching the level of Acquis Communautaire conditions, and visa requirements demanded 
of EU candidates even though Jordan was not a potential member, the asymmetry of 
power was clear in the negotiation process. The shift the EU made in the ENP to address 
its security concerns is evident in the case of the EU’s tolerance of the lack of progress in 
Jordan in favour of stability.  
Del Sarto and Schumacher also mention the addition of positive conditionality in the ENP 
as a potentially promising development that can be observed in Jordan as well, as the 
advanced status was granted based on Jordan’s progress.  
 
Thus, to respond to the question of the thesis ‘To what extent has the ‘Barcelona 
Process: Union for the Mediterranean’ been economically beneficial to Jordan? the 
benefit can be measured on the basis of Jordan’s expectations from the agreement and its 
goals when it entered into the Barcelona Process. Its early 90s’ economy that was 
dominated by rich elites and the isolation that the Gulf Crisis put them into meant that 
Jordan wished to integrate into global market and exit its isolation in order to replace its 
main trading partner, Iraq, with global partners, as well as to attract foreign investment.  
The goals King Hussein (1997) outlined were to enhance Jordan’s economy regionally 
and globally and continue into the open market economy to increase Jordan’s capability 
and competitiveness in the world economy. The Jordanian Senate’s (1997) expectation 
for the AA was to open doors for Jordan to enter the world economy and improve 
Jordan’s chances to increase their exports and increase foreign investment.  
 
Prince Hassan (1997) outlined that the agreement with the EU would bring new horizons 
for cooperation between Jordan and the EU. The agreement would reflect Jordan’s 
liberalisation policy (Aloul, 1997, p. 9). The General Secretary of the Ministry of Trade 
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and Industry, Samer Al Taweel (Al Rai newspaper 2002), outlined that the AA would be 
one of the attracting factors for foreign investment in Jordan’s export industries.  
 
The President of the Union of Jordan Chambers of Commerce, Haidar Murad, (Al Rai, 
2002) indicated that the AA would provide the Jordanian industries with access to a 
market of 450 million consumers. Mr. Outhman Budair (Al Rai, 2002), President of the 
Amman Chamber of Industry, said that the AA with the EU would enhance economic 
relations with the EU and increase Jordan’s exports to the EU, thus improving the trade 
balance that was then in favour of the EU. Budair also highlighted that the AA would 
open the EU market to the Jordanian industries and would motivate foreign and local 
investors to invest in Jordan in industries aimed at EU export. Namari (2005) highlighted 
that the agreement did bring financial aid to Jordan and increase its exports.  
 
One can see that Jordan reached most of its goals: Jordan gained a powerful economic 
partner and opened the EU market to its products. The EU provided aid to and investment 
in Jordan and brought other sources of financial aid besides that from Jordan’s rich elites. 
The agreement paved the way for Jordan to integrate regionally through the Agadir 
Agreement and globally through integration with the EU, thus fully escaping the isolation 
that the Gulf War brought on in Jordan. The agreement with the EU anchored Jordan to 
reflect the liberalization policy of Jordan. The agreement incited economic reforms and 
provided financial aid to assist in the impact of these reforms. Zangl (2016) remarked that 
the actual importance of the AA for Jordan was perhaps found in the opportunity to more 
quickly enter into a relationship with the EU than in the actual content of the agreement. 
 
However, the FTA ex-ante and ex-post assessment models show that there was more 
negative impact on the Jordan economy than positive impact as a result of the agreement. 
Jordan’s exports increased, but not enough to counter the negative trade balance with the 
EU. Jordan lost revenue from import duties. The interregional trade share and the trade 
intensity index both showed a decrease in trade with the EU, which means it was less 
attractive. The overall change in terms of trade had a negative value, thus indicating that 
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it had a negative welfare effect on Jordan. The models indicated a positive impact in trade 
creation because of EU-Jordanian trade as well as an increase in trade volume and, most 
importantly, that unemployment rates for both men and women decreased on average 
after the agreement. 
 
The different policies implicated at both the Jordan and EU levels, show the impact of 
certain policies: Jordan’s globalization and privatization policies and the common 
agricultural and security policies of the EU.  
Jordan’s globalization policy was one of the main incentives for Jordan to enter into this 
agreement with the EU, with regard to the cost benefits of this policy, the analysis in this 
thesis demonstrated that Jordan achieved certain gains from this policy: trade agreement 
with one of the biggest economic blocks in the world—the EU, diversifying its trading 
partners—which makes it less vulnerable to the external factors evident in its relationship 
with Iraq. The policy helped Jordan achieve better regional integration through the Agadir 
Agreement. The privatization policy Jordan followed helped it to minimize the impact of 
the elites’ grip and impact on business and diversify financial resources to support the 
modernization of Jordan’s industries. However, regarding the cost benefit of this policy, 
when the costs were paid, the trade balance was still in favour of the EU, and Jordan was 
dependent on the EU for financial support. Jordan’s industries were not ready to face 
competition from EU industries.  
The EU common agricultural policy also had an impact on its trade agreement with the 
Mediterranean countries. A review of this policy is necessary to improve the impact of 
the EU soft powers on the Mediterranean countries’ peace, prosperity, and partner reform 
commitments. Euro-centricity also played a role. The inclusion of the partners’ standards 
could bring better commitment to and ownership of reform from the partners. The EU 
security policy and the preference for security over democratisation were evident in the 
trade agreement with Jordan. One wonders if the other choice would have produced better 
output for Jordan in view of the region’s instability and the fundamentalist growth in the 
region.  
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One lesson learnt from Jordan’s experience that might apply to other countries in the 
region is the fact that the asymmetrical relationship between Jordan and the EU 
perpetuated the dominance of the EU and served its interests. Munir Hamarneh from 
Jordan University (Al Rai, 2002) recognized that the association between a group of 
highly developed industrial countries with one individual country would create substantial 
pressure on an individual country like Jordan. To face this pressure, it is better to form 
regional groups and negotiate as a group, not as an individual country; then, the 
partnership would be symmetrical (Al Rai, 2002). For Jordan and the other ME countries 
to better negotiate an agreement with the EU, full regional integration within the ME and 
Maghreb countries is necessary to negotiate as a group with negotiating powers.  
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Appendix I: Jordan total export to the world per SITC revision 2 (in 1000 USD)  
Product 
Group 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Agricultural 
Raw 
Materials 8003.3 9298.3 5600.4 8918.8 11167.6 11749.5 14254.4 17644.5 23128.0 25670.7 25412.3 30525.7 75884.8 
Chemical 276640.4 509345.8 586586.9 604298.6 769857.3 877834.2 946236.4 1478822.7 2616526.3 1791784.6 2343274.1 2532919.8 2487404.5 
Food 181422.0 314159.3 409128.2 435709.2 556611.5 641810.7 689821.6 744911.7 1049732.7 1031538.5 1111206.5 1256662.7 1372711.0 
Fuel 626.6 1083.0 487.3 7553.0 43929.4 7511.9 43157.3 39164.7 14581.2 31995.5 66706.0 18860.6 24396.6 
Machinery 
and 
Transport 
Equipment 247136.6 369588.6 321500.5 329510.9 463358.5 526563.7 669313.4 1004903.4 1189656.4 887242.9 733418.8 797648.3 732527.2 
Manufacture
s 953503.9 1590708.7 1794247.3 2029625.1 2757590.1 3077921.5 3595276.0 4494407.7 5923178.1 4564983.1 5102298.3 5572182.3 5485378.3 
Ores and 
Metals 143410.5 368287.9 384415.9 387378.8 466810.5 526591.6 537383.4 332360.3 658731.1 468700.9 506892.1 813143.6 756942.4 
Textiles 160216.3 344471.3 560761.3 719090.2 1061493.3 1104756.8 1308648.4 1279513.1 1105348.4 911171.1 963136.9 1078018.2 1147469.8 
Jordan total 
export  1810743.3 3162471.6 3501966.5 3802994.4 5069324.9 5669983.2 6495442.6 8112215.0 11475533.9 8801916.1 9889208.1 11021942.9 10935244.8 
                            
World export to export to the world per SITC revision 2 (in 1000 USD)  
Product 
Group 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Agricultural 
Raw 
Materials 113579591.5 103675650.9 106916563.1 124477211.9 146678704.5 
15529809
9.2 
175980466.
5 199026271.1 207854586.7 162368297.1 220559687.5 283298555.6 
260462607
.7 
Chemical 556277660.9 577424720.7 606755833.4 772975206.7 944916240.0 
10644963
93.9 
120317962
4.2 1415229701.4 1611732668.2 1381876201.3 1623567626.2 1890273365.0 
184457622
6.6 
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Food 418769539.7 433056768.4 444208956.1 534658668.9 610107053.7 662768042.8 734129366.6 886038988.0 1078283498.8 967514569.2 1090614622.8 1321957761.6 
1331873530.
3 
Fuel 633940662.1 571778598.4 551219758.2 704008176.7 928883649.2 
1254251349.
2 1652535675.0 1736106716.0 2531700430.8 1608536590.5 2072784477.9 2823153897.3 
2645558722.
5 
Machinery 
and 
Transport 
Equipment 2613949813.4 2465886214.3 2457779965.3 2942262429.6 3536759030.8 
3895952338.
1 4471899107.8 5040213173.6 5402859662.0 4203173010.5 5120841126.4 5791866962.2 
5786798023.
8 
Manufacture
s 4702007399.3 4533810974.5 4578209628.8 5532450815.1 6660481691.8 
7365084551.
4 8370129170.0 9574950364.1 10450657400.3 8318623621.1 9981231786.0 11492842193.9 
11387247973
.3 
Ores and 
Metals 175881741.3 167995034.3 160039328.8 194697261.7 276510423.2 337495669.9 493328165.4 589837881.7 625312892.2 434291402.9 643744782.9 809142291.9 711980309.5 
Textiles 385395572.1 372758578.9 383213762.0 443745033.3 498126980.6 527279420.0 578002892.1 639379924.3 654597464.9 561707672.9 648311042.6 760228009.2 731608573.0 
                            
World Total Export in 1000 USD  
All Products 6276493269.2 6042005486.1 6066740929.6 7431866549.6 8999589052.7 
1014993367
8.7 
11856552199.
3 13522192634.9 15605329230.9 12155282219.9 14802160788.8 17632909318.6 
1714501277
9.8 
Resource : WITS 2012 
 
Jordan Trade balance as a percentage of the GDP  
      
Reporter 
Name  Year 
Trade Balance (% of 
GDP) 
Exports (% of 
GDP) 
Imports 
(% of 
GDP) 
Exports (Current 
USD) 
Imports (% 
of GDP) 
Imports 
(Current USD) 
Trade 
Balance (% 
of GDP) 
Trade Balance 
(Current USD) 
Jordan 1998 -19.5 44.8 64.2 3544310016 64.2423 5084211200 -19.4576 -1539901184 
Jordan 1999 -17.8 43.3 61.1 3529798400 61.1475 4984463360 -17.8453 -1454664960 
Jordan 2000 -26.7 41.8 68.5 3538928128 68.4764 5795768832 -26.6643 -2256840704 
Jordan 2001 -25.0 42.1 67.1 3781705472 67.1132 6027062272 -25.0028 -2245356800 
Jordan 2002 -19.2 47.4 66.6 4544026624 66.6039 6383470592 -19.1924 -1839443968 
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Jordan 2003 -21.0 47.4 68.3 4829773824 68.3185 6966952960 -20.9573 -2137179136 
Jordan 2004 -30.2 52.2 82.4 5955712512 82.4344 9406911488 -30.2435 -3451198976 
Jordan 2005 -41.5 52.7 94.2 6634978816 94.2068 11859379200 -41.5008 -5224400384 
Jordan 2006 -34.0 53.9 87.9 8111847936 87.8733 13231030272 -33.9988 -5119182336 
Jordan 2007 -37.5 54.2 91.8 9279831040 91.7584 15700423680 -37.524 -6420592640 
Jordan 2008 -31.0 56.5 87.5 12415386624 87.5113 19227842560 -31.0054 -6812455936 
Jordan 2009 -23.2 45.9 69.1 10929295360 69.0755 16453803008 -23.1927 -5524507648 
Jordan 2010 -21.2 47.8 69.0 12628310016 69.0299 18241409024 -21.2413 -5613099008 
Jordan 2011 -28.3 45.6 73.9 13144788992 73.8592 21301127168 -28.2811 -8156338176 
Jordan 2012 -27.6 45.7 73.4 14284000256 73.3515 22917462016 -27.633 -8633461760 
Source : WITS  
 
 
 
<EU – Jordan relation > 
<version 1.0> 
 
 
269 
269 
 Appendix II: Exchange rate JD to US. 
Source Central Bank of Jordan 
http://statisticaldb.cbj.gov.jo/index?action=level4&page_no=1# 
JD Exchange Rate Per $US 
Year Month 
JD Exchange Rate End of 
Period JD / $US 
JD Exchange Rate Period 
Average of JD / $US 
1998 12 .709 .709 
1999 12 .709 .709 
2000 12 .709 .709 
2001 12 .709 .709 
2002 12 .709 .709 
2003 12 .709 .709 
2004 12 .709 .709 
2005 12 .709 .709 
2006 12 .709 .709 
2007 12 .709 .709 
2008 12 .709 .709 
2009 12 .709 .709 
2010 12 .709 .709 
2011 12 .709 .709 
2012 12 .709 .709 
2013 12 .709 .709 
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Appendix III: Questions to the EU Negotiators on the EU-Jordan Negotiation 
process.  
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Appendix IV: Aide Memoire – Partnership Agreement Negotiations 22 October 
1996 
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Appendix V: Agreed Minutes 16 April 1997
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Appendix VI: Meeting Commission–Jordan 29-30 January 1997: Delegation 
Commission 
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Appendix VII: The composition of the Jordanian Delegation 28-31 Jan  
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Appendix VIII: Meeting Commission Jordan Jan 1997 
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Appendix IX: Letter from European Commission dated 4 June 2018 
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Appendix X: Consent forms 
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Appendix XI: Responses of the EU Negotiators 
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Appendix XII: List of  Jordan’s Treaties 
List of treaties by country: Jordan     
Title Type 
Date of 
Signature 
Protocol to the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement 
establishing an Association between the European 
Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and 
the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, of the other part, on a 
Framework Agreement between the European Union and 
the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan on the general principles 
for the participation of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan 
in Union programmes Bilateral 19/12/2012 
Agreement between the European Community and the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan on Scientific and 
Technological Cooperation Bilateral 30/11/2011 
Euro-Mediterranean Aviation Agreement between the 
European Union and its Member States, of the one part, 
and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, of the other part (*) Bilateral 15/12/2010 
Protocol to the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement 
establishing an Association between the European 
Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and 
the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, of the other part, to take 
account of the accession of the Republic of Bulgaria and 
Romania to the European Union (*) Bilateral 30/11/2009 
Agreement between the European Community and the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan on certain aspects of air 
services (*) Bilateral 25/02/2008 
Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters between 
the European Community and the Hashemite Kingdom of 
Jordan amending the EC-Jordan Association Agreement Bilateral 26/09/2007 
Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters between 
the European Community and the Hashemite Kingdom of 
Jordan concerning reciprocal liberalisation measures and 
amending the EC-Jordan Association Agreement as well as 
replacing Annexes I, II, III and IV and Protocols 1 and 2 to 
that Agreement Bilateral 29/01/2006 
Protocol to the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement 
establishing an Association between the European 
Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and 
the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, of the other part, to take 
account of the accession of the Czech Republic, the 
Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic 
of Hungary, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of 
Lithuania, the Republic of Malta, the Republic of Poland, Bilateral 31/05/2005 
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the Republic of Slovenia, and the Slovak Republic to the 
European Union 
Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters between 
the Community and Jordan concerning imports into the 
Community of fresh cut flowers and flower buds falling 
within subheading 060310 of the Common Customs Tariff Bilateral 24/11/1997 
Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an 
Association between the European Communities and their 
Member States, of the one part, and the Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan, of the other part - Protocol 1 
concerning the arrangements applicable to the importation 
into the Community of agricultural products originating in 
Jordan - Protocol 2 concerning the arrangements applicable 
to the importation into Jordan of agricultural products 
originating in the Community - Protocol 3 concerning the 
definition of the concept of 'originating products' and 
methods of administrative cooperation - Protocol 4 on 
mutual assistance between administrative authorities in 
customs matters - Joint Declarations - Final Act Bilateral 24/11/1997 
Regional Convention on pan-Euro-Mediterranean 
preferential rules of origin Multilateral 15/06/2011 
Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the 
Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their 
Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity Multilateral 29/10/2010 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Multilateral 13/12/2006 
International Agreement on Olive Oil and Table Olives, 
2005 Multilateral 29/04/2005 
Amendment to the Basel Convention on the control of 
transboundary movements of hazardous wastes and their 
disposal Multilateral 25/10/2004 
United Nations Convention against Corruption Multilateral 31/10/2003 
WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control Multilateral 21/05/2003 
International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food 
and Agriculture Multilateral 6/6/2002 
Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants Multilateral 22/05/2001 
United Nations Convention Against Transnational 
Organised Crime Multilateral 15/11/2000 
Cartagena protocol on biosafety to the convention on 
biological diversity Multilateral 24/05/2000 
Amendment to the Montreal Protocol on substances that 
deplete the ozone layer Multilateral 3/12/1999 
Protocol of amendment to the International Convention on 
the simplification and harmonisation of customs 
procedures (Revised Kyoto Convention) Multilateral 26/06/1999 
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Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for 
International Carriage by Air Multilateral 28/05/1999 
Rotterdam Convention on the prior informed consent 
procedure for certain hazardous chemicals and pesticides in 
international trade Multilateral 10/9/1998 
Kyoto Protocol to the UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change Multilateral 11/12/1997 
International Plant Protection Convention - New revised 
text approved by Resolution 12/97 of the 29th Session of 
the FAO Conference in November 1997 - Declaration Multilateral 7/11/1997 
Amendment to the Montreal Protocol on substances that 
deplete the ozone layer, adopted at the ninth meeting of the 
Parties Multilateral 17/09/1997 
WIPO Copyright Treaty Multilateral 23/12/1996 
WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty Multilateral 20/12/1996 
Agreement relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 
December 1982 (UNCLOS) Multilateral 28/07/1994 
United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in 
Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or 
Desertification, Particularly in Africa Multilateral 17/06/1994 
Amendment to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that 
Deplete the Ozone Layer Multilateral 25/11/1992 
Convention on biological diversity Multilateral 5/6/1992 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Multilateral 9/5/1992 
Amendment to the Montreal protocol on substances that 
deplete the ozone layer (London Amendment) Multilateral 29/06/1990 
Convention relating to temporary admission (Istanbul 
Convention) Multilateral 26/06/1990 
Basel Convention on the control of transboundary 
movements of hazardous wastes and their disposal Multilateral 22/03/1989 
United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in 
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Multilateral 20/12/1988 
Montreal Protocol on substances that deplete the ozone 
layer Multilateral 16/09/1987 
Convention on Assistance in the case of a Nuclear 
Accident or Radiological Emergency Multilateral 26/09/1986 
Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident Multilateral 26/09/1986 
Vienna Convention for the protection of the ozone layer Multilateral 22/03/1985 
International Convention on the Harmonised Commodity 
Description and Coding System Multilateral 14/06/1983 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) Multilateral 10/12/1982 
Convention on the conservation of migratory species of 
wild animals (Bonn Convention) Multilateral 23/06/1979 
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International Convention for the Protection of New 
Varieties of Plants, as revised at Geneva on 19 March 1991 Multilateral 2/12/1961 
Customs Convention on the temporary importation of 
private road vehicles (1954) Multilateral 4/6/1954 
Constitution of the Food and Agriculture Organisation of 
the United Nations (FAO) Multilateral 16/10/1945 
Source: EEAS 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/searchByCountryAnd
Continent.do?countryId=2137&countryName=Jordan&cou
ntryFlag=treaties.   
 
